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Further Correspondence respecting Turkey

PART XVI.

[**E 3319/14/44**] No. 1.

Anglo-Turkish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal to Foreign Office.—(*Received July* 2.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June* 25, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I have had a short statement prepared showing the decisions and the questions involved in cases which have been heard before the Anglo-Turkish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal during the period September 1927 to the present time.

It has occurred to me that you may care to have a copy for your information.

Copies of the actual judgments have been sent to the Treasury Solicitor.

It will be seen from the attached list that within the last year the following decisions have been given :—

(1.) All claims of deportees to Malta have been either rejected by the Tribunal or withdrawn by the claimants themselves.

(2.) Abstract rights and cash assets do not come within article 65 of the Treaty of Lausanne. Previous decisions confirmed and amplified.

(3.) Debts arising out of pre-war contracts come within article 78 of the Treaty of Lausanne.

(4.) Immovable properties are restored if ownership is proved by title deeds, cadastral registration or other evidence based on official documents. Testimonial evidence is not considered to be sufficient for proving ownership of immovable properties.

(5.) An expropriation of property may be considered to be an exceptional war measure. But if this expropriation has been made *bonâ fide*, for reasons of public utility, such as the widening of streets, and without discrimination as to the nationality of the owners, the Tribunal is not competent to reverse the decision.

(6.) Regarding properties situated in the burnt area of Smyrna, which have been expropriated by a special law passed in 1925, the Tribunal held that its competence is limited to measures taken during the period running between the outbreak of war and the coming into force of the Treaty of Lausanne.

Three Cypriot claims which should have been taken up before the summer vacation have been postponed until next term owing to the illness of the British member.

I have, &c.
R. C. OWEN-WELLS, *British Agent,*
Anglo-Turkish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal.

Enclosure in No. 1.

STATEMENT showing Decisions and Questions involved in Cases heard by Anglo-Turkish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal.

Tribunal No.	Claimant.	Defendant.	Object.	Amount Claimed.	Hearing.	Judgment delivered.	Result from British point of view.	Observations.
181	Edjzadji Mehmed Bey .	British Government	Return of a bag and a valise	..	..	Oct. 10, 1927	..	In accordance with judgment delivered on June 29, 1927, the British Government delivered to claimant his bag and valise. Dispute definitely settled.
256	Heirs of Mahmoud Kiamil Pasha	British Government	Deportee to Malta. Expenses and indemnity	£ stg. 5,390	..	Oct. 10, 1927	..	Claim withdrawn.
390	Turkish Government ..	Hadfield's (Ltd.) ..	Pre-war contract	£ stg. 13,233 6*s.* 8*d.* and £ T. 100,000 gold	..	Oct. 10, 1927	..	Tribunal orders the joinder of the two cases.
68	Hadfield's (Ltd.) ..	Turkish Government						
161	Chirket Hairié	R. W. Hawthorn .. Leslie and Co. (Ltd.) and Lloyd's Bank	Pre-war contract ..	£ stg. 16,500	..	Oct. 10, 1927	..	Case settled by direct agreement between parties concerned. Defendant paid to claimant £ stg. 9,871 17*s.* 6*d.*
212	Alfred H. Midwood and Co. (Ltd.)	Constantine Calfopoulos	Debts arising out of pre-war contract	£ stg. 107 16*s.* 4*d.* and interest	..	Nov. 7, 1927	..	Tribunal orders defendant to produce evidence as to his partnership with his late father and requests Turkish agent to furnish information as to whether defendant inherited from his father a house and the contents of a safe in the Deutsche Orient Bank.
45	N. N. Berouti	Turkish Government	Coal and other goods seized at Jaffa	£ stg. 28,140 and interest	Nov. 5, 1927	Dec. 14, 1927	Lost	Tribunal incompetent. Claimant has not proved his quality of British-protected person. Goods requisitioned; and as they do not exist any more, claimant has no right to proceeds of liquidation.
168	John X. Alexakis (ex British vice-consul at Scala Nuova)	Turkish Government	Restitution of properties of Scala Nuova	.. ..	..	Dec. 28, 1927	Lost	Claimant being a British-protected person of Greek nationality, the tribunal held itself incompetent to deal with the claim of a national of one of the Allied Powers (article 64, paragraph 3).
169	Mrs. Efrosini Alexakis ..	Turkish Government	Restitution of properties at Sokia	£ T. 2,850	..	Dec. 28, 1927	Lost	Tribunal incompetent as in case No. 168 (John X. Alexakis).
64	Eastern Bank (Ltd.) ..	Turkish Government	Compialas and goods seized at Bagdad	£ stg. 86,781 8*s.* 6*d.* and interest	Nov. 1, 1927	Dec. 28, 1927	Lost	Tribunal incompetent (article 65); does not apply to cash assets, but only to properties, rights and interests which still exist and can be identified.
71	Ransomes, Sim and Jefferies (Ltd.)	Turkish Government	Return of guarantee on pre-war contract with the Vilayet of Adrianople	£ T. 9,500	..	Dec. 28, 1927	..	Orders the Turkish agent to furnish information as to the Turkish law on the organisation and financial status of vilayets.
104	Mrs. Rose Dicran Stephen	Turkish Government	Restitution of a depot in Smyrna	..	..	Jan. 4, 1928	..	Tribunal orders the Turkish agent to furnish information as to the alleged measures taken in respect of this property by the municipality of Smyrna.
105	Dicran Stephen.. ..	Turkish Government	Restitution of a house and two shops in Smyrna	..	..	Jan. 4, 1928	..	Tribunal orders the Turkish agent to furnish information as to the alleged measures taken in respect of these properties by the municipalities of Smyrna.
407	Houstafa Abdulhalik Bey	British Government ..	Deportee to Malta. Indemnity and restitution of various documents and a Koran	£ stg. 9,420	..	Jan. 4, 1928	..	Tribunal orders the British agent to inform the court whether the documents and the Koran have been traced.
399	Miss Sarah Bottomley ..	Turkish Government	Restitution of a piece of land at Cocaryali (Smyrna)	£ T. 350 gold	..	Jan. 11, 1928	..	Tribunal orders the Turkish agent to invite the cadastral authorities to state whether the property was transferred to the claimant by the former owner in 1914.
407	Moustafa Abdulkalik Bey	British Government ..	Deportee to Malta. Indemnity and restitution of various documents and a Koran	£ stg. 9,420	..	Jan. 25, 1928	Won	Tribunal incompetent by application of article 135, paragraph 1.
224	Mehmed Izzet Bey ..	British Government ..	Restitution of bail alleged to have been deposited in 1921 for claimant's son	£ T. 1,200 gold and jewellery	Jan. 4, 1928	Jan. 25, 1928	Won	Tribunal incompetent by application of article 137, paragraph 1.
62	David Sassoon and Co. (Ltd.)	Turkish Government	Restitution of compialas and goods seized in Bagdad	£ stg. 27,120 12*s.*	..	Jan. 25, 1928	Won	The only question before the court was whether the tribunal could hear a claim which had not been previously lodged with the competent authorities as provided by article 70. Tribunal decided that it is competent and allowed forty-five days for the defence on the merits.
215	Alfred Midwood and Co. (Ltd.)	Jean Platon Joannidès	Debt arising out of pre-war contract	£ stg. 51 3*s.* 10*d.*	..	Jan. 25, 1928	Won	Defendant condemned to pay to claimant £ stg. 51 3*s.* 10*d.* plus 5 per cent. interest from October 16, 1926, to day of payment and £ T. 25 costs (article 78)

Tribunal No.	Claimant.	Defendant.	Object.	Amount Claimed.	Hearing.	Judgment.	Result from British point of view.	Observations.
212	Alfred Midwood and Co. (Ltd.)	Constantin Calfopoulos	Debt arising out of pre-war contract	£ stg. 92 4*s.* 8*d.*	Feb. 11, 1928	Jan. 25, 1928	Lost	Tribunal held that the debt was incurred by the late father of the claimant, who is not responsible for it. Claim dismissed with costs.
213	Alfred Midwood and Co. (Ltd.)	Cleanthes Hadjopoulos	Debt arising out of pre-war contract	£ stg. 308 8*s.* 2*d.*	..	Jan. 25, 1928	Won	Defendant condemned to pay to claimant £ stg. 308 8*s.* 2*d.* plus 5 per cent. interest from October 16, 1926, to day of payment and £ T. 25 costs (article 78).
214	Alfred Midwood and Co. (Ltd.)	Garabet Arabian ..	Debt arising out of pre-war contract	£ stg. 107 16*s.*	Jan. 11, 1928	Jan. 25, 1928	Lost	Claim dismissed on the ground that defendant was under the impression that the goods were sold to him by M. Economidès and the claimant failed to prove that the latter was acting as their agent.
93	Sylvestro Ellul	Turkish Government	Restitution of a piece of land in Smyrna	..	Jan. 25, 1928	Mar. 7, 1928	Lost	Tribunal incompetent. Claimant failed to produce evidence as to his British nationality.
39	Barrington Tristram ..	Turkish Government	Restitution of a piece of land in Smyrna	..	..	Mar. 7, 1928	Won	Tribunal rejects the plea of incompetence, orders the continuation of the proceedings on the merits by way of production of evidence as to the expropriation of the property and as to the judgment previously given by a Turkish court on this matter.
103	Miss Cathérine Vaféa ..	Turkish Government	Restitution of eight properties in Smyrna	£ stg. 7,000	Jan. 25, 1928	Mar. 7, 1928	Won	Tribunal rejects the plea of incompetence. Five of the properties having been identified. Turkish Government is ordered to report within thirty days as to the remaining three. Judgment as to merits reserved.
48	Mrs. Fortunée Gubbay ..	Turkish Government	Restitution of property at Aleppo	..	..	Mar. 7, 1928	Lost	Case dismissed. Property situated in a territory detached from Turkey; therefore Turkish Government cannot be held responsible for its restitution.
50	Mrs. Pauline Dwek ..	Turkish Government	Restitution of property at Aleppo	..	..	Mar. 7, 1928	Lost	Case dismissed. Property situated in a territory detached from Turkey; therefore Turkish Government cannot be held responsible for its restitution.
75	Matthew Rankin ..	Turkish Government	Restitution of nine properties and machinery in Smyrna and damages	..	..	Mar. 7, 1928	Won partially	Tribunal orders the restitution of the nine properties; dismisses the claim for damages; orders the production of further evidence as to the machinery.
71	Ransomes, Sim and Jefferies (Ltd.)	Turkish Government	Debt arising out of pre-war contract	£ T. 46,618	..	Mar. 7, 1928	Lost	Case dismissed. Contract was entered upon with the vilayets of Adrianople, which is to be a moral person separate from the Turkish Government.
260	Marconi's Wireless Telegraphy Company (Ltd.)	Turkish Government	Debt arising out of pre-war contract	£ stg. 1,807 4*s.* 5*d.*	..	Mar. 7, 1928	Won	Tribunal rejects the plea of incompetence and orders the continuation of the proceedings on the merits of the case.
183	Jewish Colonisation Association	Turkish Government	Restitution of two farms in Panderma and Silivri	£ stg. 10,767 3*s.* 9*d.*	..	Mar. 14, 1928	..	Claim withdrawn.
441	Hourchid Zade Hassan Tahsin	British Government	Arrested during armistice. Furniture looted at Mudania	£ T. 25,000	..	Mar. 14, 1928	..	Claim withdrawn.
354	E. Posselt and Co ..	Gryzagorides Frères	Debt arising out of pre-war contract	£ stg. 66 4*s.* 6*d.*	..	May 9, 1928	Won	Defendant condemned to pay to claimants £ stg. 66 4*s.* 6*d.* plus 5 per cent. interest from October 18, 1926, to the day of payment.
385	Turkish Government ..	Sir W. G. Armstrong, Whitworth and Co. (Ltd.) and Vickers (Ltd.)	Restitution of money paid on pre-war contract	£ stg. 2,000	..	May 9, 1928	..	Claim withdrawn. Defendants paid to claimant £ stg. 2,000.
167	Irma and Amy Joly .	Turkish Government	Restitution of property at Hadjilar (Smyrna)	£ stg. 3,969	May 2, 1928	May 23, 1928	Won	Tribunal competent. Proofs of existence of property admitted. Turkish agent invited to produce cadastral inscription.
123	Sophie Albon	Turkish Government	Restitution of a house in Smyrna	..	..	May 7, 1928	..	Claim withdrawn. Property restored to claimant.
12	Easad Pasha	British Government..	Deportee to Malta. Indemnity and damages	£ stg. 15,000	..	May 23, 1928	..	Claim withdrawn.
413	Anna Georgiades ..	Turkish Government	Restitution of properties at Geuz-Tépé (Smyrna)	..	..	May 28, 1928	..	Tribunal invites the Turkish agent to produce extract of the cadastre register.
143	John C. Georgiades ..	Turkish Government	Restitution of three properties in Smyrna	..	..	May 28, 1928	..	Tribunal invites the Turkish agent to produce extract of the cadastre register.
19	Deelal Bey	British Government..	Restitution of 265 liras gold deposited with Deutsche Palestine Bank	£ T. 265 gold and interest	Mar. 3, 1928	June 9, 1928	Won	Tribunal incompetent. Cash assets deposited with a bank are not considered to be within the meaning of the term "property, rights and interests" as limited by article 65.
104	Mrs. Rose Dicran Stephen	Turkish Government	Restitution of property in the burnt area of Smyrna	..	..	June 13, 1928	Lost	Tribunal incompetent. Property expropriated by the law of April 22, 1925, after the coming into force of the Treaty of Lausanne.

Tribunal No.	Claimant.	Defendant.	Object.	Amount Claimed.	Hearing.	Judgment delivered.	Result from British point of view.	Observations.
105	Dicran Stephen	Turkish Government	Restitution of a house and two shops in the burnt area of Smyrna	..	..	June 13, 1928	Lost	Tribunal incompetent. Properties expropriated by the law of April 22, 1925, after the coming into force of the Treaty of Lausanne.
182	Reginald La Fontaine Whittall	Turkish Government	Restitution of five mines in Zongouldak	Plus £T.345,000 damages	Apr. 21, 1928	June 13, 1928	Lost	Tribunal incompetent. Permits of exploitation of coal mines considered to be concessions (articles 73, 77, 78).
89	John George Pisani .	Turkish Government	Restitution of properties in Kerassunda of various sums collected by defendant and mortgages	£ stg. 78,000	Apr. 18, 1928	June 13, 1928	Lost partially	Tribunal incompetent for restitution of properties expropriated *bonâ fide* for reasons of public utility. Defendant ordered to restore to claimant £T.2,894 collected from various sources. Claim for mortgages rejected for lack of evidence.
103	Miss Catherine Vafea ..	Turkish Government	Restitution of eight properties at Boudja (Smyrna)	£ stg. 7,000	Jan. 25, 1928	June 23, 1928	Won partially	Tribunal orders the restitution of five of the properties and dismisses the claim as to the other three for lack of evidence as to ownership.
116	D. A. Xenos	Turkish Government	Restitution of nine properties at Sevidikeuy (Smyrna)	..	..	June 23, 1928	Won	Tribunal rejects the plea of incompetence on the nationality of the claimant and on article 70, and orders that proceedings should continue on the merits.
119	Mrs. Sophie Coombs ..	Turkish Government	Restitution of a house at Bayarakli (Smyrna)	..	..	June 23, 1928	Won	Tribunal rejects the plea of incompetence on the nationality of the claimant and on article 70, and orders the Turkish agent to produce the extract of the cadastral registration of the property.
160	Mrs. Louisa O. Vedova ..	Turkish Government	Restitution of a property in Smyrna	..	..	June 23, 1928	Won	Tribunal rejects the plea of incompetence on the nationality of the claimant and on article 70, and orders the Turkish agent to produce the extract of the cadastral registration of the property.

[**E 3313/128/44**] No. 2.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received July* 2.)

(No. 312.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June* 26, 1928.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 239 of the 16th May, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a proclamation recently issued by the Inspector-General of the Eastern Vilayets with particular reference to the amnesty declared by the Turkish Government as a result of the law voted on the 9th May.

2. This proclamation would at any time be interesting reading, but it is particularly so now when, as for months past, the outsider is not allowed to glean any tidings as to what is happening east of the Euphrates, for it shows that things are not going as well as they should. The amnesty has obviously not been a great success, almost certainly only a minority of the Kurds transferred to Western Anatolia have, in fact, been re-established in their former homes, and honeyed words are required to encourage the reluctant to submit to the governing authority. The latter has, however, the surprising candour to admit in such a document that any backsliding in the future on the part of the "amnestied" will meet with a punishment corresponding with the magnitude of the offence which is now being pardoned. In face of such an utterance, the future does not inspire confidence, and it is, therefore, hardly surprising that the Minister of the Interior is at last about to make his promised tour in the eastern vilayets in order to take stock of the situation for himself.

3. I have sent a copy of this despatch to the British High Commissioner at Bagdad.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

Enclosure in No. 2.

Aux Vilayets orientaux : Une nouvelle Proclamation d'Ibrahim Taly Bey.

(Traduction.)

L'INSPECTEUR GÉNÉRAL des vilayets orientaux, Ibrahim Taly Bey, a adressé à la population le manifeste suivant :

"Honorables compatriotes !

"La République turque, qui n'a d'autre but que de voir les habitants du pays vaquant paisiblement à leurs affaires, sans chercher à attenter à l'honneur, aux biens et à la vie de ses concitoyens, et former ainsi des foyers heureux et prospères, avait fourni dans sa magnanimité l'occasion aux victimes de l'ignorance et de la naïveté de rentrer dans leurs foyers et de mener une vie paisible et travailleuse.

"Les personnes qui avaient été transférées dans les provinces occidentales sont rentrées dans leurs foyers. Ces personnes continuent à jouir paisiblement de tous les droits et libertés civiques en accomplissant leurs devoirs de citoyens.

"La République turque a décidé, par la promulgation de la loi en date du 9 mai 1928, de ne pas exercer des poursuites contre les personnes responsables d'actes répréhensibles commis durant la période où l'état de siège était proclamé dans ces régions. Les détenus ont été mis en liberté et les coupables qui ont demandé l'aman jouissent actuellement de tous les droits et libertés qui sont l'apanage de leurs concitoyens et vivent en toute liberté.

"En donnant une plus grande extension à la portée de la loi qu'elle avait promulguée à la date du 9 mai 1928, le Gouvernement républicain a publié une autre loi pour la cessation de toute poursuite contre les auteurs de tous les actes répréhensibles commis jusqu'à la date du 30 mai 1928 qui se seraient livrés aux autorités en se rapportant à leur clémence. Par cette loi, notre Gouvernement a voulu prouver son extrême sollicitude et magnanimité envers tous les enfants de la patrie.

"Chers compatriotes,

"Le délai accordé par le Gouvernement pour le pardon de tous ces actes répréhensibles est de trois mois à partir de la date du 14 mai 1928. J'invite par cette proclamation ceux de mes compatriotes qui ne se sont pas encore livrés aux autorités compétentes de s'empresser de profiter de cette occasion pour rejoindre

leurs familles, leurs femmes et enfants, qui les attendent en menant une vie tranquille et en vaquant à leurs affaires et occupations.

"Il importe que tout le monde soit fermement persuadé qu'en obéissant aux ordres du Gouvernement nul ne sera injustement appréhendé, jeté en prison ni puni d'une façon quelconque. Mais il faut qu'on sache aussi que le châtiment pour la moindre désobéissance aux lois sera augmenté en prenant en considération les fautes et actes précédemment commis et pardonnés.

"Tous mes compatriotes doivent s'empresser de profiter de cette nouvelle preuve de magnanimité de notre Gouvernement en s'adressant aux autorités pour régulariser leur situation dans les registres de l'état civil. Ils doivent accomplir les formalités nécessaires pour le classement des dossiers en cours d'examen auprès des tribunaux ou chez les juges d'instruction et cela pour qu'ils puissent complètement se réhabiliter et vivre le front haut et honorablement parmi leurs autres concitoyens.

"On n'a rien à gagner en détruisant sa vie, en ruinant son foyer. Des actes de ce genre ne sont pas dignes d'hommes braves et chevaleresques. Le devoir de tout citoyen turc consiste à léguer à sa famille et à ses enfants le nom et le souvenir d'un chef digne et respecté et cela en rendant des services utiles à sa patrie, à la nation turque.

"Ainsi, au lieu de servir d'instrument aux intrigues d'individus intéressés, tâchez de vous enrichir, de posséder des champs de culture et des logements et de rendre votre famille et vos enfants heureux et prospères. L'action la plus digne qu'un homme puisse accomplir dans ce monde ne consiste pas à ruiner ce qui existe, mais a créer et à bâtir ce qui n'existe pas.

"L'Inspecteur général,
"IBRAHIM TALY."

[E 3314/1223/44] No. 3.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 315.)
Sir, *Constantinople, June 27, 1928.*

A SOLUTION now appears happily to have been reached of a dispute which for some weeks has been threatening to create serious discord in the Turkish-Greek community of Constantinople, and to raise in an acute form the right of the Greek minority to manage and control their own religious and other institutions.

2. As you are aware, the Turkish delegation at Lausanne only agreed to the maintenance of the Œcumenical Patriarchate at Constantinople on the express condition that the administration of the churches and schools was handed over to the Greek community. Since that time such administration has been vested in local and central committees or ephories which are elected by the community for periods of two years. The ephory of Pera, consisting of forty-four local and six central members, had to be filled by election two months ago. According to Greek sources, on election day the local representative of the People's party and other local functionaries appeared at the Panaghia Church where the voting was taking place, and claimed that they were supervising the elections. Actually, it appears that they were present as a cover to certain malcontents of the community who were believed to be in league with Papa Eftim, the Anatolian priest (see Mr. Henderson's despatch No. 821 of the 11th December, 1923), who still controls the two Galata churches which he seized in 1924 and 1926. These malcontents put up two of their number as candidates, and this action, coupled with the Turkish control, so incensed the Greek community that many refused to vote as a protest against the irregularity of the proceedings. But this was not all, for in the evening the police apparently announced that, as voting had not been completed, it should be continued next day. The ballot boxes were thereupon removed to the local police station for the night, during which time further irregularities are alleged to have occurred, and brought back next day, when the voting was completed. The count showed that the two malcontents along with forty-eight others had been duly elected and was forthwith notified to the Vali, who confirmed the election.

3. The result created instant tumult in the Greek community, the appearance on the scene of Papa Eftim was momentarily expected, and the forty-eight, declaring themselves unable to work with "the two," resigned. A deputation went to see the

Vali, and asked that the election should be annulled. That functionary declared the election to have been in order and said he would refer to Angora. Meantime, on the occasion of every service at the Panaghia Church "the two" appeared and sought to perform the duties appertaining to the central ephors. In this they were frustrated by the congregation, consisting mostly of women, and free fights occurred every Friday and Sunday which only ended with the appearance on the scene of the police. "The two" did, however, succeed by dint of forcing the locks in establishing themselves in the central offices, though all efforts to induce the former central committee to hand over registers, documents, cash and safe keys were stoutly and successfully resisted.

4. Such was the position when a fortnight ago an official of the Œcumenical Patriarchate discussed the matter with a member of my staff. That official, who was emphatic that the patriarchate was loyally abiding by its engagements and taking no active part in the matter, was firmly convinced that the Turkish authorities were privy to the activities of Papa Eftim's friends, but felt certain that if only the community remained united—a condition very difficult of fulfilment among the Greeks of Constantinople, especially since 1923—things would straighten themselves out satisfactorily, as the Turks would be unable to challenge a united community on such an issue.

5. In the event his optimism has been justified, for last week the forty-eight ephors repented of their hasty and ill-advised decision to resign, and withdrew their resignations. The result was that on Friday and Sunday last the new ephors, with the two malcontents, were in their places and the services passed off without incident. Thus seems to have been averted something which might have developed into an important issue, and it is to be hoped that it will be a lesson to the Turks not to meddle in matters which are by treaty withdrawn from their control and more particularly, as the Turks are probably incapable of learning such a lesson, to the Greek community of Constantinople that union is strength.

6. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 3341/43/44] No. 4.

Sir P. Loraine to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 3.)

(No. 253.)
Sir, *Athens, June 15, 1928.*

I HAVE the honour, with reference to Constantinople despatch No. 276 of the 6th June, copy of which His Majesty's Ambassador was so good as to send me direct, to inform you that the signature of the Italo-Turkish pact, having been discounted, was received here quietly.

2. There can, I think, be no doubt that the prospect of the immediate return to power of M. Veniselos, which at several moments during the Greek Cabinet crisis, which lasted from the 18th May to the 28th May, appeared highly probable, gave a set-back to the Græco-Turkish discussions. It is, indeed, only natural that in Turkey the return of M. Veniselos to power should inspire misgivings similar to those which the election of Marshal von Hindenburg to the presidency of the German Reich aroused for a time in some of the Allied States. My Turkish colleague has, in private and confidential conversation with me, confirmed this opinion Djevad Bey added, however, that the douche need only be a temporary one, and that Turkey did not necessarily view with alarm the return to power of M. Veniselos. The latter was supple enough to perceive the undesirability of his own person becoming a stumbling-block in the way of a Græco-Turkish rapprochement, and in an interview with the correspondent of "Milliet," which Djevad Bey had himself arranged, M. Veniselos had already given assurances of his solidarity with the foreign policy followed by M. Michalacopoulos, which had been welcomed in Turkish official circles and had been useful in allaying anxiety.

3. It is clear from this and from what is recorded by Sir George Clerk in the same connexion that there is no desire on the Turkish side to make the possible return of M. Veniselos a pretext for shelving the discussions with Greece, and it may be inferred from Djevad Bey's language to me that M. Veniselos is himself persuaded of the desirability of pursuing them.

4. The intrinsic difficulties which have so far blocked the road to agreement still remain, but if the discussions continue, as both M. Michalacopoulos and the Turkish Government evidently intend that they should, on the lines of narrowing down the points of difference, it may be hoped that agreement will be ultimately secured. The moral difficulty appears to be that each side claims sacrifices from the other as a set-off to those which it believes itself to be making; in other words, each side accuses the other of the fault formerly imputed in matters of commerce to the Dutch, of giving too little and asking too much.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's representative at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
PERCY LORAINE.

[E 3421/43/44] No. 5.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 9.)

(No. 325.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July 4, 1928.*

IN my despatch No. 307 of the 21st June last I had the honour to report that the Greek member of the Turco-Greek Exchange Commission had observed that, at the moment of the sudden and, to him, unexpected rupture of the negotiations between the two Governments, the points at issue had been brought down to three, and that there had seemed every hope of an early and satisfactory settlement.

2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is spending a few days in Constantinople on his way to his rest cure near Vienna, was good enough to give me yesterday his account of the situation. Tewfik Rushdi said that nothing would be done during his absence, but that, on his return in the autumn, he was confident that he would not only sign a Turco-Greek pact, but would also get a settlement of the vexed questions of exchange of population and compensation. His Excellency said that agreement had in principle been reached in the discussions between himself and the Greek representative here, but that the political crises in Greece had made it impossible to get any settlement confirmed by the Greek Government, and that therefore the question had had to be suspended until the position in Athens was once more stable. Tewfik Rushdi added that he had no qualms whatever about the return of M. Veniselos to power. He was never frightened of statesmen and dictators—what really alarmed him was youth and inexperience, though to whom this last observation was pointed he did not reveal.

3. I have little doubt that the Minister for Foreign Affairs is sincere in his determination to come to a settlement with Greece, though whether it will be as easy as he seems to think to get the terms he has in mind remains to be seen. Those terms are, briefly, that each Government shall compensate its own nationals for the loss of their property in the other country, and that Turkey shall get the £500,000 as being the party who has to pay most in compensating its nationals. Indeed, his Excellency seems to have certain doubts himself, for he observed that one of the great obstacles in the way of arriving at agreement was that the Greek Government, while recognising the reasonableness of the settlement suggested, had not the strength to give it effect, and could only do so under outward pressure, which the country at large would recognise as having to be accepted. His Excellency therefore counted on the Mixed Exchange Commission, especially now that it had been strengthened by the arrival of M. Vicuna, to pronounce a decision which would have the moral force of the League of Nations behind it, and would be one that Greek Government and people would have to accept and, I might add, though his Excellency did not, the Turkish Government likewise, which would be a considerable help to Tewfik Rushdi Bey.

4. Yunus Nadi, in the "République," continues to attack the Greek Government, but there are reasons to suppose that personal motives play a part in his campaign, for it is generally believed that he and another Deputy and ex-journalist have bought up a goodly number of the Turkish claims cheap and are now trying to secure their profit by frightening the Greek Government with the threat of reprisals on Greek properties in Constantinople into paying high compensation. In any case, the Government paper, the "Milliett," is at pains to explain that there is no question of a rupture in negotiations, but only an unavoidable pause due to Tewfik Rushdi's visit

abroad in search of health and to the political situation for the moment in Greece, and there has been no sign of any application of the law to liquidate Hellenic properties in this country.

5. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 3422/43/44] No. 6.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 9.)

(No. 326.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July 4, 1928.*

I HAVE had the honour in my despatch No. 325 of to-day to report the views on the Turco-Greek negotiations expressed to me by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

2. On that occasion Tewfik Rushdi Bey went on to speak of Turkish foreign policy in general. What he said was on the familiar lines that Turkey only wanted peace and good understanding with its neighbours and the world at large, and that the Pacts of Friendship which he was signing with all and sundry were solely designed to this end. His Excellency felt that this policy, which was sincere, could only conduce to the general good, and ought, in consequence, to meet with general approbation. He was, however, pained to observe that it apparently met with no response from those of whose approval he had felt most sure. It was true that Rome had pronounced itself unhesitatingly in his favour and London had shown a benevolent interest, though his Excellency hinted that it might have been more warmly expressed, but Paris, Berlin and Moscow were silent and Bucharest was, short-sightedly enough, actually trying to hinder the development of good relations between Turkey and Greece. Tewfik Rushdi supposed that the Roumanian Government thought that if the Turco-Greek Pact came into existence, Greece would take a stiffer attitude in her discussions with Roumania's Yugoslav ally, whereas in reality Greece, once she felt herself completely reassured on the side of Turkey, could afford in any negotiations with Belgrade to show a large and generous spirit.

3. I do not quite know why Tewfik Rushdi unbosomed himself to me of this grievance, though I may appreciate it as a mark of his confidence, nor do I quite see why the silence of Paris, Berlin and Moscow should upset him so much. But the grievance is certainly there. With regard to Roumania, Tewfik Rushdi added that the Roumanian Government seemed to have forgotten that it behoved it to remain as aloof from the discussions between Greece and Turkey as the Turkish Government remained in the question of Bessarabia. It was not altogether easy to restrain those in Turkey whose sympathies were with Russia on the Bessarabia question, and it was foolish of the Roumanian Government to risk this moral support being openly given to the Soviet Republic.

4. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ministers at Athens and Bucharest.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 3524/3083/44] No. 7.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir Austen Chamberlain—(Received July 16.)

(No. 337.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July 11, 1928.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 282 of the 12th June on the subject of the Armenian Catholic Patriarchate in Constantinople, I have the honour to report that, according to the local press, the Synod recently held in Rome decided upon the transfer of the Patriarchate to Beirut. It is further stated that this decision has been confirmed by the Holy See. In making this announcement the newspapers point out that by virtue of this decision the seat of the Patriarchate returns to its original home, the first Armenian Patriarchs having resided at Azemma, near Beirut.

2. The Patriarchate here has been officially notified of the decision. The Patriarch, Mgr. Terzian, will continue to reside in Rome, where he will have as his vicar Mgr. Nazlian, former Archbishop of Trebizond and ex-*locum tenens* of the Patriarchate. The Archbishoprics of Trebizond and Marash have been abolished, the incumbent of the latter having been appointed Patriarchal Vicar and *locum tenens* of the Patriarchate at Beirut. Mgr. Rokossian becomes Archbishop at Constantinople, and so head of the Armenian Catholic Church here. Finally, a new Archbishopric has been created at Mardin, and to it has been appointed Mgr. Nisimian, at present in the United States, who will reside at Bagdad.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 3630/708/44] No. 8.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir G. Clerk (Constantinople).

(No. 430.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 28, 1928

THE Italian Ambassador informed me, in conversation on the 18th July, that he had just received an intimation to the effect that the Italian Embassy in Turkey will shortly be established at Angora. His Excellency appeared to indicate that the establishment of the Embassy at Angora was not quite synonymous with residence at that place.

I am, &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 3769/126/44] No. 9.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 30.)

(No. 359.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July* 26, 1928.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 261 of the 28th May last on the budget estimates of revenue and expenditure for the current year, I have the honour to inform you that the actual revenue collected during the financial year 1927–28 amounted, according to official returns, to £T. 204,167,629, representing a surplus of £T. 9,587,075 over the estimate of £T. 194,580,554.

2. The attached tables (Appendix I) showing the difference between actual revenue derived during 1927–28 as compared to the budget estimates for the current year, and (Appendix II) showing the estimates for 1927–28 compared to encashments, are submitted for information.* It will be observed that the customs receipts fell short of estimates by over £T. 4 million.

3. The attached memorandum furnished by the Ottoman Bank, dealing with the question of the continued decrease in customs receipts, may be of interest.*

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 3866/71/44] No. 10.

Mr. Henderson to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received August 4.)

(No. 1324.)
Sir, *Paris, August* 2, 1928.

I HAVE the honour, with reference to this Embassy's letter to the Eastern Department of the 20th July and previous correspondence, to inform you that on the 1st August I signed the protocol providing for the accession of Roumania to the Convention of the 23rd November, 1923, relating to the valuation and reparation of damage suffered in Turkey.

2. A certified copy of the protocol in question is enclosed herein.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

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* Not printed.

Enclosure in No. 10.

Protocole.

LES soussignés, dûment autorisés à cet effet, sont d'accord pour reconnaitre à la Roumanie la possibilité, jusqu'au 1er octobre 1928, d'user de la faculté qui lui a été donnée par le protocole du 23 novembre 1923 de faire procéder à la signature de la convention de même date relative à l'évaluation et à la réparation des dommages subis en Turquie.

Toutefois, il est entendu que le bénéfice de cette faculté est subordonné aux conditions suivantes que le Gouvernement roumain devra avoir préalablement agréées :

(*a*.) La somme destinée à indemniser les dommages roumains ne devra, en aucun cas, excéder 350,000 livres turques or.

(*b*.) Le pourcentage attribué définitivement aux réclamations roumaines ne pourra dépasser le pourcentage attribué aux réclamations des autres Puissances contractantes.

(*c*.) Au cas où le règlement des réclamations roumaines, après le paiement de ce pourcentage, laisserait subsister un reliquat sur la somme de 350,000 livres turques or, ce reliquat restera à la disposition de la commission, qui fera des suggestions relativement à son emploi.

Fait à Paris, le 1er août 1928.

A. BRIAND.
NEVILE HENDERSON.
G. MANZONI.
M. ADATCI.

[E 3892/708/44] No. 11.

Sir R. Graham to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received August 7.)

(No. 569.)
Sir, *Rome, August* 3, 1928.

WITH reference to your despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople No. 430 of the 28th ultimo, I questioned Signor Grandi this morning regarding the proposed establishment of the Italian Embassy at Angora. Signor Grandi replied that the Italian Ambassador in London had been instructed to give you a full explanation. The Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs were finding the present position impossible. No business could be done with the Angora Government through the Embassy at Constantinople, whereas a great deal could be accomplished through the counsellor at Angora. As a result, reports and instructions were passing directly between the Ministry and the counsellor without reference to the Embassy at Constantinople. The Italian Government thought of calling their Ambasador to Turkey "Ambassador at Angora" instead of at Constantinople, and a credit of 20 million lire had been obtained from the Ministry of Finance in order to build a suitable residence for the Ambassador at Angora. But it would take at least two years for the scheme to be carried into effect.

I have, &c.
R. GRAHAM.

[E 3997/9/44] No. 12.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received August 14.)

(No. 371.)
Sir, *Constantinople, August* 4, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of an interesting despatch by His Majesty's consul at Trebizond reporting on a journey which he recently took along the Black Sea coast to Rizeh.

2. The various remarks made to Mr. Matthews in the course of his tour regarding Russia and the prospects of bolshevism spreading in this country are worthy of note. They are especially interesting in view of the reports now current that the Russians are in course of intensifying their propaganda in Turkey.

3. Another point brought out by Mr. Matthews's despatch is the economic depression of the district, due, on the one hand, to the collapse of Russia as a buyer of Turkish produce, and, on the other hand, to the extinction of the Christian population. The native Turk seems to have neither the will nor the ability to take the place of the latter as a producer. The spirit of modern progress seems, indeed, not to have spread very deep into this part of Turkey, where the fez can still be seen, women still go veiled and polygamy continues to be practised.

4. Perhaps, however, the most notable feature of Mr. Matthews's report is the fact that in all his conversations with the native population not one word seems to have been said of discontent with the present régime. This is the more remarkable in that the district was one of the last to take kindly to Mustafa Kemal and all his works, and there are rumours to-day that serious discontent is lying a very short way beneath the surface.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

Enclosure in No. 12.

Consul Matthews to Sir G. Clerk.

(No. 47. Confidential.)

Sir, *Trebizond, July* 7, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to report that, in accordance with the authorisation contained in your Excellency's telegram, No. 8 of the 12th ultimo, I left Trebizond by motor car for Rizeh on the 16th ultimo.

2. A number of bridges between Trebizond and Rizeh were reported to have been carried away by floods caused by heavy rain during the previous week, and the driver of the car which I had originally engaged refused at the last moment to take me. However, I obtained another car which conveyed me as far as Arakli, where it broke down in attempting to ford the Kara-dereh stream just beyond that village, and had to be towed back to Trebizond for repairs. After a wait of several hours, I succeeded in obtaining horses and reached Humurgan, the chief town of the Surmeneh Kaza and now generally referred to as Surmeneh, late in the afternoon of the 16th June.

3. At Humurgan (Surmeneh), a straggling but picturesque little town of 700 or 800 inhabitants, I spent the night of the 16th June. The kaïmakam, Saaduddin Bey, telegraphed at my request to his colleague at Of to enquire whether it was possible to proceed by car to Rizeh, and received in reply a telegram stating that the bridges at Solakli, Baltaji and Kala-Potamos (*sic:* kalos potamos) were completely destroyed, and that the only means of reaching Rizeh was by motor boat.

4. Humurgan was bombarded by the Russians during the Great War, but most of the damage has since been repaired, and the town looked fairly clean and prosperous. Its principal export is nuts, which, I was told, brought in £T. 2,500,000 to £T. 3,000,000 a year. No troops were stationed at Humurgan, but there were a few officers in charge of the recruiting office situated in the ground floor of the municipality, near the landing stage.

5. I was informed that about half of the road from Humurgan to Baiburt had been constructed, and a large, new stone building, which is to be used as Government House, was nearing completion.

6. Shakir Shukri Bey, president of the municipality and representative of the People's party, with whom I had a conversation, told me that he had been wounded by machine-gun fire in the arm and captured by the British forces in Palestine during the Great War. Fortunately, he observed, he was captured by a civilised London Regiment, and not by Indians or Australians. He had been a prisoner of war in Egypt, where, he said, he had been very well treated by the surgeon, a Scotsman, in charge of the hospital to which he was drafted. But for that surgeon he would have lost his right arm. In the course of further conversation he spoke of the damage done to Humurgan by Russian bombardments from the sea, and this led to talk about present-day Russia and to his declaring that the Turks and Russians had nothing in common and were "quite apart." During my short stay at Humurgan, I received the impression that the people, both officials and civilians, were friendly.

7. I left Humurgan in the afternoon of the following day, the 17th June, not by motor boat, as enjoined by the Kaïmakam of Of, but by a motor car, which took me

as far as Solakli-dereh, otherwise the Of River, the wooden bridge over which had been completely swept away. I crossed the river by a ferry boat working on a steel hawser stretched from bank to bank, and after a walk of fifteen minutes reached Of. I had not been in the garden of the Of hotel more than a few minutes when the kaïmakam, Sami Bey, the public prosecutor, the commandant of the gendarmerie and a local merchant, named Numer Effendi, put in an appearance. In the course of a long conversation I learned that the chief export of Of was hazel nuts, that the population of the town was 300 or 400, and of the kaza 70,000, and that the town was very unhealthy in summer, malaria and fever being prevalent. The maize sown in the valley of the Solakli-dereh had been washed away by the heavy rains and floods of the 12th–15th June. There was a fair motor road from Of to Baiburt, and motor cars did the journey in four or five hours. Most of the inhabitants of Of spent the summer months at Evian-Iskeleh, a village on the Humurgan–Of road, a few miles to the west of Solakli-dereh. Sami Bey, the kaïmakam, told me with evident pride that although only three years ago practically every male habitant of Of wore a turban, now one seldom saw a sarikli. He would not admit that the women concealed their faces as strictly as formerly, but thought that legislation was necessary to bring them completely into line with the men. As at Humurgan (Surmeneh), there was a recruiting office at Of. There were no troops at Of and no movement of troops through Of.

8. After spending a night in the filthiest hotel in which it has ever been my misfortune to stay, I left Of on the morning of the 18th June by the row boat of the Of custom-house for the Sadik-zadeh saw-mill, situated on the right bank of the Kala-Potamos River. It interested me to find that, notwithstanding the existence of Turk Ojaks in Humurgan, Of and Rizeh, the Greek name of this river should be retained even in official use. On arrival at the Sadik-zadeh saw-mill, I found that the telephone to Rizeh was not working, but Sadik-zadeh Rushen Bey, one of the owners of the mill, who happened to be on the spot, arranged for the despatch of a messenger to Rizeh to order a motor car. During my four hours' wait, Rushen Bey entertained me better than he knew by talking freely and behaving naturally. He and his brothers, who spring from a family of Rizeh boatmen, made a considerable amount of money during the Great War and the armistice by transporting passengers and goods by motor boat between Constantinople and Black Sea ports. In addition to the saw-mill, they own the Sadik-zadeh line of steamers, and are agents of the Russian Oil Syndicate. Rushen Bey told me that Shukri Kaya Bey, Minister of the Interior, was contemplating a visit to the provinces of the Black Sea, and had recently telegraphed to the Vali of Rizeh that he intended landing there and would require a motor car to take him to Khopah and Artvin. Rushen Bey thought it extraordinary that the Minister of the Interior should be unaware that there was no motor road from Rizeh to Khopah or from Khopah to Artvin. I expressed the opinion that it was extraordinary that his own Department did not inform Shukri Kaya Bey that there were no such roads before he despatched the telegram. Rushen Bey complained that the absence of roads made it difficult for him to obtain supplies of timber for his mill. At present much of the timber that he used was floated down the Kala-Potamos, but that method of transport was precarious and only possible during a portion of the year. He had been thinking of having the timber transported by means of a steel cable from the forests to the saw-mill, but without roads he had found that it would be impossible to have a steel cable set up. He informed me that he exported wood to Constantinople and Smyrna, where it was always in demand. The only other saw-mill in Turkey of which he knew was at Bez-Nuk. The machinery in his mill came from Germany. He did not think that the wooden bridges between Trebizond and Rizeh, which had been carried away by the recent floods, would be replaced for two or three months, but motor cars might be able to get through from Trebizond to Rizeh in a few weeks when the water in the rivers had fallen.

9. Rushen Bey deplored the poverty of the country, and stated that before the Great War the bulk of the trade of the Turkish Black Sea coast had been with Russia. Owing to the conditions prevailing in Russia since the revolution, trade between Turkey and Russia had dwindled and no money was coming into this country from Russia. He was convinced that bolshevism was on the decline, and that Bolshevik propaganda could produce no effect in Turkey. As agent of the Napht Syndicate, he had noticed that bolshevism had changed greatly in the last five years. The Russians had killed or exiled their ablest men, and, in any case, Islam made the Turks proof against bolshevism. I thought of what Sami Bey, the Kaïmakam of Of,

had told me the previous day respecting the changes effected in his district in the space of three years, but refrained from asking Rushen Bey if Islam at present influenced anyone in Turkey except the inarticulate and powerless country people.

10. I arrived at Rizeh by motor car in the evening of the 18th June and put up at the " Yardim " hotel, managed by a certain Shevket Effendi. Mahmud Esad Bey, Minister of Justice, and Izzuddin Pasha, army inspector, arrived the following day by the steamship " Reshid Pasha " of the " Seir-i-Sefain," and were received by the leading civil and military officials, detachments of the 7th Infantry Regiment, which constitutes the garrison, and a military band. Mahmud Esad Bey held a reception at the vilayet on the 19th June, while Izzuddin Pasha inspected as much of the garrison as could be paraded, that is to say, between 600 and 700 men. Two or three hundred men remained in the barracks, which are situated on the coast road to the east of the town and about a quarter of an hour's walk from the vilayet, apparently because they did not possess complete uniforms. For example, many of the men left behind in barracks were wearing shoes of the country with turned-up toes instead of the boots worn by the troops paraded, while others were dressed in torn uniforms or partly in civilian clothing. The troops paraded had with them fifteen to twenty machine guns mounted on mules and horses. The only number on the men's collars was the figure " 7," while a small proportion had no number whatever on their collars. Mahmud Esad Bey motored out to the Sadik-zadeh saw-mill, where he spent the afternoon of the 19th June, and both he and Izzuddin Pasha left Rizeh for Trebizond by the " Reshid Pasha " on its return to Rizeh from Khopah on the evening of the 20th June.

11. A Turkish merchant of Rizeh remarked to me, with reference to Izzuddin Pasha's inspection, that in two or three months another inspection would be made, then a third, and possibly a fourth before the end of the year. If as much attention were paid to the civil administration of Rizeh as to the garrison, things would be very different, he said.

12. The same merchant told me that there was comparatively little smuggling now between Rizeh and Russian ports such as Batum, owing to the Russians having recently hanged several smugglers. The fines and terms of imprisonment inflicted by the Turkish authorities were no deterrent. The chief articles smuggled from Russia were cigarette paper and playing cards, and to Russia cloth of European manufacture. Legitimate trade between Turkey and Russia was small. The Russians prohibited the export of grain to Rizeh, and put obstacles in the way of the import of oranges from Rizeh. Rizeh now imported maize by motor boat from Roumania. The Russians had enquired into the possibility of opening a trade agency at Rizeh for the sale of manufactured goods, such as motor-car tyres, and had decided that it was not practicable to do so. My informant did not think that any natives of Rizeh were Bolsheviks; they knew too well what bolshevism meant. In his opinion, the prosperity of the ports of the Black Sea ended with the death of the Tsar Nicholas. In support of this statement, he said that before the Great War every peasant woman in the Rizeh district carried at least five 20-rouble gold pieces in her girdle, whereas not a woman had one such piece at present.

13. Another merchant, a haji, who performed the pilgrimage to Mecca twenty-two years ago and looked ridiculous wearing a cloth cap with a peak, told me that this country would do nothing until roads and railways had been constructed, and surprised me by adding, in a tone of admiration, that the day after their arrival at Rizeh during the Great War the Russians began road making.

14. Communications with Rizeh by road are bad. Caravans go fairly regularly from Rizeh to Erzerum by way of Ispir, taking two days to Ispir and three days to Erzerum, five days in all. It is intended to construct a motor-car road from Rizeh to Erzerum by way of Ispir, and a survey is being made at present, but no one in Rizeh believes that funds will be available in the near future for the construction of this road. The first 30 kilom. of the Rizeh–Ispir–Erzerum road are at present just possible for motor cars. Pack animals take from a day and a half to two days to go from Rizeh to Khopah by way of Atineh. However, there is no regular service, and it is usually difficult to obtain animals. During my stay at Rizeh the bridge over the Askores River was down, and the river was too swollen for animals to cross. This bridge is the first bridge of any importance on the Rizeh–Atineh–Khopah road.

15. On the 22nd June I visited the gardens of the Agricultural Department, which are laid out on three or four acres of " abandoned " property situated on the slopes of a hill immediately above the town of Rizeh and were formerly the site of a Greek church and Greek houses. The church bell has been hung up in a large tree

near the house of the director of the gardens, a Russian by birth, and is rung several times daily to mark meal hours. Fifteen persons, most of whom are women of Rizeh, are permanently employed as gardeners. Tea plants and mandarin (orange) saplings were planted out in rows in the gardens, which were well kept. Mandarin saplings are delivered gratis to villages which apply for them. The authorities are endeavouring to improve the oranges, which are the principal export of Rizeh, and intend to encourage the peasants to take up the growing of the hazel nut, which is little cultivated east of the Kaza of Of.

16. On the 23rd June I called on Jemil Bey, the Vali of Rizeh, who had been absent at Khopah when I arrived. Jemil Bey is about 40 years of age, stout and heavily built. He is unmarried, and told me that he felt very lonely. He has been at Rizeh about six months, and much regrets his former post at Eskishehr. I advised him to get a wife to look after him, and tried to cheer him up by pointing out that an important frontier province like Rizeh must be more interesting than a railway junction like Eskishehr. Jemil Bey was the first and only native of this country who conversed with me in any language but Turkish during my tour. He spoke French correctly and fairly fluently, but had little to say. His immediate predecessor at Rizeh is at present Vali of Izmit. The only Vali of recent years who did anything to cause himself to be favourably remembered by the people of Rizeh was Khurshid Bey, who was Vali in 1923–24. Under his auspices a sort of triumphal arch and a number of buildings, such as the cinema, club, and the hotel called " Hotel of the Republic," which is at present badly managed and dirty, were built on the sea front, but his chief title to fame is his having started a furniture industry among the inmates of the Rizeh prison, which still flourishes. Specimens of this furniture, made of dried maize fibre plaited and twisted round light wood, are to be found on board the " Seir-i-Sefain " steamships and in most European and better-class Turkish houses along the Black Sea coast.

17. Rizeh has an electric-light installation, which has not yet driven out oil lamps and tallow candles. It functioned on four of the five nights that I spent in the town, chiefly owing to the exertions of Sabri Kaptan, the harbour master, who devotes his spare time to the dynamo, not for remuneration but as an outlet for his energy. Sabri Kaptan told me that twenty years ago he had been stationed on the " Firman " ship at the Dardanelles, and expressed great admiration for all things British.

18. If Constantinople is built on seven hills, Rizeh is probably built on double that number. Most of the houses stand apart, each with its own garden, which makes it difficult to estimate the number of the inhabitants, who, however, probably number between 8,000 and 10,000.

19. The merchant to whom I referred in paragraph 13 above was formerly one of the principal exporters of Rizeh cloth, also known as Trebizond cloth, although manufactured only in Rizeh. He told me that before the Great War this cloth was exported to Syria, Egypt, Mesopotamia and the Hejaz. Now, owing to high customs tariffs, the export abroad had practically ceased. I purchased a roll of 45 arshins of the cloth from him for £T. 5, and propose to send a report, accompanied by a sample of the cloth, to the Department of Overseas Trade.

20. I left Rizeh for Khopah by motor boat on the afternoon of the 23rd June, intending to spend a night at Atineh on the way. Owing to rain and wind storms, I was unable to leave Atineh until the 26th June. During my stay at Atineh I was one morning the guest of the Turk Ojaghi to breakfast, and had a number of conversations with local officials and notables. The kaïmakam, Ahmed Bey, had arrived a month previously from Childirin, in the Vilayet of Kars, where he had been stationed for a year and had lost two of his children in the space of ten days owing to the absence of a doctor and medicine of any kind. He had been five years Kaimakam of Birejik on the Euphrates prior to, and during the first two years of, the Great War, and had known Messrs. Wooley and Lawrence when they were excavating at Charchemiah. He was about 50 years of age and had never held a post out of Anatolia. He was friendly and communicative, and told me that many natives of the Rizeh Vilayet went to Russia in search of work. Most of them were bakers, who found remunerative employment there. Some of them even went as far afield as Moscow, which had a larger population than pre-war Moscow and was suffering from a shortage of houses. Their difficulty was to get their savings out of Russia, as the Russians prohibited the export of money, but they frequently succeeded in clandestinely doing so. There was no scarcity of Romanoff gold pieces and Bank of England notes in Russia to-day, and he wondered how it came about

that the Russians had packets of new Bank of England notes numbered consecutively in the same series. I could only suggest that as gold was liquid and Bank of England notes as good as gold, such notes were bound to find their way everywhere, even into Russia.

21. There are practically no roads in the Atineh district, and the inhabitants are anything but prosperous. The population of the town is about 500, and the chief exports are beans, apples, timber and eggs. The "Seir-i-Sefain" steamers call once a week, weather permitting, on their way to Khopah, and other steamers call occasionally.

22. Ahmed Bey told me that polygamy is still generally practised in the Rizeh and Kars Vilayets, although the law now recognises only one of a polygamist's wives. Atineh, like the other towns which I visited, possessed its depot of the spirit monopoly, where raki and other alcoholic beverages were for sale. However, the consumption of spirits is negligible, and throughout my tour I observed no case of excessive drinking, nor was any such case brought to my knowledge. On the other hand, I was surprised at the number of people who had nothing better to do than to play "tric-trac." The noise of this game was to be heard in the cafés from 5 A.M. to midnight at such out-of-the-way places as Of and Atineh.

23. I had a number of conversations with Fevzi Effendi, a local notable and a member of the Council of the Rizeh Vilayet. Fevzi Effendi, although a Laz and an enthusiastic student of the Laz language, is the representative of the People's party at Atineh. One of his brothers, Zia Effendi, is president of the municipality, while another directs the Turk Ojaghi; indeed, Fevzi Effendi and his brothers may be said to rule Atineh. Fevzi Effendi stated that the Laz language had been extinct in Trebizond since the time of the Turkish conquest towards the end of the 15th century and was dying out in Rizeh. However, everyone in Atineh knew Laz, which was the language of the home throughout all the villages in the district. Fevzi Effendi gave me the derivations of the place names along the coast as far west as Samsun, which, according to him, were Laz and not Greek as I had supposed. The name Atineh came, for example, from the Laz word tin, meaning light, which was possibly connected with the English day, dawn and corresponding words in other European languages. Ma in Laz was an affix indicating the doer and corresponding to the Turkish suffix ji. Thus, the Laz word matin meant the lighter or light-giver.

24. Speaking of the Turkish Government, Fevzi Effendi said that no one pretended that the elections to the Grand National Assembly or to other representative bodies were free at present, and he personally believed that if they were free the result would be confusion. With the spread of education and greater experience there would no doubt be a gradual change in this respect. He did not believe in bolshevism, but stated, as it seemed to me, rather significantly, that this country must have money to enable it to develop and progress. The Atineh district was comparatively prosperous before the Great War. For example, the villages in the Hemshin Nahieh, some twelve hours south of Atineh, had hot springs of recognised value in the treatment of rheumatism and skin diseases, and were formerly frequented every year by visitors from Russia, who spent considerable sums of money during their stay. This source of revenue had now dried up, and the villages in question were falling into ruin and most of the inhabitants had emigrated.

25. The public prosecutor of Atineh told me that he had been a prisoner of war at Ramleh, Egypt, where he had learned a few words of English. He was very proud of this accomplishment.

26. I left Atineh at about 5 A.M. on the 26th June and reached Khopah shortly after 9 A.M. I was unable to arrange to see the kaïmakam, Aghiah Alp Bey, an ex-police official from Constantinople, who has been stationed at Khopah for the last three years, but was interested to hear that he had the reputation of being Russophobe.

27. I had a long conversation with a British subject resident in Khopah, who supplied me with most of the following information: The new customs building situated to the east of the town would be completed in about a month. Some 50 kilom. of the Khopah–Artvin–Kars road had been constructed, but it was unlikely that the road would be finished this year. The old Russian road between Artvin and Kars was still in good order. Pack animals at present took eighteen hours from Khopah to Artvin. The German company, which in the past had worked the Quartzkhaneh copper mine, had offered to construct the road from Quartzkhaneh to Khopah at its own expense on condition that the Turks granted it an extension of

its concession. The Turks did not accept this offer, and although there were still a few Germans at Quartzkhaneh, the mine had been idle for the last eighteen months. When the Khopah–Artvin–Kars road had been made, troops and military stores would be sent to Kars by Khopah instead of by Erzerum and Sari-Kamish as at present. There was a considerable amount of smuggling between Khopah and Russian ports. There were no troops in Khopah, and there had been no movement of troops through Khopah in recent years. There was the usual recruiting office. The population of Khopah does not exceed 1,000, and its commerce is small. During the past year some twenty Mussulmans of Russian nationality, who refused to become Turkish subjects, were expelled from Khopah.

28. I was impressed by the fact that in the country between Trebizond and Khopah the heavy work in the fields and in the towns is performed by women. I was also impressed by the number of able-bodied men to be seen lounging about the streets and in the coffee-houses of the towns and villages with apparently nothing to do. The towns and villages seemed dead, many houses being in a state of ruin and many shops closed. Of and Atineh were particularly depressing in this respect, but what I say applies to all the towns on the Black Sea coast that I have visited from Korasund to Khopah. The effects of the war and the elimination of the hard-working Christian population are sufficient to account for existing conditions.

29. The Turkish Hat and Cap Law is my excuse for the following paragraph: In the towns between Trebizond and Khopah a few men and boys were to be seen wearing the Russian blouse and cap, and one man particularly was most conspicuous walking along the road a few miles from the Of River dressed in that garb and accompanied by a hoja. On enquiry, I learned that he was the officer of the Of Municipality. The women were, as a general rule, closely veiled, and made a great show of veiling their faces, if possible, more closely on the approach of any person of the opposite sex. The dress of the country women is distinctive and simple in the extreme. Over the blouse and baggy trousers or skirt is worn a striped peshtimal, an oblong cotton shawl measuring about 2½ by 1½ yards, in wide blue and bright scarlet lines. This garment plays the twofold rôle of cloak and head covering, for by a deft movement of the hand the face is rapidly hidden from view. The more advanced women are beginning to discard the soft, heelless native shoe and are adopting high-heeled shoes, which must be an almost impossible from of footwear for the stones of the village street. I saw fezes being worn fairly frequently by boys and in a few instances by men, and was informed that many peasants carry their fezes about in their pockets, and on arriving at a safe distance from a town fold up their hats or caps and put on the forbidden head covering, but I have never witnessed the change being made. A small cap, usually brown or white, and shaped exactly like a fez, but with a small turned-up brim, is much affected by the peasants. The higher officials of Rizeh were dressed up in black suits, dress shirts, bowler hats, grey spats and horn-rimmed spectacles on the 19th and 20th June in honour of the visit of the Minister of Justice, and looked, and doubtless felt, most uncomfortable, while less important people were to be seen wearing imitation Scotch and Irish tweed suits, panama hats and grey canvas shoes.

30. I embarked on the "Seir-i-Sefain" steamship "Kara-Deniz," which left Khopah for Trebizond in the afternoon of the 26th June, arriving here in the early morning of the 28th June. The "Kara-Deniz" called at Rizeh, Of and Surmeneh (Humurgan) on the way, although there was very little cargo to load or unload at any of these places.

31. I enclose herewith a diary* showing the time taken between various localities visited during the tour, together with a sketch map.†

I have, &c.
W. D. W. MATTHEWS.

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* Not printed.

† Not reproduced.

[E 4142/128/44] No. 13.

Sir G. Clerk to Lord Cushendun.—(*Received August* 20.)

(No. 384.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, August* 14, 1928.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 312 of the 26th June last, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that, according to an announcement in the press, the Government authorities at Mardin received on the 12th instant the submission of Sheikh Abdurrahim and Sheikh Mehdi, the brothers of the original leader of the Kurdish revolt in 1925, Sheikh Said. In accordance with the terms of the amnesty, these two chiefs have, it is stated, been pardoned and allowed to proceed to their homes in the north.

2. It is hard to judge from here of the importance of this event, but it would seem as if it might be a distinct gain to the credit of the conciliation policy. And if the report is true, it marks an advance in political morals, for in the days of the Sultans people who surrendered under promise of amnesty were usually disappointed in their hopes.

3. Ibrahim Tali Bey, the inspector-general of the southern Kurdish districts, has just been here for a few days, possibly to take the Ghazi's orders about this surrender.

4. In a conversation with the Iraq Chargé d'Affaires, Ibrahim Tali expressed himself as completely satisfied with the Kurdish policy of Iraq, but Sabih Bey tells me that not all the Government—for one, Shukri Kaya Bey, the Minister of the Interior—have the same conviction of the sincerity in intention and in practice of Iraq and of His Majesty's Government, though he believes that the Ghazi himself is convinced of our good faith.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 4143/128/44] No. 14.

Sir G. Clerk to Lord Cushendun.—(*Received August* 20.)

(No. 385.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, August* 14, 1928.

ON the 8th instant there was at last unveiled the monument of the Ghazi to which the Constantinople Municipality has devoted years of desperate effort in clearing a space of worthy dimensions at Taxim in Pera, and in exacting contributions from all and sundry.

2. Of my colleagues, the Italian Ambassador alone was present at the ceremony, the sculptor's Italian nationality having no doubt furnished him with a pretext for observing the practice he has adopted since the signing of the Italo-Turkish treaty, of being at hand on all possible occasions. Signor Mussolini also sent Mustafa Kemal Pasha a telegram of congratulation, receiving a reply slightly less warm in tone.

3. The monument, which is less undignified than might have been expected, represents on one side the Ghazi at the cannon's mouth leading the army to victory, and on the other the Ghazi in the midst of a group of contemporary Turkish statesmen, frock-coated like himself, advancing to "deliver the goods," which must be imagined to be the modern Turkish State.

4. It was perhaps not unnatural that the speeches made on this occasion should have referred to the detested period of the Allied occupation of Constantinople. A Deputy and another unofficial speaker used no measured terms in alluding to the Allies' treatment of the city and its inhabitants, and when the Allies are spoken of in this connexion it is always ourselves who are in mind. It is a fact to be reckoned with that the bitter memories entertained by Turks of all classes of the British military occupation are dying very hard, and that, moreover, they are in some measure kept alive by an annual ceremony in memory of the Turkish sentries who were killed in the first moments of the occupation.

5. But the note chiefly struck by the Minister of Education, who unveiled this monument, and by the other speakers, was eulogy of the Ghazi. It was the Ghazi who had not only delivered Constantinople but made the new Turkey. This is true enough. Indeed, it is so clearly a truism that one cannot help being somewhat struck at each one of the public occasions on which it is pronounced by Cabinet Ministers and others. Only a few days ago, for example, there was a Turkish pilgrimage to the Gallipoli Peninsula, and there the semi-official guide's theme was that the peninsula was the scene of a Turkish—not a German—victory over the proud and strong, and that that Turkish victory was due to the then Colonel Mustafa Kemal Bey. Again, one would have thought that the country had had a sufficient dose of the Ghazi's great speech when it was delivered nearly a year ago. But the semi-official "Milliet" daily treats its readers to extracts therefrom filling many columns and illustrating the Ghazi's forethought, perspicacity, tenacity, and the other qualities with which he has served the country so well, and periodically the newspaper rubs it all in with a leading article.

6. It has evidently been deemed expedient to keep up a constant propaganda on the Ghazi's behalf. It may be that the excesses of his private life, which have unfortunately begun again since his arrival here and are known to everyone, are thought to need setting off in the popular mind against his merits. It may be that this propaganda is meant to counter in some measure such discontent as there is with the present régime.

7. How much this discontent amounts to it is extremely hard to say. In the first place, the Government naturally comes in for odium on account of the present bad times. Turks who have rushed blindly into business and made a hopeless mess of it owing to their utter inexperience, are not going to hold the Government blameless. Peasants who have been encouraged officially to extend their area of cultivation and now find their crops blasted by drought will be equally critical of the Government. However unfair such an attitude may be, the inefficiency of the administration certainly affords some pretext for grumbling. It is said that the minor officials are more insubordinate, rapacious and incompetent than ever. Indeed, the semi-official "Milliet" in a recent leading article admitted that the provincial official (it would be too much to expect it to impute any shortcomings to an official in the capital of the new republic) was very often both incompetent and corrupt.

8. It may be assumed, then, that the Government finds the political effects of the present economic crisis a little embarrassing. But I doubt if they are more serious than that. The Government seems to have as firm a grip over the country as ever. Within the Government itself there seem to have been dissensions which have now blown over. The Ghazi is said to have summoned Fethi Bey from Paris to help him to overcome Ismet Pasha's resistance to certain political proposals of the Ghazi's which the Pasha considered extravagant. But as Fethi Bey preferred his Embassy to the reversion of Ismet's premiership, the Ghazi, so it is said, was obliged to give way to his Prime Minister.

9. Although, therefore, there are rumours of minor changes in the Government, including the perennial report of Tewfik Rushdy's impending retirement, the Government seems solid enough. Nor is there any indication of discontent in the army. The constantly uncertain factor is the Ghazi's health, but here again, I learn, on fairly good authority, that his supporters, feeling that he cannot last more than a year or two, have made all plans for an emergency and are confident of keeping control of the country. The successor in view is said to be either Kiazim Pasha, the President of the Assembly, or more probably Ismet Pasha, and the People's party, which has a strong organisation throughout the country, would be relied on to enforce acceptance of the choice.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 4144/127/44] No. 15.

Sir G. Clerk to Lord Cushendun.—(*Received August* 20.)

(No. 386.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, August* 14, 1928.

IT was announced officially last week that on the 7th instant the Soviet Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs signed at Angora certain minor agreements concerning the Russo-Turkish frontier, namely, renewals of the Pastures Convention and the Traffic Convention, which were originally made at Tiflis in March 1922, and two new agreements, one for the local settlement of frontier disputes and the other, which had been signed *ad referendum* two years ago at Batum, concerning veterinary measures.

2. In spite of these signs of agreement, I learn that the Angora Government is becoming more and more concerned at the effect of Bolshevik propaganda in this country, and that the influence of my Soviet colleague is becoming less and less. The withdrawal of Tewfik Bey from the Embassy at Moscow is interpreted as meaning that the Ghazi not only wanted his old secretary back again, but that he now regards the Soviet régime as of little positive value, whatever its negative importance may be. There is not much doubt that Soviet propaganda has affected a considerable number of Turks, both of the educated and of the lower class, who, if not convinced Communists, are at any rate ready, in these hard times, to make some show of sympathy in return for the largesse of the Soviet authorities.

3. A trial is going on at Angora at the present moment of certain soldiers and others, who are charged with putting up Communist placards in the capital. Details are withheld, but the placards are said to have been directed very plainly against the Ghazi and his Government. At another Communist trial a Turkish doctor and an artisan were sentenced here last week to two months each for being in touch—apparently only to the extent of writing begging letters—with the Central Executive Committee at Moscow, and belonging to a subversive organisation. The lightness of the sentences passed in these cases bears out the view that the Turks are too afraid of the Soviet Government to take more drastic measures. At the same time they are probably even more afraid lest this Bolshevik propaganda, efficiently watched by the police though it is, might result in an attempt on the Ghazi's life.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 4146/18/44] No. 16.

Sir G. Clerk to Lord Cushendun.—(*Received August* 20.)

(No. 388.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, August* 16, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the negotiations between the Turkish Government and the Swedish Railway group reported in my despatch No. 272 of the 30th May last, have now been brought to a conclusion.

2. It would appear that the Turkish Government has decided to retain those financial clauses of the original contract which fixed its total commitments at 55 million dollars. Under the new arrangement, according to press reports, the Swedish group shall first construct the line from Filias on the Black Sea coast, through Zafranbolou and Tchangri to Irmak, on the Kizil River to the east of Angora, and that they shall merely construct as much of the southern line, from the Bagdad Railway to Diarbekir, as will be possible for the money which then remains to them. The period of construction is increased from five and a half to seven and a half years.

3. In order to prevent the group from accepting bonds in future for work which they have not done, the Turkish Government has requested that all bonds received in excess of the value of work actually carried out be returned forthwith, and has decided that future payments will be made only as the work is executed.

4. The revision of this contract after the cancellation of the contract granted to the Belgian groupmakes it of some interest to review the actual position which has been reached in the Turkish Government's scheme for railway construction.

5. The Swedish group have as yet done very little levelling on their northern line, though some progress has been made from Irmak, where 20 kilom. of rails have arrived and will shortly be laid. On the southern line levelling has proceeded from

Keller (on the Bagdad Railway) to Bihisne, but work will presumably be suspended on this line until the northern stretch is completed. This means that the possibility of tapping the Arghana copper region is even further from fulfilment than the connexion of the Eregli and Zongouldak coalfields with the capital, and the new lines take on more and more a purely strategic appearance.

6. The German group of Julius Berger has completed the work of levelling on about half the stretch Kutahia–Balikessir, and rails are already being laid along 120 kilom. No work has yet been done on the other line for which this group is responsible between Boghaz–Keupru (on the Angora line just west of Kaisarie) and Oulou–Kischla (on the main Bagdad line).

7. The contract granted to the Belgian group for the construction of the line Tourhal–Sivas–Kaisarie was cancelled on the 16th January, 1928 (see my despatch No. 39 of the 19th January). Levelling work has been carried out for some 20 kilom. from Tourhal, and at the present moment trains run as far as Zilé, which is 20 kilom. beyond Tourhal and 220 kilom. from Samsoun. A group of Turkish contractors has undertaken to carry the line to Moussakeuy, a further 80 kilom. The Belgian group had levelled some 70 kilom. from Kaisarie, and the Turkish Government are now employing troops to lay the rails on the first section of this stretch, and hope to bring the line to a point about 150 kilom. from Sivas.

8. When the Fox Brothers International Corporation (see my despatch No. 205 of the 25th April) was negotiating with the Turkish Government for the contract for the erection of railway repair shops at Kaisarie, it was suggested that the remainder of the lapsed Belgian contract should be taken over by this society. In view of the financial difficulties left by the failure of the Belgian group and the difficulties which were already appearing in regard to the Swedish agreement, Fox Brothers were unwilling to take over this contract without further compensating concessions. It was therefore suggested that this society should undertake the construction, not only of the section left unfinished by the Belgian group, but also of a line from Sivas to Erzeroum, a line linking the Kaisarie–Sivas line with Malatia, and of the ports of Eregli, Samsoun and Mersina. The *tracé* of these lines is as yet uncertain. It is probable that the junction of the Samsoun line with the Kaisarie line will be at Derikli, 25 kilom. west of Sivas, and that the junction of the Malatia branch with the Kaisarie line at Hanili 35 kilom. south-west of Derikli. The total distance of line necessary to connect Samsoun with Sivas and Kaisarie is about 210 kilom.

9. The route of the line Sivas–Erzeroum will probably pass north of Divrik and through Erzindjan, a total distance of about 460 kilom., but as the line is purely strategic and the General Staff is extremely suspicious of foreign visitors, none of Fox Brothers engineers have as yet been allowed to survey the line.

10. The Hanili–Malatia branch is some 225 kilom. in length, but unless Fox Brothers also take over the construction of the sections of the Keller–Diarbekir line left uncompleted by the Swedes, this Malatia branch will be left in the air. In any case, if Fox Brothers obtain their contract they will thus assume responsibility for the construction of some 900 kilom. of normal-gauge line. The estimate amount of the contract is 180 million liras. It is expected that cost of construction will average not less than 100,000 liras per kilometre, while, on the basis of the revised figure at which the Swedish group estimated the harbour construction at Eregli, the three harbours should cost approximately 30 million liras, a total of some 120 million liras actual expense.

11. There is yet no information available as to the condition of the contract, but my informant is confident that an agreement will shortly be reached. It is certain that the Turkish Government is most anxious to avoid entering into a third contract which will later have to be cancelled or revised. It is extremely suspicious of any phrasing of the slightest ambiguity, and weighs anxiously each word of the proposed contract. Fox Brothers, on the other hand, seem by no means sure of their financial position. They are naturally slow to take over the responsibility of the old Belgian group and so risk being involved in the numerous lawsuits to which its failure has given rise. At the same time, although able to profit to a large extent by the experience of others, they are still being asked to contract for work in country and in conditions which must remain largely unknown to them until the work is well begun.

12. On the other hand, it is reported that the Minister of Public Works is determined to push the matter through. There is serious opposition in the Assembly, headed by the Deputy for Eski-Chéhir, himself a contractor—which realises that Turkish credit is weak, and that money from abroad can only be obtained at high rates of interest. It maintains that large sums would be saved if railways were built out of income, and

would patriotically prefer that the money which will yearly leave the country should fall into Turkish rather than into foreign pockets. Such an opposition may prove awkward to face when the Assembly reopens and Behidj Bey is anxious to be able to present them with a *fait accompli*, and to assure them that in spite of the trouble caused by the Swedish group, fresh contracts have been made to carry unceasingly forward the important work of opening up darkest Anatolia by railway.

13. Whether this contract, if successfully signed, will prove more durable than the other two seems to me doubtful. The actual sum for railway construction budgeted for by the Minister of Public Works is 29 million liras. The present annual charge in respect of thie 178 million lira bonds already covered by the Belgian, Swedish and German groups amounts to 20,750,000 liras for the next five years.

14. It would, therefore, appear necessary to find fresh revenue if Fox Brothers are to be paid by bonds in the same way as the Swedish group. I confess that I see no source whence further revenue can be derived. It looks indeed as if Turkey was nearing the point after which no further construction can be done out of income, and that this ambitious scheme for the construction of utterly unprofitable railways is doomed to failure unless the contractors are prepared to grant a loan to the Turkish Government.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

[**E 4293/560/44**] No. 17.

Sir G. Clerk to Lord Cushendun.—(*Received August* 28.)

(No. 391.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, August* 22, 1928.

IN my despatch No. 268 of the 29th May last I reported that the first step towards the introduction of European characters had been taken by the passing of the law which ordained the use of European figures in all Departments of State, though, owing to an error in the press telegram making the announcement, the date of the change was given as this summer instead of 1929. In any case, the press already uses European figures, the Constantinople municipality proposes to bring them into official use next month, and they will be in general official use next summer.

2. It had been supposed that the introduction of European characters would not be accomplished for at least five years. But the leading spirits of Angora, who during this summer weather are all scattered in pleasanter haunts at Constantinople, Smyrna and elsewhere, are devoting some of their leisure to a determined effort to speed up the innovation. As one of them said to me the other day, no one is going to bother to learn the new letters if he thinks there are five years ahead before they can be forced on him, but everyone will try to learn them if he thinks he will be obliged to use them at the end of only two years. The word has therefore gone forth that the new alphabet will be in official use in two years.

3. Every kind of publicity is being given to the subject. Every day newspapers publish a few paragraphs in the new alphabet, whether it be a well-known poem or a saying of the Ghazi's. One paper has already started a prize competition in the new writing. Courses have been opened by the university, the Press Association, the training colleges and the Turk ojaks. But the greatest impetus has been given to the movement by the Ghazi himself. He describes the new letters not as "European characters," but as "the new Turkish characters." He declares that the Turkish mind has been held by the Arabic characters as in a vice. It is everyone's duty, therefore, he says, to help to speed the new Turkish letters, and the papers publish facsimiles of his own writing in the new style. A class has been started for Cabinet Ministers and others who frequent him at Dolma Bagcheh Palace, and at dances and other gatherings where he appears in public the Ghazi has developed an awkward trick of singling an individual out and asking him how he is getting on with his new lesson. Those who were present at the naval regatta last Friday must have observed that the President's yacht now has her name inscribed thus—"Ertogrul"—on her stern, and the more old-fashioned of them may have shuddered to think that that same vessel was built to the order of Abdul Hamid, the originator of pan-Islam.

4. It is characteristic of local methods that, although the new letters are being advertised like this, the precise form of the new alphabet has not yet been finally and officially settled. From the philologist's point of view the work has been pretty well

done so far. The general principle is to have one letter for one sound. No new letters have been made, but certain of the usual letters are put to unusual uses or given diacritical signs. The language might have been reproduced not too clumsily by being spelt as if it were French, but, it is interesting to note, one of the reasons for avoiding this procedure was the desire to avoid increasing French cultural influence. No doubt that decision has caused keen disappointment to the French Embassy. For the foreign world in general there is some satisfaction in the thought that it may soon be possible to make out the names of stations and other useful signs which are at present exhibited with the most rigid exclusiveness in Arabic characters only.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

[**E 4364/4000/44**] No. 18.

Sir G. Clerk to the Earl of Balfour.—(*Received September* 3.)

(No. 396.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, August* 28, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to transmit, with reference to my despatch No. 376 of the 8th instant, a further despatch from Mr. Morgan upon the subject of the Smyrna police. The state of things prevailing there seems to have impressed the Minister of Justice, Mahmud Essad Bey, during a recent visit of inspection, for he has declared with some emphasis that the reform which his Ministry is now going to embark on is that of the prison system of the country. This reform has been overdue for long, and it may be wondered whether, if Mahmud Essad Bey succeeds in introducing into prison life the monotony of cleanliness, order and isolation, he will not make it a much more serious deterrent.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

Enclosure in No. 18.

Consul-General Morgan to Sir G. Clerk.

(No. 63.)
Sir, *Smyrna, August* 20, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to report that the campaign against the police referred to in my despatch No. 59 of the 4th August to your Excellency is still proceeding.

2. Saadet succumbed to her wounds, and her assassin, Police Inspector Aladdin, was committed to prison. He has since unsuccessfully made application to be released on bail, and declares that his life is in danger, as the majority of his fellow-prisoners owe their incarceration to him.

3. That his fears are not unfounded is proved by the fact that on two occasions during the present month pitched battles have taken place between the prisoners in the Central Prison of Smyrna. The ringleaders of the first fight were men condemned to long terms of imprisonment, and knives were freely used. The result of an hour's fighting was that two men were seriously wounded. The second fight produced three casualties. The local press deduces from these incidents that there is some disorganisation in the police administration.

4. The police authorities are beginning to show signs of resenting criticism of their methods. A lawyer named Eumer Fuad, having rashly stated that certain clients of his had been beaten in April last at a police station, is at the present moment standing his trial at the instance of the chief of police. The latter has deemed it necessary to make a tour of inspection of all the police stations in Smyrna, and the public has been glad to learn that the inspection has brought to light a serious irregularity in one of the stations, where the chief of the station was found to be wearing clogs.

5. It must on the whole be considered a good sign that the press is free to indulge in criticism of the police and that it exercises its privilege.

I have, &c.
JAMES MORGAN.

[E 4466/1223/44] No. 19.

Sir G. Clerk to Lord Cushendun.—(*Received September* 10.)

(No. 404.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, September* 4, 1928.

WITH reference to Sir A. Chamberlain's despatch No. 352 of the 19th June last, I have the honour to report that the Turkish press has recently announced with much satisfaction a favourable verdict given by The Hague Court on the point submitted to it by the Mixed Commission for the Exchange of Populations. This decision, following upon that given in the "Lotus" case last year, may be hoped to incline this country towards the settlement of disputes by arbitration, and more particularly by The Hague Tribunal.

2. The question at issue arose out of a dispute regarding the interpretation to be given to article 4 of the final protocol annexed to the Athens Agreement of the 1st December, 1926. According to that article, "any questions of principle of importance which may arise in the Mixed Commission in connexion with the new duties entrusted to it by the agreement signed this day, and which, when that agreement was concluded, it was not already discharging in virtue of previous instruments defining its powers, shall be submitted to the President of the Græco-Turkish Arbitral Tribunal, sitting at Constantinople, for arbitration. The arbitrator's awards shall be final."

3. The question arose whether such questions of principle could be submitted to the single arbitrator by either of the Governments direct or only by the Mixed Commission itself. The Greek Government took the former view, hoping in this way to be able to get at any rate some points settled over the head of the Mixed Commission, whose record in the matter of settling even the simplest disputes is frankly deplorable. The Turkish Government, on the other hand, stoutly upheld the right of the commission to decide whether a question should be referred to the arbitrator.

4. The Hague Tribunal, as I have already stated, upheld the Turkish point of view. I learnt, however, from Greek sources some weeks ago, that since the arrival of the new Chilean member of the Mixed Commission, M. Vicuna, the question had assumed less importance in Greek eyes, since M. Vicuna, unlike all past and present members of the commission, had a mind of his own, and could take a definite line on questions under discussion and even impose it upon his colleagues. If this be so, there may be a hope that in the coming year the commission may at last begin to settle some of the questions it was set up to deal with.

5. Meanwhile, the press reports that the Italian representatives, both here and at Athens, are busy endeavouring to bring the two countries together, and the not unfavourable comments in the Turkish press upon M. Veniselos's electoral success may indicate that the Turkish Government is hopeful of being able to conclude some amicable settlement with Greece in the not too distant future.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 4467/708/44] No. 20.

Sir G. Clerk to Lord Cushendun.—(*Received September* 10.)

(No. 406.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, September* 5, 1928.

WITH reference to Sir A. Chamberlain's despatch No. 262 of the 2nd May last, I have the honour to report that the Comte de Chambrun, the newly-appointed French Ambassador, arrived here towards the end of July.

2. As M. Daeschner, the Comte de Chambrun's predecessor, only left Turkey a few days before the President of the Republic came down from Angora to spend the summer on the Bosphorus, the question of the presentation of his successor's letters of credence became one of considerable importance in French eyes. The Ghazi steadfastly refuses to acknowledge the official existence of Ambassadors and Ministers in Constantinople or anywhere except at Angora, and let it be clearly understood that he had no intention of interrupting his holiday by a special journey to Angora for the purpose of receiving Comte de Chambrun. On the other hand, the French Government, having the Syrian frontier and other rather urgent questions to discuss with Turkey, wished their new Ambassador to enter upon his functions as

soon as possible. I understand, therefore, that Fethi Bey, the Turkish Ambassador to Paris, was very emphatically told by the Quai d'Orsay that when he came here for the Afghan visit he must make his Government understand the importance of arranging for the early reception of the new French Ambassador. Fethi Bey, on his return to Paris, seems to have said quite definitely that he had arranged a plan whereby the Ghazi would "happen" to be in Angora in the early days of July and would take the opportunity of receiving Comte de Chambrun and the new Persian and Afghan Ambassadors and the new Polish Minister. On the strength of this assurance Comte de Chambrun arrived, only to find that the Ghazi had no intention of going to Angora until the autumn.

3. The situation threatened to become a little difficult, for the French thought that their prestige was suffering by the presence of an unaccredited Ambassador awaiting the Ghazi's pleasure, while, on the other hand, the French Government was presumably reluctant to increase the slight tension over Syria by telling Comte de Chambrun to leave the country until the date of his reception was fixed. Fortunately, my American colleague pointed out the common-sense way in which a similar situation, which is not infrequent, is dealt with in Washington, and the solution was applied as soon as Tewfik Rushdi returned from his cure. It has now been arranged in agreement with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that, while awaiting his reception by the President of the Republic, Comte de Chambrun is recognised by the Turkish Government as having entered into official relations with it and as having taken over the direction of the French Embassy.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 4469/127/44] No. 21.

Sir G. Clerk to Lord Cushendun.—(*Received September* 10.)

(No. 408.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, September* 5, 1928.

IN my despatch No. 386 of the 14th August last I had the honour to report on a certain uneasiness which appeared to be discernible in Russo-Turkish relations. Shortly after that date the reciprocal exports and imports agreement was renewed as between the two countries. Although Russian exports to Turkey had fallen, Turkish exports to Russia, it was cheerfully announced, were to be allowed up to the previous maximum. But this renewal of the agreement has been far from stopping all friction. There have been bitter complaints in the press at the treatment accorded to Turkish traders in Russia who seem to have tried to evade the Soviet restrictions on the remittance of funds abroad and then to have been dealt with severely by the Soviet authorities.

2. From Trebizond Mr. Matthews reports the announcement by the local governor that in retaliation for the confiscation of Turkish properties in Russia the properties of Soviet nationals in Turkey are to be sequestered. A first step in this direction has actually been taken by the official sale at auction of the house occupied by the French consul, but as the Soviet national who owned it was by race a Greek, perhaps too serious an inference should not be drawn.

3. Arrests of persons suspected of Communist sympathies and activities continue —half a dozen here, one near the Russian frontier, two workmen who were charged with distributing pamphlets and collecting money at Angora. Mr. Matthews also reports that several officers are under arrest at Sarikamish for selling military documents. I have now been shown a copy of the manifesto mentioned in the last paragraph of my previous despatch as having been placarded at Angora. It announces the sixth congress of the Third International and calls on the Turkish Communist party—which, of course, cannot be said to exist—for support. It describes the Angora Government as imperialists who prostitute the word "people," the Grand National Assembly as *bourgeois* parasites, and the Ghazi, though it does not mention him by name, as an intolerable *bourgeois* dictator. This, of course, is about as near blasphemy as one can get in this lay republic. It may explain the rumour—for which I cannot vouch—that my Soviet colleague recently distributed the sum of 500,000 dollars amongst the great ones of Angora.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 4471/560/44] No. 22.

Sir G. Clerk to Lord Cushendun.—(*Received September* 10.)

(No. 410.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, September* 5, 1928.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 391 of the 22nd August, I have the honour to enclose a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Trebizond reporting that there, too, the movement for the spread of the new alphabet is in full swing. Mr. Matthews mentions that the interest of the inhabitants is in proportion to the difficulty they anticipate in learning the new letters. On the other hand, one hears of enthusiasm being aroused here and there among the illiterate by the Ghazi's asseveration that people who in all their lives have never been able to master the Arabic script will be able to acquire the use of the new Turkish letters in a few months.

2. The campaign is going on vigorously. The Ministry of Justice and even the Department of Religious Affairs have started courses of instruction in the new alphabet for their staffs. Tewfik Rushdi Bey declares that the correspondence of his department will shortly be conducted in the new characters. Members of the popular party are bidden to special courses at Dolma Bagcheh Palace, and prisoners at Smyrna try to melt the heart of the Minister of Justice by presenting him with petitions addressed to the Ghazi in "Turkish" letters.

3. But the chief propagandist has continued to be the Ghazi himself. Crossing the Marmora in his yacht, he has paid surprise visits to Rodosto and Brussa, appeared at the Government offices there and lectured the officials about the alphabet. At Rodosto he went into a chemist's shop and invited a priest to write a sentence in Arabic. No one could read it. The Ghazi then wrote the same Arabic sentence in the new script and everyone—of course—read it with ease. The wireless was then called into play to describe from his yacht at midnight the Ghazi's indignation with someone who wrote to enquire what was to become of the Arabic texts displayed in mosques. Such individuals, declared the Ghazi, must be rank fools not to realise that the introduction of the new script was the will of the people. Mustafa Kemal himself, or anyone who sought to resist it, would be crushed, and, with that tacit warning to any who might be inclined to resent the imminent disappearance of Arabic from Moslem worship, the wireless station was told it might close down for the night.

4. On the 1st and 2nd instant the Ghazi visited Chanak and the Gallipoli battlefields and town. Again he addressed the officials on the subject of the alphabet, and his reminiscences of historic events on the peninsula were reproduced in the press largely in the new characters. So the campaign goes on, but the minorities may have seen cause for anxiety in a recent leading article of the semi-official "Milliet," which said that with the removal of the barrier constituted by the old Arabic letters the assimilation of all racial elements would be easy and there would be nothing to warrant Greeks, Armenians and Jews in Turkey making use of their own languages any more.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

Enclosure in No. 22.

Consul Matthews to Sir G. Clerk.

(No. 64.)

Sir, *Trebizond, August* 27, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to report, for your Excellency's information, that the Ghazi's pronouncement at the Serai-Burnu Gardens, Constantinople, in favour of the use of the Latin alphabet was not unexpected here, and that the interest which it has excited is in like ratio to the inconvenience which it will cause to those of the inhabitants who, by the nature of their calling, are obliged to know how to read and write.

2. The local press and most motor cars have been using the new "international" figures instead of the old Arabic figures since the beginning of June last. Motor cars are now changing "Tirabzon" on their name plates from Arabic into Latin characters, while the local Turkish newspapers, "Yeni Yol" and "Tijaret Gazetasi," write a few sentences in each issue in the new characters.

3. The local "Turk Ojaghi" is organising classes to teach the new characters, and the Vali has asked the Ministry of the Interior for a supply of 50,000 copies of the new official alphabet.

4. A Mussulman of Baku, with whom I had a conversation to-day, informed me that the Latin characters had been successfully used by Moslem newspapers of the Soviet Caucasian republics for more than two years. He also informed me that the Minister of Public Instruction of Azerbaijan, who is a Mussulman, had recently prohibited modern dances like the "Charleston" as immoral, although such dances were approved by the Government in other portions of the Soviet Union.

I have, &c.
W. D. W. MATTHEWS.

[E 4561/71/44] No. 23.

Sir W. Tyrrell to Lord Cushendun.—(*Received September* 17.)

(No. 1547.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated the 13th September, respecting the accession of Roumania to the convention of the 23rd November, 1923, relating to the valuation and reparation of damage suffered in Turkey.

Paris, September 14, 1928.

Enclosure 1 in No. 23.

French Ministry for Foreign Affairs to British Embassy, Paris.

LE Ministère des Affaires étrangères a l'honneur de faire savoir à l'Ambassade de Grande-Bretagne que la Roumanie vient d'adhérer à la convention du 23 novembre 1923 relative à l'évaluation et à la réparation des dommages subis en Turquie, et cela aux conditions prévues dans le protocole signé à Paris le 1er août 1928.

Pour répondre au désir exprimé par le Chargé d'Affaires de Roumanie à Paris, le Ministère des Affaires étrangères a l'honneur de faire parvenir, ci-joint, à l'Ambassade de Grande-Bretagne une copie certifiée conforme de la communication par laquelle M. Cantacuzene a notifié au Gouvernement de la République l'adhésion de son Gouvernement à la convention précitée.

Paris, le 13 *septembre* 1928.

Enclosure 2 in No. 23.

M. Cantacuzene to M. Briand.

Légation de la Roumanie, Paris, le 10 *septembre* 1928.

M. le Président,

EN me référant à la correspondance échangée au sujet de l'accession de la Roumanie à la convention du 23 novembre 1923 concernant l'évaluation et la réparation des dommages subis en Turquie, j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence que je suis spécialement chargé par mon Gouvernement de notifier au Gouvernement de la République que la Roumanie adhère à la convention susmentionnée et accepte les conditions prévues dans le protocole du 1er août 1928 et qui sont les suivantes :

1. La somme destinée à indemniser les dommages roumains ne devra, en aucun cas, excéder 350,000 livres turques or ;
2. Le pourcentage attribué définitivement aux réclamations roumaines ne pourra dépasser le pourcentage attribué aux réclamations des autres Puissances ;

3. Au cas où le règlement des réclamations roumaines, après le paiement de ce pourcentage, laisserait subsister un reliquat sur la somme de 350,000 livres turques or, ce reliquat restera à la disposition de la commission, qui fera des suggestions relativement à son emploi.

Conformément à ce qui précède, je vous serais reconnaissant, M. le Président, de prendre acte de l'adhésion de la Roumanie et de bien vouloir en faire part aux Gouvernements des Puissances signataires de l'accord qui fait l'objet du protocole du 1er août 1928.

Veuillez, &c.
Le Ministre plénipotentiaire,
Chargé d'Affaires de Roumanie,
B. CANTACUZENE.

[E 4662/128/44] No. 24.

Sir G. Clerk to Lord Cushendun.—(*Received September* 24.)

(No. 426.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, September* 19, 1928.

ON the 11th instant Ismet Pasha, accompanied by the Minister of Health, left Angora on a tour through Cæsarea and Sivas to Malatia, the chief town of his own constituency. There, on the 13th, he delivered a long speech reviewing all the aspects of Turkish policy. On the subject of internal administration he claimed, with some justice, that all was quiet, and that in maintaining this happy state of affairs the Government did not have to employ any abnormal tribunals.

2. Turning to foreign affairs, Ismet Pasha remarked that the policy of the Government was a straightforward one, namely, to preserve the country's independence in any circumstances which might arise and to avoid being drawn into any "intrigues" against a third Power—not, he added, that any overtures of this kind had been made to the Government. True to its policy of promoting mutual understanding, the Government had made treaties with Afghanistan, Persia and Italy. The latter instrument had done much to dispel unfounded suspicions and to increase friendship. A treaty of arbitration, non-aggression and neutrality was being negotiated with Bulgaria. With Greece, Turkey had no serious political difference, but she could not remain indifferent to the losses of her citizens. For his part, he would do all in his power to effect the settlement which a recent friendly letter from M. Veniselos now encouraged him to hope for. Relations with Russia continued to be cordial. With Great Britain relations were normal—they were good. France was the Power chiefly concerned in the public debt settlement which cost Turkey such sacrifices. As regards Syria, the Government only wanted a real and a stable frontier. He would not deny that they had been perturbed by events on the Syrian frontier. They had in the higher political sphere no differences with France, and he hoped that the new French Ambassador would be disposed to settle the question quickly. Relations with Germany, Japan and other countries were good. The Government had decided to sign the Kellogg Pact because it exactly fitted in with the Turkish Government's ideals, more particularly since Mr. Kellogg had himself interpreted it as not affecting the right of self-defence.

3. Ismet Pasha then dealt with economic affairs. He repeated that the Government had no intention of borrowing. They had vivid recollections of the disastrous consequences of foreign loans. They had got on very well without foreign money so far, and—he added, with an optimism which all will not share—their railway programme would be finished in a few years. Next year they were going to start on a £T. 100 million programme of works designed, firstly, to stop floods from devastating agricultural land, and, secondly, to irrigate it. While he wished his hearers to realise that "credit" was not an inexhaustible supply of money available for anyone to finance his own schemes, he was able to tell them that they would have a State bank in a year and that the Government was going to deal drastically with present methods of usury which, he truly observed, were rank robbery. The Government was also going to take steps to stabilise the currency and to prevent spending abroad.

4. The Pasha's peroration was devoted to the new alphabet. The whole movement, he said, was a campaign against ignorance. The object was none less than to make every individual able to read and write. Thus alone could the full development of later generations be assured. In this campaign against established tradition the Ghazi himself was going about like a village teacher and the whole country had been turned into a schoolroom.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 4759/560/44] No. 25.

Mr. Edmonds to Lord Cushendun.—(*Received October* 1.)

(No. 437.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, September* 27, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to report that, leaving behind him a gracious message of farewell for the inhabitants of Constantinople, the Ghazi, accompanied by his particular friends, set out on the 14th instant by way of the Black Sea for Angora. He chose this route in order to add a fillip to the propagation of the new letters. After touching at Sinope he was met at Samsoun by Ismet Pasha and the Minister of Health, and the whole party travelled by rail and car viâ Amasia, Tokat, Sivas and Cæsarea to Angora, where the customary ovation had been prepared. At each place the Ghazi's black-board was set up in the market-place, and he lectured the people about the new alphabet. At Sivas, it is reported, the mayor's 6-year-old son wrote without a mistake, while the Ghazi taught a totally illiterate butcher to write his name in ten minutes, thereupon adjuring him to teach all the other butchers in the town; 1928 is, therefore, likely to be regarded as an *annus mirabilis*.

2. The authorities state that 56,000 adults learnt to read and write the old Arabic characters in 1927. They are convinced—and rightly—that the new alphabet will make the rate of progress very much quicker. Fifteen thousand teachers are being trained to teach the new letters. Text-books are being printed for immediate use. A new dictionary, it is confidently announced, will be turned out in a few weeks. In Constantinople alone 200 class-rooms have been opened for teaching the new alphabet. At a word from the committee of the Popular party Deputies have left the comfort of their homes in Constantinople and Smyrna and, in imitation of their chief, are touring their unfamiliar constituencies in order to stimulate the new movement. The Ghazi is being still more closely identified with it. The new letters are called the Ghazi's alphabet. He replies in person—by telegram—to someone who suggests that the prescribed use of the letters "g" and "k" is less perfect than it might be, that the alphabet is fixed for ever. A few days previously he has himself decreed the abolition of the newly prescribed hyphen as a help to the unlearned. No accessible part of the country feels secure from a visit of examination by the Ghazi, and so intense has been the propaganda in general that official departments are now announcing the introduction of the new writing for the first of next month.

3. Amongst other departments the Directorate of Religious Affairs has made this announcement, presumably with a certain malicious glee, for it is easy to imagine the consternation of the priests, who depend on this Directorate for their monthly pittance. The public in general has come to realise that the introduction of the new alphabet is a much more serious affair than the imposition of the hat. The Turkish parent sees that his child will grow up unable to read the Koran unless it be translated into Turkish and transcribed into the new characters. He sees also that the priests who are still authorised to officiate are, as a class, likely to take unkindly to the new alphabet. It is plain that in the result there will be a further diminution of religious influence. The children who grow up unable to read Arabic characters will be subject at most to the influence of such religious books as the Government may permit to be put into the new writing, and of such priests as may be modern enough to qualify for teaching the books approved. It is small wonder that among the uneducated there are absurd rumours afloat about the Ghazi intending to pervert the whole country to Christianity.

4. It is not generally known, but it appears to be a fact, that some time ago the Ghazi thought of building a mosque near his house at Chan Kaya, where a modernised form of worship could be practised. He was dissuaded from the project by his friends, who felt it to be premature. But some idea of what he had in mind can be gained from the recommendations of a commission which sat at the university here this summer to consider adapting the forms of Moslem worship to modern conditions.

Pews and music were to be introduced, ablutions dispensed with, boots and shoes admitted, and the liturgical language was to be Turkish. The commission even ventured into the domain of dogma, and suggested that the whole interpretation of Moslem scriptures should be overhauled in the light of modern science and philosophy. Suddenly the rector of the university issued an official denial that any such scheme was under consideration, and no more has been heard of the matter. It cannot, however, have been forgotten by the people, and no doubt the official intention is to proceed with it whenever the moment is felt to have come. It is to be ascribed not so much to a silly desire to make Turkey appear modern as to an honest conviction that religion as practised in Turkey has been a bar to the country's progress.

I have, &c.
W. S. EDMONDS.

[E 4854/708/44] No. 26.

Sir G. Clerk to Lord Cushendun.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 444.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, October 4, 1928.*

IN my despatch No. 406 of the 5th September last, I had the honour to report to your Lordship the arrival of the new French Ambassador in Turkey and the difficulties he had experienced in entering officially upon his functions. The Ghazi having now returned to Angora, M. de Chambrun has at last been able to present his letters of credence and the formal ceremony took place on the 28th September. Copies of the speeches exchanged on this occasion, as reported in the semi-official "Milliet," are enclosed herein.*

2. When M. de Chambrun paid me his first official call after his provisional recognition by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as reported in my despatch referred to above, he said that he was happy to think that the relations between the French and British Governments had never been so close as they were now, and he had every confidence that he and I would work together in the same spirit; nevertheless, he continued, since France had not the good fortune of England to possess a continuous foreign policy, he felt that in his relations with the Turkish Government he must infuse more "cœur"—which I took to be M. de Chambrun's method of discounting any doubts that might possibly arise subsequently in my mind owing to the warmth of his Excellency's assurances of the unique affection of France for Turkey, and to the thought that perhaps his intensive pursuit of Turkish affection might not really conduce to our common interests. It was therefore with little surprise that I read the cordial language of the speeches exchanged between his Excellency and the Ghazi, or the declaration of the Ambassador to the Constantinople journalists on his return from Angora that Angora was the heart of Turkey and that the French Embassy must forthwith be established there. Incidentally, I venture to observe that, with Italy prepared to spend over £200,000 on building an Embassy in Angora (see Sir R. Graham's despatch No. 569 of the 3rd August), and the intentions of France as now announced by M. de Chambrun, it becomes more than ever politically important for the credits of our more modest building estimates to be granted in the next budget.

3. How far M. de Chambrun will find the Turks prepared to respond is another matter. They know the value of words as well as anyone, and their new-found friendship with Italy—a friendship which the Italians lose no opportunity to emphasise—will tend to make the Turkish Government more intractable in its negotiations with the French. The Ghazi did indeed reply in equally cordial terms to M. de Chambrun's speech, but it was significant that the semi-official "Milliet" should have chosen the particular day on which the ceremony took place to devote its leading article to the woes of Syria under foreign occupation, and to the need of that suffering country for a Mustafa Kemal. The "Milliet" has, indeed, since published a further article eulogising France in general and her new Ambassador in particular. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether the Turks will be induced by flattering words alone to give way to the French thesis on the Syrian frontier question.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

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* Not printed.

[E 5053/1223/44] No. 27.

Sir G. Clerk to Lord Cushendun.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 453.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, October 18, 1928.*

THE energy which, as foreshadowed in my despatch No. 404 of the 4th September last, M. Vicuna, the new neutral member, has brought to bear on the problems of the Græco-Turkish Mixed Exchange Commission has involved that body once more in acrimonious discussions. Together with the then president, M. Holstad, M. Vicuna drew up a scheme for hastening a solution of the questions with which the commission has so long been dallying. To anyone unversed in the intricacies of these questions, the proposals seem only designed to give immediate effect to existing agreements about "établis" and the restoration of property or compensation therefor. But the fact that the scheme was welcomed as admirable by the Greeks lends some colour to the contention of the Turks that it left much to be desired on the Turkish side. In any case, it brought the third neutral member, General De Lara, hastening back from leave to enter violent and comprehensive protests.

2. According to the view of the Greeks, the chief merit of M. Vicuna's scheme is that it embodies what they claim is an old Græco-Turkish decision, namely, to interpret the term "établi" without any reference to an individual's intention to reside. This, the Greeks claim, affects some 20,000 Greeks here. The Turks, on the other hand, say that they are not greatly concerned whether a few thousand more or less Greeks remain in Constantinople. The reason why they object to M. Vicuna's report is, they say, that it overlooks the failure of the Greek Government to restore the properties of Moslem owners or to provide compensation instead. They aver that they are perfectly ready to restore the properties here of absentee Turkish Greeks as soon as the Greek Government respects the rights of the Moslem proprietors. The fact at the bottom of the whole tangle seems still to be that the Turks, knowing that the Greeks are largely unable to implement their various undertakings to restore, press their right to compensation in order to secure for their impoverished treasury as much as possible of the £500,000 earmarked by the Greeks. In short, it is a question of haggling.

3. For the moment the commission has decided to send a delegation to Western Thrace to enquire on the spot into a situation which the Greeks say it has full cognisance of, while the Turks say it has been neglected. That any progress will necessarily be made on the delegation's return does not appear. Hope seems to lie rather in the forthcoming Græco-Turkish negotiations, for which my Greek colleague is about to obtain M. Veniselos's instructions in Athens. A suggestion has been made in the press that Turkey should obtain transit facilities at Dedeagatch, but I cannot say whether the Government seriously desire any such concession. As regards Ismet Pasha's invitation to M. Veniselos, the press at first announced the Greek Premier's acceptance, but it now only speaks of the probability of his visiting Angora to sign a pact. From the Greek delegate on the Mixed Commission I understand that there is, at any rate, no possibility of M. Veniselos going to Angora unless a settlement is first reached of the problems arising out of the exchange of populations.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK

[E 5054/5054/44] No. 28.

Sir G. Clerk to Lord Cushendun.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 454.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, October 18, 1928.*

THE tram strike which has just come to an end here was hopefully described by the local press as a sign of approaching industrial maturity. The company, a Belgian concern, felt in August that trouble was brewing and consulted the authorities. The Government were concerned at the possibility of the tram company

making concessions to its employees which might eventually necessitate similar concessions to employees of the State railways costing more than a million Turkish pounds per annum. But what alarmed the Government still more was the prospect of successful subversive activities. They therefore promised the tram company support in fighting the strike, and they were as good as their word.

2. Some 2,000 men came out on strike on questions of pay and hours. The company at once improvised a tram service under police protection, and managed to extend it so quickly that the public were not greatly inconvenienced. The strikers held meetings, at which they were careful to cheer the republic and seem never to have mentioned communism. They received contributions from one or two workmen's unions, but at the end of a week they put their case in the hands of the Government, and in the result the old terms have been maintained and the company will take back only those employees it pleases.

3. There is little doubt that the agitation was provoked from without. The men do not seem to have been seriously underpaid and overworked. Two well-known Turkish agitators were found to have had a hand in the affair, and, although no proof has been disclosed, the natural inference is that its ultimate origin was Moscow. The Turkish Government, anxious as it is not to offend Russia, in controlling the press and affording police protection, took no overt action which could be construed as more than neutral. But in doing only that much it knew well enough that it was enabling the company to gain that decisive victory over subversion which it was so anxious to secure. The episode is, therefore, a not uninteresting illustration of Angora's present attitude to Moscow.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 5215/16/44] No. 29.

Consul Monck-Mason to Lord Cushendun.—(*Received November* 1.)

(No. 87. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Aleppo, October* 23, 1928.

WITH reference to Mr. Consul Hough's despatch No. 90 of the 17th September, 1926, relative to the prohibition of the entry of foreigners into the Turkish provinces east of the Euphrates, I have the honour to report that Turkish policy has not changed in this respect.

2. The technical staff of the Bezanti–Alep–Nissibin and Prolongements Railway Company have always been allowed, however, to travel into that part of Turkey on their lawful occasions, being provided with a special "vessika" or circulation permit by the Turkish Military Commissioner of the railway line. The railway company at Aleppo has now been officially notified by the Turkish Military Commissioner that the Angora Government will shortly close the frontier of the region in question to all members of the railway technical staff not of Turkish nationality, for political reasons.

3. This unexpected order, which will immobilise hundreds of the railway staff, has created an embarrassing situation, and the case has been reported to the headquarters of the Bezanti–Alep–Nissibin and Prolongements Railway Company in Paris with a request that diplomatic action be taken.

4. The Turks are strengthening their military frontier posts in the provinces east of the Euphrates, ostensibly with a view to dealing more severely with the Syrian contraband traffic.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople, His Majesty's High Commissioner, Bagdad, and to His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut, Damascus and Mersina.

I have, &c.
A. MONCK-MASON.

[E 5124/126/44] No. 28A.

Sir G. Clerk to Lord Cushendun.—(*Received October* 24.)

(No. 51. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, October* 24, 1928.

YOUR telegram No. 68.

There are three methods of granting financial assistance to Turkey. Broadly speaking, these are as follows:—

1. Issue of a loan in London or elsewhere on guarantees such as tobacco monopoly revenue or customs revenue. I personally consider that neither guarantees nor Turkish credit are sufficient encouragement for anything of the sort in London, and Turkish Government have steadily rejected in public any idea of such foreign loans.
2. Foreign capital helping private Turkish enterprises to develop such things as mines, agriculture or forestry. Turks would probably insist on retaining control of such enterprises, and even if, with this handicap, they were successful, Turks would probably find some way of squeezing foreign shareholders out of their profits.
3. Advance of money by banks or private syndicate for the development of public works, such as railways, harbours, reclamation of waste lands, and so on. This seems to me the only form of financial assistance that we might possibly encourage, on condition that material, machinery and expert labour needed from outside should be furnished by us. Moreover, any advance should be made in successive stages as the particular work progresses, and should be met by short-term Turkish bills. This is, roughly, the system in force in actual case of railways now being constructed, and to some extent limits the risk of loss.

I only know one relatively safe form of commerce with Turkish Government. It will pay for things it really wants, such as printing machinery for Latin characters, and especially material for Ministry of National Defence. Here we have to meet our foreign competitors, usually backed by their Governments and big banks, with the added handicap that, as regards arms, the Turks prefer, *ceteris paribus*, to deal with the small Powers.

On the other hand, it is certainly desirable to show readiness to assist Turkey financially on proper conditions, and I would keep an open mind until we know more what the Turks are after. Your telegram does not say what is the nature of the mission proposed, but if and when more is known of the scheme, I would certainly encourage the idea of a British mission coming here and studying conditions on the spot.

Besides the public debt and the Constantinople loan, there has been very unsatisfactory treatment of the telephone company, quay company and the Aidin Railway. I think that if negotiations look like taking practical shape, the Turks should be made to realise that until these and such-like cases are cleared up, His Majesty's Government find it very difficult to encourage investment of further British capital in Turkey. I do not, however, suggest that a settlement of these three cases should be made a *sine quâ non* of any financial assistance. No doubt the Bank of England would find an opportunity for insisting on a settlement of the Ipranossian case, but Turkish reluctance to settle pre-war claims and to execute the judgments of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal might also be mentioned as affecting the opinion of the good faith of the Turkish Government held by His Majesty's Government.

[E 5151/20/44] No. 28B.

Sir G. Clerk to Lord Cushendun.—(*Received October* 27.)

(No. 52.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 27, 1928.

DEPUTATION of British Chamber of Commerce has just called to present protest on behalf of all British claimants against reported intention of Reparations Commission in Paris to consider inclusion of claims by concessionary companies.

British Chamber of Commerce have no direct evidence of such intention, but their information is confirmed by Italian and French Chambers of Commerce, and it is feared that once such claims are admitted by the commission for consideration by Paris commission, who are a completely independent body, it will be difficult to get decision reversed. For this reason deputation begged me to telegraph to your Lordship to ask that protest may at once be lodged in Paris.

Deputation pointed out that not only is consideration of admission of claims by concessionary companies definitely and formally excluded by article 6 of the Reparations Convention of 23rd November, 1923, but that these claims, if admitted, would leave little or nothing for legitimate claimants. Apart from some advances from the Treasury, claimants have been waiting ten years for payment, failure to obtain which has inflicted great hardship on many British subjects, and ruined or crippled many British business interests.

[E 5266/1223/44] No. 30.

Sir P. Loraine to Lord Cushendun.—(*Received November* 5.)

(No. 406.)

My Lord, *Athens, October* 24, 1928.

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople has been so good as to forward me a copy of his despatch No. 453 to your Lordship of the 18th October, on the subject of the difficulties subsisting between Turkey and Greece in connexion with the exchange of populations, and I have the honour to submit the following observations in that connexion.

2. I fully agree with the opinion expressed by Sir George Clerk that the solution of these difficulties is far more likely to be found by direct negotiation between the Governments of Angora and Athens, than by the cumbersome and hitherto mainly ineffective activities of the Græco-Turkish Mixed Exchange Commission.

3. I am reliably informed that the invitation extended by Ismet Pasha to M. Venizelos was one to visit Angora after M. Veniselos's recent tour to the capitals of Italy, France, Great Britain and Yugoslavia. I understand that the answer returned by M. Veniselos was distinctly friendly and conciliatory in tone, and was to the effect that a visit at the moment suggested by Ismet Pasha would not be opportune, but that he hoped it would be so on a later occasion. The reasons given by M. Veniselos were that he had already been absent from Athens for a longer period than he had anticipated and that pressing work awaited him in the Greek capital which required his immediate attention. Furthermore, that he himself was not fully acquainted with the ramifications of the Græco-Turkish difficulties and that if he came to Angora with an incomplete knowledge of his subject, it could hardly be expected that any useful or definite results could be obtained. On the other hand, I gather, he cordially welcomed the spirit in which Ismet Pasha's invitation had been addressed to him and expressed genuine anxiety to reach a settlement of the difficulties which separated the two countries, and to place the relations between them on a solid and friendly basis.

4. My Turkish colleague tells me that, in his opinion, the logic and good sense of M. Veniselos's reply are unassailable; he has not yet had time to study the whole case and it is most desirable that he should do so personally. Djevad Bey contends that one of the main obstacles to a settlement hitherto has been the uncompromising and even grasping attitude of the Greek technical bureaux. He regards the fact that the Greek Prime Minister has already brought the Greek Minister at Angora to Athens, where his predecessor at Angora, M. Tsamados, is Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and has already had a conference, assisted by these two gentlemen, in order to get at the root of the difficulties, as favourable evidence of the sincerity of M. Veniselos's intentions. He himself believes that the only effective way of dealing with the subject is to reach an agreement on as many points as possible by direct diplomatic conversation, and then to endeavour by direct contact between M. Veniselos and the Angora Government to bridge over the remaining points. He admits that, for the sake of reaching agreement, sacrifices will have to be made on both sides, but he evidently expects that the Greek sacrifices will have to be somewhat heavier than those of his own country. The argument which he uses to defend this point of view is that Greece, especially because she has a considerable merchant marine, whereas Turkey has practically none, stands to gain far more than Turkey from the development of commercial and economic relations between the two countries.

5. Djevad Bey did not conceal from me his opinion, which, indeed, I share, that the best chance of a Græco-Turkish settlement lies in its achievement by M. Veniselos himself. Should M. Veniselos fail, he regards the outlook as dismal indeed for the future relations of the two countries.

6. I have myself formed the impression that M. Veniselos is absolutely sincere in his desire to reach a definite settlement with Turkey, and I am optimistic enough to think that his personal energy and skill will succeed in overcoming the considerable obstacles which have in recent years blocked the way to a Græco-Turkish understanding.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
PERCY LORAINE.

[E 5258/12/44] No. 31.

Sir G. Clerk to Lord Cushendun.—(*Received November* 5.)

(No. 462.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, October* 27, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 557 of the 1st instant, requesting my observations on the Board of Trade's letter of the 24th September, relative to the proposed new commercial treaty with Turkey.

2. Your Lordship asked for observations in particular in regard to (*a*) the expediency of attempting to conventionalise any part of the Turkish tariff in the new treaty, and (*b*) the scope of the suggested consultation between my commercial secretary and his foreign colleagues. I propose to take the latter point first.

3. It was never intended by Colonel Woods that our draft treaty should be submitted to his colleagues for discussion before it was presented to the Turkish Government. His idea was merely, subject to your Lordship's concurrence, to ascertain how his colleagues would view the suggestion that the Powers interested should join together to invite the Turkish Government to start negotiations for its commercial treaties, and, further, to propose that the Turkish Government should be asked for a statement of its general tariff policy and for a copy of the new tariff which would form the basis of discussion.

4. As I explained in my despatch No. 366 of the 2nd August last, the object of this suggestion is (1) to place the onus of any delay in starting the treaty negotiations upon the Turkish Government, and (2) to avoid giving the impression that we are holding up our negotiations until we see what concessions other Powers are able to secure. I realise that in a question of this sort the maintenance of a united front bristles with difficulties, but I think that we should make this our aim as long as we can, for all foreign Powers stand to gain by acting together, at least until the broad lines of Turkish commercial treaties are laid down.

5. As regards the question of attempting to conventionalise any part of the Turkish tariff in the new treaty, we have to bear in mind what the Turkish Government is probably aiming at in its new tariff. Its objects may be taken to be increase of revenue and protection and encouragement of native industries. It is therefore likely that the imports which will be hit hardest by the new tariff will be luxuries and such manufactured articles as the Turks are now trying to produce themselves, while raw materials and manufactured articles which are not likely to be produced in Turkey for some considerable time may be subjected to comparatively low rates of duty. Moreover, it is fairly safe to anticipate that the new Turkish tariff will have maximum and minimum rates for every article of importation. Obviously, our foreign competitors will endeavour to secure the minimum, or even lower, rates for their chief articles of export into Turkey, and they are generally in a better position to bargain than we are. They will also try to obtain general most-favoured-nation treatment. Our power to make tariff concessions to Turkey is limited, and my own impression is that to attempt to conventionalise any part of the new Turkish tariff would not only be waste of energy but might actually make our position more difficult. I would therefore base our negotiations upon most-favoured-nation treatment only, not as a concession from Turkey but as a matter of course. There is, however, no reason why we should not have a list of articles on which we desire special rates of duty, as the course of negotiation may show that the Turks realise both our value as a market for such things as mohair and carpets, and the fact that the importation at low rates of duty into Turkey of many of our manufactured articles, which Turkey cannot hope to produce herself for many years to come, will assist the development and prosperity of the country. I would accordingly venture to suggest that the Board of Trade should be asked to draw up a list of such articles, for use if circumstances seem favourable.

6. To return to the question of the actual opening of negotiations, I am of the opinion that, once we have formally invited the Turkish Government to start discussions, we stand to gain if the other Powers go ahead of us in their negotiations. Reports are contradictory as to the intentions of the Turkish Government itself. One rumour is that the Turkish Government wish the first negotiations to be with Italy, and would be ready for them to take place in Rome. Another report is to the effect that the Turkish Government wishes to open negotiations with the United States of America first of all, while the French commercial secretary hopes that the French negotiations will be held in Paris and the German commercial secretary is in favour of his discussions taking place at Angora. These points will become clear

in due course, and I will only observe that if the Turks are willing to negotiate in Rome and in Paris, there would seem considerable advantage in getting them if possible to negotiate with us in London.

7. The Board of Trade further raise the question of the Residence Convention, and are of opinion that we should be well-advised to endeavour to include in the treaty all the questions of establishment covered in our ordinary commercial treaties, at the same time renouncing our rights under the Lausanne Residence Convention. From the practical point of view I welcome this proposal, because the sooner we know the conditions under which British subjects will be able to reside in Turkey the better. Moreover, if we can propose to the Turkish Government a draft commercial treaty modelled upon our treaties with great Powers and including articles dealing with residence, business, consulates, &c., it would probably be easier to negotiate than a separate residence agreement, though, presumably, the other principal signatories to the Lausanne Residence Convention ought to be notified, if not consulted, before we inform the Turkish Government of our willingness to give up our rights thereunder. I would accordingly suggest that any draft treaty which the Board of Trade prepares should include clauses to cover these points.

8. As I read the letter of the Board of Trade, it is not intended that such matters as schools, hospitals, release on bail, &c., should be included in the commercial treaty. It would in many ways be more convenient if we could have one general comprehensive agreement including all these matters. But if this is not feasible, either for technical reasons or because the Turkish Government would not be willing to include such matters in the commercial treaty, we should, I think, endeavour to negotiate on these separate points *pari passu* with the negotiations of the commercial treaty. Whether the resultant agreement should be in the form of a treaty or of an exchange of notes is perhaps of less importance.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 5378/43/44] No. 32.

Sir G. Clerk to Lord Cushendun.—(*Received November* 12.)

(No. 472.)

My Lord, *Angora, October* 31, 1928.

DURING my stay here to attend the annual celebrations of the birth of the Turkish Republic, I have had interviews with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the President of the Council.

2. In neither case had I any outstanding questions of importance to discuss. The Minister for Foreign Affairs evolved an ingenious argument for refusing to accord to Palestine the benefits of the Commercial Convention attached to the Treaty of Lausanne, on which point I am addressing a separate despatch to your Lordship, while my interview with Ismet Pasha was mostly devoted to an effort to save the Constantinople golf course, on which the local soldiery have cast envious eyes.

3. I should, therefore, not have troubled your Lordship with this report were it not that I feel that I should record the remarkable cordiality and friendliness shown by both Ministers. They both—Tewfik Rushdi especially—emphasised their irritation with the French attitude in Syria, an attitude which, they said, compared most unfavourably with our loyalty in Iraq, and this frame of mind may account to some extent for their expressions of goodwill, but otherwise I believe that both the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister were genuinely trying to voice their pleasure at the satisfactory development of the relations between the two countries. At any rate, there was no hint of what they said being gratitude for possible favours to come. Having in mind your Lordship's telegram No. 68 of the 22nd October, I gave both Ministers an opening to show any desire for credits in London, but neither of them breathed a word in that sense.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 5382/127/44]

No. 33.

Sir G. Clerk to Lord Cushendun.—(*Received November* 12.)

(No. 479.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, November* 6, 1928.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 408 of the 5th September last, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Trebizond reporting upon Russian activities in his consular district.

2. The penetration of North-Eastern Anatolia by Russian consular and commercial agents, where Russian residents are conspicuously absent and trade insignificant, is no doubt part and parcel of the aims and methods of the Soviet Government in the Near East. Whether the results in North-Eastern Anatolia are successful appears from Mr. Matthews' despatch to be doubtful.

3. The Turks are always ready to give outward expression to their love for Moscow. Thus, though the Ghazi made scant reference to Turkish relations with Russia in his speech to the Assembly on the 1st November, the semi-official "Milliet" came out two days later with a leading article written by its editor emphasising the happy relations of the two countries and the fact that their maintenance and development was one of the essential principles of Turkey's foreign policy. Similarly, the local press has made much of the fact that M. Souritz took the opportunity of Independence Day to send his card with congratulations to all the Deputies of the Assembly, and has expressed itself as touched by the delicacy of the Soviet Government in ordering the demolition of a monument at Sebastopol commemorating the conquest of the Crimea, perhaps not realising that this action was probably due more to hatred of Great Britain than affection for Turkey. Moreover, Yunus Nady, the editor of the "Jumhuriet," has been devoting a number of articles to a visit he recently paid to Moscow, where he was, according to his own account, received with every mark of friendship and respect by MM. Rykov, Litvinov, Karakan and others, and whence he returned full of praise for the present Russian régime. But all this largely is lip service, while Yunus Nady's venality and anti-British sentiments being alike proverbial, it is unnecessary to attach exaggerated importance to his utterances. Turkey owes much to Russia and cannot afford to offend the Soviet Government, but bolshevism has no more determined opponents than the Turks.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

Enclosure 1 in No. 33.

Consul Matthews to Sir G. Clerk.

(No. 82. Confidential.)

Sir, *Trebizond, October* 22, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to transmit the following observations on Russian activities in this district :—

2. The Russians have at Trebizond a consulate-general, the official staff of which includes, in addition to Comrade Ettingoff, the consul-general, an interpreter and three secretaries. The members of the staff live together with their wives and children in a large building in the centre of the town, belonging to a Russian subject of Greek origin named Theophylactes, who is believed to reside in Constantinople. In summer they move into the former summer residence of a Russian subject named Kapayanides, which is situated in the suburb of Souk-Su on a hill to the south-west of the town. They have also a trade delegation, directed by a Russian subject named Sgoroff, who has a staff of two clerks of local origin but of Russian nationality. The Russians maintain a consulate-general at Erzerum, which is at present in charge of a consul named Martsinski, assisted by an interpreter and two secretaries, as well as a trade delegation, the staff of which consists of three Russians and a Persian. They have a consulate at Kars, and are believed to have a consulate or vice-consulate at Artvin. At Samsun they have a trade delegation, but no consulate at present. They are stated to be desirous of opening a consulate at Khopah, and to have considered the question of establishing a trade delegation at Rizeh and decided not to do so.

3. The imposing consular and commercial "representation" of Russia in North-Eastern Turkey makes other countries look small. The Persians have a consulate-general at Erzerum and a consulate at Trebizond, the French have consulates at Trebizond and Samsun, while we, the Italians and the Germans have each a consulate at Trebizond. The Russians have to-day a more numerous body of official consular and commercial representatives in this region than they had before the Great War. This appears all the more remarkable, as prior to the Great War other countries such as the United Kingdom and France had consulates at Erzerum. At present, Russia and Persia are the only countries officially represented in that town, while Russia is alone in having consular representatives at Kars and Artvin.

4. Apart from the staffs of the Russian consulates and trade delegations there appear to be no residents of Russian nationality in this district. There are considerable numbers of residents of Russian origin but now of Turkish nationality, the great majority of whom are Moslem refugees from the Caucasus, the remainder being White Russian refugees.

5. The Russian revolution brought trade between Russia and this part of Turkey almost to a standstill. During the last few years trade has somewhat revived, but it is still insignificant as compared with pre-war trade. Mineral oils, cement and hay are the chief imports into this district from Russia. Efforts have been made to introduce other commodities, including manufactured goods, but although long credits have been granted by the trade delegations little business has been done. Attached hereto will be found a table, supplied by the Trebizond Chamber of Commerce, giving Russian imports into Trebizond during the period from July 1927 to the end of April 1928. Since March last two Russian merchant steamships, the "Odessa," of about 1,000 tons, and the "Troujenik," of 342 tons, have visited Trebizond several times a month. The "Odessa" has carried cargoes of oil, and has excited interest locally through having a mixed crew of men and women. The exports to Russia from this district, consisting mainly of fruit from Rizeh and Gumush-khaneh, are small.

6. Local residents, both foreign and native, believe that the Russian consular and trade representatives in this district are engaged chiefly in espionage and the diffusion of Soviet propaganda. Such activities are no doubt carried on principally underground, but indications that they exist are not lacking.

7. It is known that some seventy Turkish subjects resident in this district receive monthly or quarterly remittances from Moscow through the Ottoman Bank. There is reason for thinking that these remittances are in the main *bonâ fide* contributions to their relatives or dependents from Turks who have proceeded to Russia in search of work. At the same time, there is little doubt that some of these remittances represent salaries paid to Russian agents.

8. Last spring a Communist organisation was discovered at Kars, and a number of persons, including Ibrahim Effendi, an ex-president of the municipality of Kars, were arrested. The case against them was either not strong or Russian influence was exerted on their behalf, for they were released on bail and proceedings were subsequently dropped.

9. A number of military officers of the garrison of Kars were arrested in July last on a charge of having sold important military documents to Russian agents connected with the Russian consulate at Kars. They were taken to Sari Kamiah, where an equiry was held, the result of which has not yet transpired.

10. In this connexion, it may be mentioned that a Russian cruiser was observed off Trebizond on the 12th June last, and a Russian destroyer on the 22nd and 24th August last. Whatever the reason of their appearance may have been, it was regarded locally as a threatening and unfriendly act.

11. The local Russian consular representatives spend money freely in various directions. For example, Comrade Ettingoff, the consul-general at Trebizond, gave a dinner party on New Year's Eve 1927–28, attended by many leading local Turks, including the Vali, which did not come to an end until much champagne and brandy had been consumed and daybreak was near. A former Vali of Erzerum, Zuhdi Bey, who is at present one of the Deputies of Konia, was unable to resist hospitality of this kind afforded by the Russian consulate-general at Erzerum, and his position became so compromised that he was forced to resign.

12. Russian consular representatives also spend money on the exhibition of propaganda films in local cinemas, and on articles in the local press. They make absurd accusations against Great Britain, such as of fomenting disorder in this country, of which I quoted an example in my despatch No. 32 of the 27th April last.

13. In conversation with me, local Turks have referred contemptuously to propaganda of the kind mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs, and the effect of such propaganda may be easily exaggerated. It can produce little effect on the lower classes or on honest and patriotic Turks of the educated class.

I have, &c.
W. D. W. MATTHEWS

Enclosure 2 in No. 33.

Statistique des Importations à Trébizonde de Marchandises russes de Juillet 1927 *à fin Avril* 1928.

Articles.	Kilog.
Pétrole	528,750
Benzine	226,600
Huile pour machine	31,349
Huile minérale	19,750
Bazout	6,753
Herbe sèche (foin)	1,343,306
Paille	113,682
Ciment	200,000
Tissus en coton	13,558
Sucre en cubes...	11,400
Sucre en poudre	5,050
Chaises en bois travaillé	77
	2,500,275

[E 5383/128/44] No. 34.

Sir G. Clerk to Lord Cushendun.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 482.)
My Lord, *Angora, October* 30, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to report that yesterday, together with four members of my staff, I duly attended the official celebration of the fifth anniversary of the Turkish Republic.

2. As was the case last year, the presidential receptions were held in the building of the Grand National Assembly, where the Ghazi received the President of the Assembly, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, former Deputies and all the high naval and military officers, judges and other officials in Angora, and, finally, the heads of foreign missions in full uniform, accompanied by their staffs. The time-table went a little wrong and we had to wait in a small overheated reception room for three-quarters of an hour beyond the time set down for our reception; but I think this was only normal inefficiency, while the fact that foreign missions were the last to be received was really a kindness, inasmuch as it meant we were not obliged to hang about waiting for the ceremonial parade while other receptions were being held.

3. This parade consisted of the troops of the division stationed at Angora, boy scouts, girl guides, students of the primary and secondary schools, and representatives of various societies and guilds, all, with the exception of the naval cadets and of two specially favoured companies of boy scouts from Smyrna and Konia, drawn from Angora itself. The features that impressed me most were the homogeneity and sturdiness of the Anatolian peasants in the various regiments, the improvement in the physique and appearance of the boy scouts, and the performance of the military band just across the narrow street where the parade was held, which for two hours with drum and trumpet reiterated the same twenty bars without a pause. A similar celebration is held on the same day in every town of importance in Turkey and what I saw was only what Angora itself could produce, but if the youth of the other districts is of the same quality the Turks have every reason to be hopeful for the future.

4. In the evening the Minister for Foreign Affairs gave a State banquet at the new hotel, at which the Ghazi, the heads of missions, the Cabinet Ministers and other high Turkish dignitaries were present. The dinner was followed by a ball given by the "Turk-Ojaghi," which was crowded and hot but decorous. At least it was so up to 5 A.M., which was the hour when I retired, the Ghazi having caught hold of me as I was slipping away at a more reasonable time and kept me in conversation for over two hours. I should add that this conversation, though most friendly both to myself and to the country which I have the honour to represent, was of no special political importance.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 5384/128/44] No. 35.

Sir G. Clerk to Lord Cushendun.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 483.)
My Lord, *Angora, November* 1, 1928.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 482 of the 30th October last, I have the honour to report that the heads of missions were invited to attend the opening of the new session of the Grand National Assembly which took place this afternoon.

2. I enclose a copy of the presidential speech on this occasion.* There is nothing in it which was not said by the Prime Minister at Malatia on the 13th September last, except at the end, where the Ghazi urged the need for the new alphabet.

3. Owing to the admirable innovation of providing us beforehand with the text of the speech in French, I was able to follow its delivery closely, and I was struck by the complete indifference with which the Deputies received that part of the speech which is devoted to foreign affairs. While most of the Ghazi's points connected with internal administration and development were loudly applauded, his references to foreign affairs were greeted with silence, except for a faint "hear, hear" at the mention of the reforms instituted by the King of Afghanistan, and still fainter and, indeed, regretful applause of his Excellency's observation that the settlement of the Ottoman Debt had been inspired by the obligation to recognise one's debts and maintain one's credit.

4. Immediately the Ghazi had finished his speech he left the Chamber and the business of passing the law for the new alphabet was tackled. The new officers of the Assembly were instantly elected, the Bill establishing the new alphabet was brought in, the examining commission was appointed, and within fifteen minutes reported that its terms were admirable in every way, and the first, second and third readings were passed unanimously forthwith, and only unexpected addition to the two or three speeches *de circonstance* being the suggestion by an enthusiastic Deputy that a golden plaque with the new characters embossed in gold should be presented to the Ghazi by a grateful House, a motion which was also unanimously carried.

5. The practical result is that from the 1st December next the new characters will be compulsory in newspapers and public notices. By the 1st January they will be brought into use by official departments, though these departments can make concurrent use of the Arabic characters for another five months and may keep certain registers in the old script until June 1930.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

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* Not printed.

[E 5385/128/44] No. 36.

Sir G. Clerk to Lord Cushendun.—(*Received November* 12.)

(No. 484.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, November* 8, 1928.

FROM occasional notices in the press, it would appear that the present Kurdish policy of the Government, with which I dealt in my despatch No. 384 of the 14th August last, is having a certain measure of success.

2. During the summer the authorities continued to send back to Kurdistan families which had been deported to Western Anatolia. Later on, as your Lordship will be aware from information received from Bagdad, two sons of Sheikh Said, a brother of Sayid Taha, and other Kurdish chiefs who had taken refuge in Iraq, crossed the frontier and made their submission to the Turkish authorities. Another indication of a better state of things was the tour which Ibrahim Tali Bey, the inspector-general, made as far north as Van and Bitlis in September last, a venture which he could hardly have risked a year ago.

3. Still, in spite of the claim of the Government that all is quiet and normal in the eastern vilayets, there is difficulty in finding doctors, teachers and other officials to proceed there. A reform of obvious wisdom which has at last been started is the construction of a system of roads. A road from Kharput to Erzinjan, which will cut through the Dorsim country, has already been begun, and another is to be made at once between Ovajik and Hozat. The inspector-general declares that the whole new road system will be finished in three or four years and that Van will be brought within five days of Angora. It is the inaccessibility of Kurdistan which so far has always baffled the Turkish administrator. As roads are extended eastwards the Kurds will come under more constant authority, and Turkish officials on their part will get a truer understanding of the special problems of the Kurdish districts. Among such problems is that of land tenure, and with this the Turkish Government proposes to deal by breaking up the large estates of the chiefs and distributing them among the tribesmen.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to the High Commissioner for Iraq at Bagdad.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 5483/128/44] No. 37.

Sir G. Clerk to Lord Cushendun.—(*Received November* 19.)

(No. 489.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, November* 14, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to transmit a copy of a despatch from the acting British consul at Trebizond reporting his conversations with the local representative of the People's party who, far more than the Vali, is the chief authority and the leading spirit in the place.

2. What Shevket Bey told Mr. Were of the Government's programme is, I believe, roughly true. The law introducing Latin characters has, as I have reported, already been passed. A Bill to make Sunday the legal day of rest was, according to the press, filed at Angora by a Constantinople merchant Deputy a few days ago for discussion in due course, and it would appear to be only a matter of time before it becomes law. Whether the Government, rather than use compulsion, will not leave the introduction of ladies' hats to the surer, if slower, influence of a fashion which has already begun, I cannot say. The new Municipalities Law, which is understood to be ready for submission to the Assembly, will, I trust, benefit British owners of property both at Smyrna and elsewhere, but I have not had an opportunity of examining the text.

3. Had he been speaking to someone else upon the subject of Russia, Shevket Bey might have said that, while Turks had no use for communism inside Turkey, they did not altogether forget the support they derived from Moscow when breaking away from European control. But Shevket Bey's remarks about internal policy give a fair sample of the ideas of those who are seeking to modernise this country.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

Enclosure in No. 37.

Acting Consul Were to Sir G. Clerk.

(No. 86.)

Sir, *Trebizond, November* 5, 1928.

IN my despatch No. 84 of the 30th October last I had occasion to refer to Shevket Bey, Deputy for Oumush-khanch and an inspector of the People's party. I have now had the opportunity of ascertaining his views on various matters relating to the government and administration of this country and on the probable course of legislation during the current session of the Grand Assembly. I have no reason to suppose that he has greater authority to speak of the future than any other of his fellow Deputies, but I venture, nevertheless, to hope that the ensuing summary of his views will prove interesting, if not informative, to your Excellency.

2. Shevket Bey asserts that various measures for the further modernisation of the Turkish people are being studied by the Government, but that press of work has prevented the various commissions and sub-commissions appointed for the purpose from making as rapid progress as might have been wished; but things were proceeding smoothly, if slowly.

3. The first act of the new Assembly would be to pass the necessary legislation relative to the introduction of Latin characters (to which Shevket Bey refers as "Turkish" characters); this would be followed by a modification of the law relating to the weekly day of rest, which would thenceforward fall on the Sunday. Next in order would come the legal abolition of the *charshaf*, with which the women of this country still contrive, despite official remonstrances, to conceal their features; a reform which would have been introduced long ere this had it not been for certain æsthetic and economic considerations; for, said Shevket Bey, it was common knowledge that Turkish women had no idea of how to dress, and it was, therefore, advisable to postpone any action until they had acquired some elementary notions on the subject; economically, the deterrent was the prospect of the export of considerable capital for the purchase of the necessary finery.

4. The Municipalities Law, now quite out of date, would shortly be amended in accordance with the requirements of the present day. All presidents of municipalities of the old régime would be placed on the retired list, and would be succeeded by intelligent "moderns"; thus Kazaz Hussein, president of the Trebizond Municipality, had been called upon to resign, and his successor would shortly be appointed.

5. Turkey had no use for Russia and Russian communistic experiments. While Turkey was flooded with Russian goods, and vast sums of Russian money were being spent in Turkey and elsewhere on anti-British propaganda, the Russian people lacked the most essential food-stuffs and clothes. The changes in Turkey were inspired by the English and French revolutions of 1652 and 1793.

6. Asked whether he did not anticipate that the introduction of the innovations he contemplated would cause considerable discontent and would meet with much passive resistance in this somewhat backward and conservative district, he replied that there could be no progress without an element of discomfort, and that, if necessary, acceptance of the reforms would be compelled by physical force.

7. It will be seen that Shevket Bey is a firm believer in the doctrine of compulsory liberty, basing himself on the conviction that his constituents are so many sheep, unable to judge of what is good for them; and that he and his colleagues of the National Assembly are competent shepherds. If Shevket Bey is a typical Turkish Deputy, and I am inclined to think he is, I venture to think that the latter part of his belief is fallacious. He is truculent and forceful, but, knowing no language but Turkish, he has no real acquaintance with the history of the gradual development of the Western civilisation which he aspires to impose upon his fellow-countrymen, and fails to see that the hasty and arbitrary imposition of reforms is destructive not only of any liberty of thought, but also of any incentive thereto, and merely serves to perpetuate the inertia which was the bane of the old Ottoman Empire.

I have, &c.
C. A. W. WERE.

[E 5618/2741/44] No. 38.

Sir G. Clerk to Lord Cushendun.—(*Received November* 26.)

(No. 494.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, November* 19, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that, in accordance with the practice of previous years, the President of the Council took an early opportunity of giving to the Assembly an account of the Government's activities during the past year and of its programme and intentions for the future.

2. Ismet Pasha's speech consisted of a summary of the Government's activities in the economic sphere, dealing mainly with the measures taken for the alleviation of distress in those regions which suffered so severely as the result of the serious drought in the autumn of 1927 and the unfavourable climatic conditions during the spring and summer of this year. Particular reference was made to works of irrigation which were taken in hand during the end of the last financial year, and to the necessity of developing further schemes of this nature in order not only to safeguard agriculture against disaster but to intensify it throughout the country.

3. Ismet Pasha referred to the improvement in agricultural conditions which, it was hoped, would be effected in those districts in Anatolia in which the Government had been able, with the extremely restricted credits available, to carry out irrigation and reclamation work during the past year, and he then furnished the Assembly with an estimate of the expenditure necessary to accomplish the ambitious schemes in the same direction in succeeding years.

4. According to the Prime Minister, a sum of £T. 200 million is necessary in order to carry out the programme of the Government in regard to irrigation and reclamation, but as a first step towards its realisation £T. 100 million is required to cover the cost over a period of ten years. It is proposed that this sum be met by an annual progressive vote, which should, according to Ismet Pasha, attain in three years' time approximately £T. 10 million per annum.

5. Although economic conditions are reported from more than one source to be unfavourable and trade more or less stagnant, the Turkish Government continues to vote large credits for public works. The vote for the Ministry of Public Works for the current financial year amounted to £T. 32,717,798, whilst, for the coming financial year, an estimate of £T. 36,616,738 will be laid before the Assembly. How far this additional expenditure can be met remains to be seen, for detailed estimates of revenue are not yet available, but if increased expenditure is to be met by an increase in revenue and not by reductions in the military and other votes, it is difficult to see where the increased allocation to the Ministry of Public Works is to be found.

6. The remainder of the Prime Minister's speech was devoted to the necessity for centralising and co-ordinating the construction of roads throughout the country and to the readiness of the Government to collaborate loyally with foreign groups undertaking works of public utility in Turkey, provided such groups were, in their turn, prepared to respect the terms of their contracts. Finally, Ismet Pasha stated that it had been decided to take in hand, within the next twelve months, the organisation of a State bank.

7. Only a passing reference was made in the speech to the question of railway construction. The position in this respect has not changed to any very great extent since my despatch No. 388 of the 16th August last was written. Messrs. Fox Brothers' International Corporation have, so far, failed to obtain the contract for the remainder of the lapsed Belgian agreement, but, on the other hand, it is reported that their negotiations relative to port construction are progressing satisfactorily with the Ministry of Public Works. As the result, an agreement is likely to be signed at an early date for the construction of ports at Samsun and Mersina which are, at present, practically open roadsteads.

8. Moreover, Messrs. Fox Brothers' International Corporation are also taking a lively interest in the proposed irrigation schemes and have already submitted proposals to the Government relative thereto. The commercial secretary to this Embassy also learns that a Franco-American consortium will shortly be making proposals to the Government also for irrigation works, and no doubt the Germans will appear in the field in the same connexion.

9. As regards the attitude to be adopted towards the proposed participation of British capital in public works enterprises in Turkey, there is nothing that I can usefully add to the views expressed in my telegram No. 51 of the 24th October last. If the Turkish Government can be induced to come to an arrangement whereby the

payment for work carried out is made as such work progresses, or is covered by short-term bills falling due within the same year or during the following year, the element of risk is reduced to legitimate dimensions and operations on this basis should, I think, be encouraged, provided that they carry the condition that British material and labour is supplied. But as regards any proposal involving the acceptance of Turkish Government bonds maturing in five or ten years, I cannot express the same degree of confidence, owing to the difficulties that lie in the way of establishing a true picture of the Turkish Government's financial position. I would, as already stated in my telegram, welcome the visit to Turkey of a mission of investigation interested in public works undertakings, particularly if representatives of well-established British firms interested in irrigation and other works accompanied the mission.

10. There is no doubt that the Turkish Government would be glad to receive overtures from well-established public works contractors and constructional engineers for railway, irrigation and other schemes, but the rock on which the negotiations are likely to split is that of credit, though the Government may, in the case of a British firm of international reputation, be prepared to offer a form of security better than any proposed hitherto.

11. Of all the groups and firms which have approached the Turkish Government since the institution of the present régime, there have been few with anything to lose and in many cases the negotiations have been carried out by an intermediary whose rôle has been that of the "honest broker" hoping to sell his concession to the highest bidder. The collapse of the resuscitated "Chester" scheme, the repeated but abortive attempts of Colonel Fonjallaz, claiming to represent a German-Swiss group, to obtain concessions from the Turkish Government, and the failure of the Belgian group to carry out their contract are typical of the majority of the overtures made to the Government during the past four or five years, and in spite of the repeated reports in the press to the effect that foreign groups are prepared to invest money in this country, I have yet to learn that Turkey enjoys a favourable reputation as a field for foreign enterprise and investment.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 5619/230/89] No. 39.

Sir G. Clerk to Lord Cushendun.—(*Received November* 26.)

(No. 497.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, November* 20, 1928.

THE French Ambassador, who broke his sojourn in Angora in order to attend the French armistice celebrations here, was good enough to call upon me on the eve of his return to the capital, to give me a confidential account of the present stage of his negotiations regarding the Turco-Syrian frontier.

2. M. de Chambrun said that his instructions from Paris were explicit, not to budge an inch from the frontier line laid down by the commission under General Ernst. Nevertheless, if he found in the course of his discussions with Tewfik Rushdi Bey that an agreement could be reached by some slight concession on the part of France, he intended to urge his Government to yield to that extent. M. de Chambrun appears to have discovered near Nissibin some Kurdish villages which he is ready to cede to the Turks, a sacrifice which may prove less welcome than he anticipates to both Turk and Kurd.

3. M. de Chambrun had no exaggerated hopes of an immediately successful issue to his negotiations, and was prepared for the moment when it would be necessary to admit that agreement was not at present possible and to suggest that the question should be left in abeyance for a few months. His only fear was that during this interval the Turks might work up a serious incident, but, as I said to him, I think that they are too intelligent to create a situation which would render it impossible for the French Government to make any concessions at all.

4. M. de Chambrun said that he had told me everything that was in his mind, for one reason, because he meant to be always completely open with me, and for another, because he would welcome any views of mine as to the wisdom of the line he was adopting.

5. I said that I fully reciprocated his desire for complete frankness between us, and would answer him in that spirit. Naturally, I looked upon his discussions

with the Turkish Government from a more general point of view than he could perhaps do. So far as I could gauge the present trend of Turkish policy, one of its objects seemed to be the formation of what I might call a Central Eastern *bloc*, consisting of Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, with the direction thereof firmly settled at Angora. I did not even shut out the possibility of there being a vague idea of the eventual inclusion of the Georgians. So long as the British and French mandates over Iraq and Syria existed, Turkey had not a free hand; but those mandates would not last for ever, and she was probably working for the day when they expired. There was not necessarily any aggressive intention underlying this Turkish conception, which might almost be called a natural effort on the part of Turkey to consolidate her position, nor, indeed, need it be altogether disadvantageous to either of our two countries, should our relations with Turkey remain friendly and cordial. Most of the fuss the Turks were making over the Syrian frontier seemed therefore to me designed with an eye to the eventual exercise of Turkish influence over a nominally independent Syria.

6. To come to the concrete question of the actual point at issue between M. de Chambrun and Tewfik Rushdi Bey—the Nissibin–Jezireh frontier line—there seemed to me two reasons for the curiously intense anxiety of the Turks to obtain a few more square kilom. of what I gathered was entirely stones and desert. It was very probable that the Turks would prefer a line running from Nissibin to Khamik at the junction of the Tigris and the Khabur River, rather than to Jezireh, and they might hope by working up sufficient agitation to obtain such a concession from France. Alternatively, as M. de Chambrun had doubtless himself already noticed, hints were frequently appearing in the press to the effect that the Turco-Syrian line on the west was inequitable. (I enclose a copy of a rather violent article* by Yunus Nadi Bey in the "République" of the 20th November, of this nature, and I would also refer to the second paragraph of Mr. Knox's despatch No. 150 of the 7th March last.) It might be that Tewfik Rushdi Bey was manœuvring for a position where he could suggest that, as the Nissibin–Jezireh frontier was unalterable, some compensation for the Turks could perhaps be found, in the interests of general good relations, to the west.

7. In any case, so far as my humble opinion went, his Excellency was well advised in his intention to keep the present discussion strictly confined to its original limits, while prepared to offer at the suitable moment, if his Government allowed him to do so, the slight concession which he had mentioned to me. I had no doubt that his Excellency would not let himself be too much perturbed by the attacks on France in the press, the purpose of which was obvious.

I have, &c.
GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 5621/128/44] No. 40.

Sir G. Clerk to Lord Cushendun.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 500.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of despatch No. 80 from His Majesty's consul-general, Smyrna, dated the 19th November, respecting local discontent with the Turkish Government.

Constantinople, November 22, 1928.

Enclosure in No. 40.

Consul-General Morgan to Sir G. Clerk.

(No. 80.)

Sir, *Smyrna, November* 19, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to report that there are indications that not all Turks in Smyrna find it easy to endure the present dictatorship, or to join in the hearty and too well drilled chorus of praise which greets every new enactment of the Government.

2. The local press find it easy to disguise under the name of "foreign propaganda" all symptoms of discontent. Thus labour grievances are labelled

* Not printed.

"Communism," and religious grievances are called "Bahaism." The population are told that Turkey has not suppressed the dervishes, in the interests of progress, to make way for the foreign sect of the Bahais, and are warned of the danger of belonging to secret societies, with special reference to Freemasonry and the Order of Bektashis.

3. The press does not grow over-excited in its denunciation of Communism or Bahaism, and thus indicates that it considers the danger from these two theories as unreal or insignificant.

4. Recently posters appeared in the Turkish quarter of the town expressing indignation with the present Government of "leeches," and denouncing the Popular party on the ground that the people have no real representation in it or in the Chamber of Deputies, and calling for justice for all Turks. No news of this has appeared in the press, as it is obviously too important a matter to be disclosed to the general public. The police have not been able to discover the authors, and are still searching for them.

I have, &c.
JAMES MORGAN.

[E 5738/128/44] No. 41.

Mr. Edmonds to Lord Cushendun.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 502.)

My Lord, *Angora, November* 26, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch No. 49 of the 20th November, which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Mersina, dealing specifically with the escape from Caesarea into Syria of Mir Liva Hussein Pasha, which formed the subject of Aleppo despatch No. 45 of the 17th October to the High Commissioner for Irak. A copy of this latter despatch was sent by Mr. Monck-Mason direct to the Foreign Office.

2. While Mr. Chafy's information regarding the escape of Hussein Pasha is not without interest, it is to the later paragraphs of his despatch that I desire to invite your Lordship's particular attention. With travelling in Eastern Turkey made almost impossible by the restrictions now in force, branch managers of the Ottoman Bank, with a variety of useful sources of information at their disposal, are in an exceptional position to gauge the local situation, and it is therefore of interest that confirmation should be received from such a source of the opinion expressed in Sir G. Clerk's despatch No. 484 of the 8th November, that the present Kurdish policy of the Turkish Government is having a certain measure of success and that the Turkification of the eastern provinces is proceeding gradually. That the Sheikh Said rebellion, which only three years ago threatened the very stability of the Turkish Government, should to-day constitute the theme for a threatrical representation in Turkey, even for the purpose of an object lesson, is also not without significance. The view of certain Kurdish politicians in Irak mentioned in a report which has doubtless reached your Lordship, but of which I nevertheless enclose a copy,* to the effect that the Turks' present Kurdish policy has failed hopelessly, is perhaps not wholly inconsistent with the opinion that from the point of view of the Turkish Government that policy is beginning to succeed.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the British High Commissioner at Bagdad.

I have, &c.
W. S. EDMONDS.

Enclosure in No. 41.

Consul Chafy to Mr. Edmonds.

(No. 49.)

Sir, *Mersina, November* 20, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to refer to Mr. Consul Monck-Mason's despatch from Aleppo, of which copies were sent to the Embassy at Constantinople and to this consulate, to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq, No. 45 of the 17th ultimo,

* Not printed

relative to Mir Liva Hussein Pasha, a Kurdish exile who escaped from Caesarea to Syria.

2. When in Caesarea recently I learnt of the escape thence about two months ago of an important exiled Kurdish Pasha, who I presume to be the same person. It appears that he first gave his parole, was allowed to move freely about the town, and behaved in an exemplary manner to avert suspicion, and then suddenly made a dash and succeeded in escaping with a band of chosen companions. I was told that the Ghazi was so furious that he cut out as a sign of his disapproval a visit he was to have paid about that time to Caesarea, in anticipation of which a flower garden was hastily laid out in the grounds of his unfinished villa, and, of course, had the chief of police removed.

3. I gathered that other minor Kurdish exiles in Caesarea had before been allowed to go home. The opinion of the manager of the Ottoman Bank in Caesarea, who was before in Ourfa and knows the Kurds very well, was that real trouble in Kurdistan is now over, and that the Kurdish clans, who keep warring among themselves, will never now succeed in combining to resist Turkification. He had no news of recent trouble in Kurdistan.

4. The bank manager also told me what is doubtless known to the Embassy, namely, that all non-Turkish staff, including managers and sub-managers, have been removed from the Ottoman Bank's branches in the Turkish frontier regions such as Erzerum, Baiburt, El-Aziz, Diarbekir, Ourfa and Aintab. He said the bank's business in those places is in consequence declining.

5. That the Turkish Government believes, or wishes to make the people believe, that the Kurdish rebellion is now quite a thing of the past is shown by a very crude propaganda-play which I saw in Mersina two nights ago performed by a travelling threatrical troupe from Constantinople. This somewhat childish work of art treats Sheikh Said's rebellion as a past historical episode suitable for an object lesson. A house packed to suffocation duly guffawed at the odd old oriental custumes of these funny old rebels and roared with glee as the rebellion was scotched in a few melodramatic jerks and the body of the sheikh (invisibly supported by some cunning Heath Robinson contrivance round the waist) finally appeared before their eyes dangling by the neck from his gibbet. The authorities must have been delighted to see the local villagers and Farmer Gileses, who include many Kurds, laugh so heartily and spontaneously at this neat little effort.

I have, &c.
R. E. W. CHAFY.

[E 5740/43/44] No. 42.

Mr. Edmonds to Lord Cushendun.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 504.)
My Lord, *Angora, November 26, 1928.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, according to the local press, Signor Grandi, the Italian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, will shortly pay an official visit to Angora.

2. I have received confirmation of this report from the Italian Embassy. The visit is said to be of no political importance, the object merely being to return, on behalf of Signor Mussolini, the visit paid to him in Rome by Tewfik Rushdi Bey last spring on his return from the Preparatory Disarmament Conference at Geneva. According to present arrangements, Signor Grandi will arrive here towards the end of December and will stay two or three days. It is further stated that Signor Grandi will pay an official visit to M. Veniselos on his journey to or from Turkey.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Rome and Athens.

I have, &c.
W. S. EDMONDS.

[E 5741/560/44] No. 43.

Mr. Edmonds to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 506. Confidential.)
Sir, *Angora, November 27, 1928.*

IT might well be thought that the introduction of compulsory education in Turkey and the adoption of the new alphabet would have more than satisfied the present appetite of the Turkish Government for educational reforms, but, if information which has just been given to Mr. Helm is accurate—and I have every reason to credit it—this is far from being the case. The further reform now contemplated will, it is true, only affect a small percentage of the population of this country, but, if carried out, must be of great importance. It envisages, in fact, the abandonment of French as the chief, and in many cases the only, foreign language to be taught in Turkish secondary schools and its replacement by English.

2. The source of this information is Falih Rifki Bey, Deputy for Bolu, and, after the Ghazi, perhaps the most industrious propagator of the new alphabet, he having been president of the commission which was responsible for its elaboration. To him at least, the idea is not by any means new, for, when in the spring he informed a member of the Embassy staff of the decision to change the alphabet, he added that there was then a strong movement in favour of the adoption of the English language, and that this reform would certainly follow. At the time the eventuality appeared to His Majesty's Ambassador to be so remote that he did not consider it worth reporting officially. Latterly, however, there have been many signs of the way the wind was blowing, as, for instance, the widespread desire of Deputies, officials and Turks of all classes to learn English, a very marked increase this session in the number of pupils attending the English High School for Boys in Constantinople and a recent request of the head of the Turkish ojaks for an English lecturer. Finally, in the course of a private conversation this week, Falih Rifki Bey stated that the decision to replace French by English had now been definitely taken, though it was being kept as confidential as possible until the necessary preparations had been made for the change, which, of course, could only be effected gradually. The present idea was to establish lycées at Constantinople, Angora, Smyrna and the bigger towns throughout the country. At these lycées a large part of the instruction would be given by English teachers, and he expected that ultimately some 110 Englishmen would be engaged. He realised that the matter of language would present some difficulty, but foreigners could now learn Turkish with much greater facility than formerly, and the difficulty would therefore be a passing one. The authorities were, at any rate, determined that the teachers should come from England and not be locally-born British subjects who possessed neither the British nor the Turkish mentality. Falih Rifki Bey did not definitely ask for the assistance of His Majesty's Embassy—probably matters have not gone far enough for that yet—but he did hint at it, and Mr. Helm informed him that, if approached, the Embassy would be only too pleased to render the Turkish Government all possible assistance.

3. It would, of course, be idle to pretend that this important decision is prompted by love for Great Britain. It does, nevertheless, arise out of a deep-seated and often expressed respect for British institutions and methods and a like confidence in the greater value—for material purposes at any rate—of Anglo-Saxon as opposed to Latin culture. A general feeling is, in fact, abroad in the highest quarters here that the spread of the English language and of Anglo-Saxon culture is essential if Turkey and the Turks are to benefit to the fullest possible extent from the reforms which have been effected under the present régime. Though this conviction has been existent for some time, it is, nevertheless, probable that this latest reform might have been indefinitely postponed but for a number of visits which have been paid by prominent Turks to Western Europe and America in the last two years. Perhaps the decisive factor was a visit which Falih Rifki Bey and two other Deputies paid in the summer of 1927 to Rio de Janeiro, where they represented Turkey at an inter-parliamentary congress. On that occasion they visited São Paulo and other prosperous Brazilian ports, where they were much impressed by the manner in which British and American business men have on less than equal terms secured possession of all the important branches of trade. Later visits to other countries merely strengthened this impression, and also made these Turks realise that English is the language of world trade and commerce. From that time Falih Rifki Bey started

to work for the spread in Turkey of the English language, of which he himself does not speak a word. He is in close touch with the Ghazi, and it was certainly not without the approval of the latter that last winter he published in the semi-official newspaper a series of articles in which he preached the desirability of the adoption of English as the first foreign language in Turkey. To his efforts the recent decision must be largely due, and he now says that, in order to obtain fresh ammunition for his campaign, he will proceed next summer on an official mission to the Scandinavian countries, Great Britain and America.

4. As suggested above, this reform has been prompted by a desire for material advantages. But if it is persisted with, it may have considerable moral effects, for the Turkish character it likely to take more kindly to Anglo-Saxon than to Latin culture, which with the Turk is rarely more than a veneer. The most obvious political effect is that French susceptibilities will be cruelly injured, and that seems to be why the Turkish Government is keeping the scheme dark at present—for French educational interests are deeply entrenched here. Their position has, it is true, been considerably shaken in recent years—as, for instance, by the regulations forbidding religious teaching in any schools in Turkey—but, even so, it is still strong. Of Turks who know a foreign language to-day, the vast majority know only French, and for one who knows something of England a hundred will have some acquaintance with France. We are, in consequence, often misunderstood in politics and always handicapped in trade. For our part, therefore, we can only welcome the prospect of greater intercourse.

I have, &c.
W. S. EDMONDS.

[E 5742/43/44] No. 44.

Mr. Edmonds to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received December* 3.)

(No. 507.)
Sir, *Angora, November* 27, 1928.

THE Turkish press has recently published an interview granted by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Bulgarian semi-official paper the "Bulgarie," in which his Excellency reviewed the relations of Turkey with a number of foreign countries. I have the honour to furnish below a summary of this interview, which may be found of interest, particularly as regards Bulgaria. Dr. Tewfik Rushdi spoke first of the negotiations now being resumed with Greece, but it will be more convenient to reserve treatment of this question for a subsequent occasion.

2. In reply to a question whether after the completion of the negotiations with Greece his Excellency proposed to open conversations with other countries, and particularly with Yugoslavia and Roumania, with a view to the conclusion of special pacts, Dr. Tewfik Rushdi recalled that he had, on the occasion when he inaugurated the policy of individual pacts, openly declared that Turkey was ready to conclude such pacts with all States, and that she had already concluded pacts of non-aggression, of neutrality and of arbitration, or other special agreements with Soviet Russia, Persia, Afghanistan, Syria and Italy. His Excellency considered it indispensable that before the conclusion of such pacts any litigious or pending questions should be settled, as it would be undesirable that such questions should come under discussion on the morrow of the signature of a pact. The only countries with whom Turkey still had open questions were France (the Syrian frontier), Greece (the exchange of populations and the liquidation of their properties), and Yugoslavia (the property of Moslems expatriated from this country). The last-named question Dr. Tewfik Rushdi considered might easily form the subject of an agreement with Yugoslavia. When negotiations with these States had been concluded, Turkey would have consolidated her relations with the whole world.

3. Dr. Tewfik Rushdi's interlocutor then asked him whether he considered that peace was adequately safeguarded at the present time. In the course of his reply to this question, his Excellency declared that in their mutual relations all nations should be placed on a footing of equality, and should treat with one another as equal with equal. Such a peace of justice would be lasting. The other type of peace, a peace of equilibrium, was not ideal. The equilibrium existing at a given moment could be shattered or shaken, and, in the very constitution of the equilibrium, there was a potential threat to peace, which was the system of alliances.

4. Dr. Tewfik Rushdi was then asked which he considered was more likely to contribute to the maintenance of peace in the Balkans—a system of individual pacts or a so-called Balkan Locarno. His Excellency replied that he could not conceive the application to the Balkans of a general pact such as was envisaged under the title of a Balkan Locarno. Who would be the parties to such an agreement, and who would be the guarantor for its strict observance? The whole idea appeared chimerical. The policies of the Balkan States, the conception which each entertained of its relations with the others, and, above all, the mentality of the Balkan peoples, a mentality perhaps peculiar to the Balkans, all militated against the conclusion of such a treaty.

5. Finally, Dr. Tewfik Rushdi gave his views on the relations between Bulgaria and Turkey. Apart from routine matters, there was, his Excellency said, no question at issue between the two countries. Turkey had always looked on Bulgaria with a very friendly eye. She had followed with a real sympathy the efforts of the Bulgarian people to pursue their development in the face of the difficulties which had arisen out of the war. She was always ready to give concrete shape to this Turco-Bulgarian friendship in a more precisely-worded pact. This pact should, in his Excellency's view, be a pact of arbitration, of non-aggression and of neutrality, and would complete the edifice of the two treaties already concluded between Bulgaria and Turkey, viz., the treaty of friendship signed on the 18th October, 1925, and the treaty of commerce signed at Angora on the 12th February, 1928. It was in no way different from those which Turkey and many other States had already concluded, and could only redound to the advantage of the two signatories, while in no way injuring the interest of other peoples.

I have, &c.
W. S. EDMONDS.

P.S.—I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Sofia.

W. S. E.

[E 5744/43/44] No. 45.

Sir R. Graham to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received December* 3.)

(No. 848.)
Sir, *Rome, November* 27, 1928.

I SOUNDED the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs this afternoon with regard to his forthcoming visit to Angora. Signor Grandi assured me that the visit was purely one of courtesy. When Rushdi Bey had come to Venice this summer he had insisted that, as Signor Mussolini could not leave Italy, the visit should be repaid by Signor Grandi, and a promise to this effect was given. The Italian Government had rather hoped that the matter had been forgotten, but recently a telegram had been received from the Turkish Government reminding him of the promise. He had asked that the visit should be considered as private, but this the Turkish Government had refused, and it was evident that they would make as much capital out of it as possible. But the Italian Government were anxious not to wound Greek susceptibilities. Signor Grandi would therefore also call at Athens. What he would like to do would be to combine the two visits and to go to Athens after Angora, but he was not sure how the Greek Government would take this proposal. If they agreed, Signor Grandi would proceed to Angora at the beginning of January, and call at Athens on his way home. Should, however, M. Veniselos object to this proposal, Signor Grandi would leave for Angora in the middle of December, return here, and then pay a visit to Athens some time in January.

2. Copies of this despatch are being sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople and His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.
R. GRAHAM.

[E 5868/43/44] No. 46.

Sir P. Loraine to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received December* 10.)

(No. 472.)

Sir, *Athens, November* 27, 1928.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 406 of the 24th October on the subject of Græco-Turkish relations, I have the honour to inform you that the somewhat unexpected incidents of the last few days have formed the subject of serious and not very restrained comment in the Greek press, and I fear it must be recognised that the prospect of an early solution of outstanding difficulties has suffered an appreciable setback. Indeed, the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the course of an interview I had with his Excellency on the 23rd instant, told me that this fresh and quite unanticipated attack from the Turkish side was causing anxiety to the Greek Government, who were puzzled to know what motive lay behind it.

2. His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople will no doubt have informed you of the precise nature of recent events. As the matter has been represented here, the Mixed Exchange Commission resolved to undertake a tour of Western Thrace in order that its members might familiarise themselves with the physical conditions under which the populations to which their deliberations related were living. During this tour, according to the Greek version, the Turkish delegate Husni Bey discovered or purported to discover grave irregularities in the treatment which the Mussulman inhabitants were receiving at the hands of the Greek authorities and thus conjured up the spectre of a Turkish minority in Greece, calculated very seriously to prejudice relations between the two countries. The Turkish press, it was added, had been informed of Husni Bey's accusations by journalists attending the commission on its tour, and had launched violent attacks against Greece. For some days this aspect of Turco-Greek relations, to which subject a great deal of space is daily set aside by the press, was relegated almost to the "faits divers" columns. Some indignation was, indeed, expressed at what was described as the irrelevance and the lack of foundation of these stories, the charge of irrelevance being founded on the contention that the mandate of the Mixed Commission did not include in its scope the question of the relations between the Greek authorities and certain Greek citizens. It was, further, alleged in the Greek press that Husni Bey's indignation was due rather to the lack of due reverence with which the Ghazi's name was received by the Thracian Moslems, to their continued preference for the fez, and to their ignorance of the new Latin alphabet than to any oppressive act on the part of the Greek authorities. In short, the action of Husni Bey and the consequent press articles were regarded as being unimportant, if vexatious, until the 25th instant, when it became known that the Angora Government, to the general surprise, had approved and endorsed the attitude of Husni Bey, and that the Turkish press had opened a second and heavier barrage of criticism and accusation. Polemical reprisals in the Greek prints were not lacking, and—what was a much more serious matter—the public were given to understand that the Government, "while unable to modify the general trend of its policy, aiming at effective consolidation of peace in the Orient" did not see their way to initiate negotiations for the solution of outstanding questions with Turkey, "so long as the atmosphere remained poisoned by the campaigns of calumny and of unjustified attacks." Such a conclusion is as logical as it is regrettable, and one can but hope that the period during which negotiations are interrupted, for so unfortunate a cause, will not be unduly prolonged.

3. A summary of representative press articles is enclosed herewith.*

4. A copy of this despatch is being sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
PERCY LORAINE.

* Not printed.

[E 5859/1223/44] No. 47.

Mr. Edmonds to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received December* 10.)

(No. 514.)

Sir, *Angora, November* 29, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to report that the delegation which, as stated at the end of Sir G. Clerk's despatch No. 453 of the 18th ultimo, was sent to Western Thrace by the Mixed Exchange Commission, returned very quickly to Constantinople after accomplishing rather less than nothing. It seems hardly to have got to Gumuljina (Komotini) before the Turkish delegates managed to be hearing complaints about boys without fezzes being refused schooling and men who had worn hats being denied burial. The Greek Minister tells me that the persons responsible for these incidents were not the Greek authorities, but the Turkish priests, and this seems likely enough. In any case, Jemal Husni Bey, the Turkish delegate, who is young and impetuous, demanded that he and his Turkish colleagues should be allowed to move unaccompanied about Western Thrace enquiring into the general conditions under which the Moslems live, for the constant complaint of the Turks is that these people are "oppressed." The Greek delegate, M. Diamantopoulo, refused, maintaining that at Constantinople the Greek delegation never ventured to go about enquiring into the general treatment of the Greek minority—a true, but disingenuous statement, for the Greek delegates know the conditions without enquiring. In basing his demand on articles 12 and 16 of the Exchange Convention, Jemal Husni Bey certainly seems to have tried to stretch the meaning of that agreement. His action was also impolitic, for, if the issue of the treatment of the respective minorities were raised, the Turkish Government would perhaps not come off best. No terms of reference had been laid down before the delegation set out from Constantinople, the neutral president, M. Holstad, was unable to reconcile his Turkish and Greek colleagues, the Turk took the next train home again, and there was an outcry in the Turkish press.

2. All this would not have seemed to matter very much—for the Constantinople press has often allowed the Exchange Commission's doings to lash it into fury—were it not for the negotiations impending between the two countries. But I find that both the Greek Minister and the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs regard the matter as a storm in a tea-cup. The Turkish Under-Secretary told me that, although the Athenian press had begun the campaign, the Turkish Government regretted that the Turkish press had retaliated, but, of course, the Government had no control over it. The Greek Minister said that he had agreed with the Turkish Foreign Minister to wait for the storm to die down before renewing negotiations, and that Tevfik Rushdi Bey had promised to do what he could to calm the press here in the meantime. The Italian counsellor has heard from M. Pappa; he says M. Veniselos's instructions in the above sense, which is incidental confirmation of the belief that the Italian Government is still taking a hand in the negotiations.

3. It is, of course, not to be supposed that the Turkish authorities could not have kept the local press quiet if they had wanted to, but it is possible that the semi-official "Jumhuriet," which raised most of the clamour, went rather farther than the Minister for Foreign Affairs would have wished. The official "Milliet" has maintained a moderate tone, and has, in general, urged the desirability of forgetting such minor squabbles in view of the need which each country has of the other's friendship. In so far as the Turkish Government allowed the campaign, it was no doubt upon the usual Turkish calculation that a preliminary browbeating may make the other party more easy to bring to terms. In this it hardly seems to have succeeded, for M. Pappa told Mr. Roberts that, although he regarded the "établis" question as settled by the Turks' virtual acceptance of the commission's ruling, he felt that, as regards the compensation which Turkey desired for properties in Greece, his country had already gone to the limit of possible concessions.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.
W. S. EDMONDS.

[E 5860/560/44] No. 48.

Mr. Edmonds to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received December* 10.)

(No. 515.)

Sir, *Angora, November* 30, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch of considerable interest which has just reached this Embassy from the acting British consul at Trebizond.

2. Mr. Were presents an unrelieved picture of gloom, decay and desolation which bodes ill for the advance of republican Turkey towards civilisation and development. Turkey is, in fact, probably more than ever before, a land of contrasts. At Angora one sees nothing but the reforming hand at work, and the emergence, in spite of much bungling and many set-backs, of something which must be called progress. In other parts of the country also, as, for instance, in Cilicia, there has been a considerable advance. Why, then, this retrograde movement at Trebizond, on which successive consular officers have been unanimous in commenting, though not perhaps with such pessimism as does Mr. Were, whose standards, owing to this being his first experience of the Turkish provinces, may be somewhat high?

3. The reason must, I think, be found to a large extent in the disappearance of the Pontine Greeks, who were the very source of the prosperity of the Trebizond hinterland. In no other district, with the possible exception of the country round Smyrna, was the work of exchange so drastic, but, whereas at Smyrna a more or less industrious population was introduced to take the place of at any rate some of the departed Greeks, Trebizond has been pretty well left to its fate. Funds for agricultural and other development are scarce, and, when available, are devoted to the embellishment of the new capital—to such an extent that a certain provincial Deputy risked, and fell into, disgrace by lodging a strong protest in the spring when a supplementary estimate for new construction was under discussion in the Chamber—or to the development of areas which are likely to afford a quicker return on the money expended. The turn of Trebizond is left to come later.

4. But there are other causes, and of these the principal are the great decline in the Persian trade passing through Trebizond and the steady development of Trebizond's rival, Samsun, which, according to all accounts, is, thanks largely to American tobacco interests, progressing at a considerable pace.

5. Finally, there is another factor which may or may not weigh with the Central Government when projects for development are under consideration. I refer to the proximity of Trebizond to the Russian frontier. However cordial Russo-Turkish relations may be to-day, Turkey's suspicions of her northern neighbour are no less real than they were a generation ago, and it may be that the Turkish Government does not like the idea of spending money on the creation of a flourishing vineyard so near to the neighbour's wall as to arouse his cupidity. If so, that Government should perhaps pay heed to the reverse side of the picture, which shows that, by neglecting the vineyard, it can only add to the latent discontent of the occupiers and incline them to take advantage of an opportunity, should one occur, to rid themselves of the blight which has descended on them. It might also encourage Russian designs by stimulating in the Russians the desire to exploit an inheritance which it so manifestly and shamefully neglects.

I have, &c.

W. S. EDMONDS.

Enclosure in No. 48.

Acting Consul Were to Sir G. Clerk.

(No. 89.)

Sir, *Trebizond, November* 15, 1928.

IN a series of despatches written from this consulate in the months of May, June and July, 1927, Mr. Knight submitted, by your Excellency's direction, his observations on various aspects, as seen at Trebizond, of Turkish national life under the republican régime.

2. In studying these reports I have been much struck by the fact that in the course of the eighteen months that have elapsed since their compilation little or no change appears to have occurred in the situation as there described, and that where any modification is to be observed it is generally in a retrograde direction. As a new

comer to the country I cannot presume to speak with the authority possessed by Mr. Knight, but I venture, nevertheless, to submit the following general observations on the subjects discussed by him, before custom shall have led me to view with an indifferent eye the evidence of neglect that abounds on every side.

3. In his despatch No. 3 of the 12th May, 1927, Mr. Knight discussed the position of women in the vilayet, and came to the conclusion that no genuine improvement therein was to be recorded, even the outward sign of their emancipation, the abandonment of the veil, being suppressed at the dictation of their male relatives. To-day, the position remains the same, the "charchaf" is still used to cover the features to whatever extent the wearer considers to be desirable, varying from a merely conventional concealment of the mouth to a complete muffling of the head, such as I have rarely seen even in that hot-bed of Moslem fanaticism, Fez. Of the "painted, half-clad flappers" mentioned by Mr. Knight I have seen no sign, and this must, I suppose, be accounted an improvement, though I suspect their disappearance to be due to the general blight which seems to have stricken all things, pure and impure, in and around Trebizond. The one social gathering I have attended here, a ball given on the anniversary of the republic, was graced by the presence of a number of Turkish ladies, all amply, if rather dowdily, clothed, who ranged themselves gawkily round the room, in obvious fear and terror lest they should be called upon to take the floor with one of the apostles of liberty. Of any attempt to inculcate amongst the female population the rudiments of housewifery, by the creation of classes for cooking, sewing and such domestic virtues, there is no indication whatever; while acquaintance with the new alphabet is now held to be of far greater importance than any knowledge of the proper care of children.

4. In his despatches Nos. 5 and 18 of the 19th May and the 30th June, 1927, respectively, Mr. Knight dealt with the questions of the general efficiency of the local administration and of the degree of corruption prevailing therein, and expressed the opinion that inefficiency and venality existed side by side in at least a fair proportion of the Government offices. My experience of Turkish administration in general is so small that I can express no opinion as to whether the standard of efficiency obtaining here is up to the usual average or not; but I am, nevertheless, prepared to say that in no other country of which I have experience would the local brand of administration be held to have any existence except on paper. Regulations there are in plenty, but it appears to be no one's duty to apply them or to see that they are carried out, and the general atmosphere of "Liberty Hall" is such that even the local newspaper has been inspired recently to sound a note of protest.

5. Nor is the prevalence, or otherwise, of corruption a matter of which I am yet competent to speak. One case, indeed, of the apparently illegal imposition of a fine by an administrative official has been brought to my notice, but the sufferer considered, probably rightly, that nothing was to be gained by making a fuss. At the same time, I do not see how the hordes of Government employees in this district can afford to live on the miserable pittances allotted to them, unless they eke them out by petty exactions of one kind or another.

6. Of the *Turk Ojak*, of which the activities were described in Mr. Knight's despatches, Nos. 6 and 29 of May and the 26th July, I can only say with certainty that its premises are now, to all appearances, utterly deserted, the only indication of its continued existence consisting of a notice, in chalk, on a board suspended from its railings, inviting women to attend lessons on the new alphabet.

7. In any case the *Turk Ojak* is but a poor relation, in Trebizond, at all events, of the Popular party. This all-pervading organisation is indeed anything but popular with Trapezuntians, whose innate conservatism would make them look askance at any body of reformers, however great the benefits they might bring in their train, and who view with positive disgust the unproductive peacockings and posturings of the local party representative, Shevket Bey. But for all their dislike of him and his works they are careful to conceal their feelings, and there is no doubt that he is the real power in the place, and would still be so even were the office of Vali held by a less insignificant individual than the present occupant of the post. The extent of this nonentity's surrender of authority may be gauged from the fact that the examination of the vilayet employees in their proficiency in the new alphabet is being conducted by appointees of the party.

8. The hygienic conditions obtaining in Trebizond, if one may draw conclusions from the state of the streets and the personal cleanliness of the inhabitants, must be very poor indeed. The so-called Municipal Garden is nothing better than a rubbish dump, and the two or three principal thoroughfares radiating from it are, it seems to me, more malodorous than the back streets, possibly because the latter

lie for the most part higher up the hill-side. It is scarcely necessary to say that no proper drainage system exists or is in contemplation; nor is the repair of the water-supply under consideration. In these two respects at least laicized Turkey, at Trebizond, continues to put its trust in the Lord.

9. In the matter of public works the record of the authorities is almost incredibly bad. It may conveniently be dealt with under two heads—construction and destruction. On the constructive side there is, or was, the Municipal Garden aforesaid, for it can now only be correctly described as an ash-pit; and the new vilayet offices, the outer walls of which have been constructed, but work on which has now been for some considerable time suspended, owing, I understand, to some dispute with the contractor. There the story ends. The tale of destruction, active in some cases, but more often the result of passive neglect, is far more comprehensive. Of all the admirable work performed at Trebizond by the Russians (and it is to me a revelation that a race not renowned for energy should in so short a space of time have here accomplished so much of value) only the barest vestiges remain. The Russian port, which was more than half finished at the time of the evacuation, has been allowed to decay to the point of uselessness; and the roads constructed by them, excellently graded and aligned, are now, with one exception, no more than pitted phantoms of their former selves. Traces of the Armenian population have vanished also, for the most part, but the Armenian church still stands, though completely gutted and untenanted, presumably because there is forthcoming neither the energy to raze it to the ground, nor the intelligence to make some practical use of it. The Ghazi Pasha Avenue is still a gaping void, flanked by disembowelled houses and littered with refuse, and is perhaps as fitting a monument as could be imagined to the benefits conferred by the new régime on Trebizond. Nothing is safe from the destructive instincts of the race; and even the old fortifications of the town, which have stood for 800 years and would probably have resisted the assaults of time and weather for several centuries to come, are being carried off stone by stone to prolong the precarious existence of hovels scarcely fit for human habitation. I find it difficult to believe that there can be any future for a race so devoid of creative instinct, so catastrophic in its rare activities, bedeck it and disguise it as its rulers may with all the outward signs of Western civilisation.

10. My experience of the town's communications with the outside world is confined to the approach by sea and to the roads in the immediate vicinity. Apart from the Russian harbour, to the derelict condition of which I have already referred, there is a small breakwater, utterly useless as a protection to shipping, in rough weather, when communication with the shore becomes impossible. The roads leading east, west and south, to Platana, Rizeh and Erzerum respectively, are, close to the town, in an atrocious state. On the Erzerum road there is, or has been, some intention of effecting repairs at some future date, for metal is piled by the road side, and an occasional man or boy is to be seen breaking stones from time to time. From Mr. Matthews's accounts of his recent journeys, I gather that the wooden bridges on the Rizeh road are regularly washed away at the first rains. The road to Platana is, I am given to understand, quite presentable, but I have not yet had an opportunity of seeing it for myself, and am inclined to think that its presentability must be purely relative.

11. Industrially Trebizond is dead. Local industries were never of much importance, being confined to the production of a kind of hempen cloth and to a species of silver filigree work. Both have now disappeared, though an abortive attempt was made some time ago to revive the textile industry. It failed because the initiators of the scheme were destitute of all energy, practical knowledge and business instincts.

12. Commercially and economically the town is, if not moribund, at least in a very low state of health. The transit trade with Persia has dropped to insignificant proportions, and shows no signs of recovery, since Batum is able to deal therewith infinitely more expeditiously at any time of the year, and particularly so in the winter, when the Erzerum road is practicable only for camel caravans, and then only at great risk. Tobacco, which at one time ran hazel-nuts close for first place amongst the exports of the district, is to-day disappearing as a crop, partly owing to the helplessness of the cultivators, now that the Greek element is no longer available, partly in consequence of the arbitrarily low prices obtainable from the Tobacco Monopoly. The hazel-nut trade, though not at the mercy of any monopoly, is also likely to decline unless some instruction as to the proper care of the trees is made available; while the utter ignorance of the law of supply and demand amongst merchants leads them to fritter away their resources in futile attempts to raise the

price of the commodity on the European market. Finally, the Agricultural Bank appears to have no conception whatever of its proper functions, and by refusing credits to agriculturists drives them into the arms of usurers, whose interest charges vary between 100 and 200 per cent.

13. The unrelieved gloom of this picture must appear incredible, but I am satisfied that I have not over-emphasised the general air of abandonment that prevails. There is, indeed, about Trebizond much natural charm that tends to discount the unfavourable impression derived from the evidence of man's handiwork. As an urban centre Trebizond must continue to survive, though with a constantly diminishing population. As a port, the natural outlet for the surplus agricultural products of the Armenian tablelands, its continued existence is also assured, up to a point, for with the linking-up of Erzerum by road with various important Anatolian centres (foreshadowed by the Inspector-General of the Eastern Vilayets), the current of such trade will tend to set in other directions, and Trebizond, handicapped by the neglect of the Central Government and by an entire lack of public spirit amongst its inhabitants, will be hard put to it to resist that tendency. Whether, as is generally asserted here, Trebizond has incurred the displeasure of the Ghazi by its frigid reception of him in 1924, I am unable to say. In any case, official recognition of its existence appears to be confined to much unintelligent propaganda in favour of the new alphabet—a matter of which I propose to speak in a subsequent despatch.

I have, &c.
C. A. W. WERE.

[**E 5862/600/44**] No. 49.

Mr. Edmonds to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received December* 10.)

(No. 517.)

Sir, *Angora, December* 3, 1928.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 270 of the 30th May, I have the honour to inform you that on the 29th ultimo the Grand National Assembly ratified the Turco-Afghan Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation, which was signed here on the 25th May last.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Kabul.

I have, &c.
W. S. EDMONDS.

[**E 5867/42/44**] No. 50.

Mr. Edmonds to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received December* 10.)

(No. 527.)

Sir, *Angora, December* 4, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to report that the question of the Ottoman public debt came before the Grand National Assembly on the 30th ultimo. It had previously been discussed at a meeting of the Popular party, and it was there decided, in accordance with the Ghazi's clearly-expressed wish, that the agreement made with the bondholders' representatives on the 13th June, 1928, should be accepted in the general economic interest of the country and this long-standing difference with Western Europe cleared out of the way.

2. Last Saturday's debate in the Assembly was, therefore, not much more than a performance staged for the benefit of the outside world, particularly the French. The Minister of Finance described the situation in moderate terms. Other Deputies reached considerable heights of rhetoric in describing the onerous terms of the old loans, the anti-Turkish character of the Debt Administration, the injustice of demanding further payments from a country after wasting its life and wealth by war. Two motions were presented demanding the postponement of a matter which chiefly concerned France until vital questions now under discussion with that country should be settled. To these the Minister for Foreign Affairs replied by begging the Assembly that it should trust the Government to safeguard the country's political interests and should not insist on connecting two distinct questions. To emphasise

the correctness of his attitude, Tewfik Rushdi Bey sent round to the missions concerned—at midnight—copies of the motions and of his answer.

3. The general tone of most of the speakers was one of sober recognition of the need for settlement, and, after a debate of seven hours' duration, the Assembly approved the agreement by a large majority. It added two conditions, however, providing that the interests of the State must be preserved (*a*) in the division of certain outstanding portions of the Tripoli indemnity and of the reserve fund; (*b*) in connexion with the withdrawal of Ottoman notes issued in and after 1914.

4. Munir Bey, the Turkish Minister at Berne, who has been the Government's legal adviser in this question since its beginning, happens to be here, and told me that, in his private opinion, these reservations would not in any way affect the validity of Turkey's ratification or the bondholders' rights. The Minister of Finance expressed himself to the same effect to members of the French Embassy. The press of the following day explained the second proviso by a statement that the excess (given variously as £T. 600,000 and £T. 900,000) of the old notes presented for exchange over the Debt Administration's estimate of the total of that issue is due to malpractice on the part of officials of the administration.

I have, &c.
W. S. EDMONDS.

[E 5955/18/44] No. 51.

Mr. Edmonds to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received December* 17.)

(No. 529.)
Sir, *Angora, December* 10, 1928.

DURING the past few years His Majesty's Embassy has not failed to keep your Department informed at short intervals of the progress being made by the Turkish Government with its programme of new railway construction. Comment on the progress and aims of this construction has, however, hitherto been for the greater part confined to the economic field, only an occasional reference being made to the schemes from the strategic point of view.

2. For this reason, and also because of its own value, I have the honour to bring to your notice the enclosed despatch which I have just received from the military attaché to this Embassy. In his despatch Major Heywood analyses the strategic considerations by which the Turkish Government have no doubt been guided, and the extent to which their aims will be achieved by the completion of the schemes already in hand. I would particularly commend to your attention the diagram which forms the enclosure to Major Heywood's despatch.

I have, &c.
W. S. EDMONDS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 51.

Major Heywood to Sir G. Clerk.

(No. 7.)
Sir, *British Embassy in Turkey, November* 23, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to refer to the development of the railway system of Turkey-in-Asia.

2. Large contracts have been placed by the Turkish Government for the construction of new railway lines. It is apparent that some of these lines are not likely to be of much profit commercially, so that one must look to other fields in order to be satisfied of their importance.

3. From the military point of view Turkey requires good communications both from east to west and from north to south. It is not too much to say that the railway construction programme will fulfil her needs as far as this can be done without excessive financial expenditure.

4. The railway system, as it now exists, gives but poor communications for operations on the southern or eastern frontiers, and in the event of operations on the south, west or east it would be difficult to concentrate the full military power of Turkey with any speed.

5. At present Turkey is happy with regard to the western front. Since the improvement of relations with Italy and Greece there is little immediate fear of attack by either of these countries. International relations in the Balkans, however, are not famed for their stability, and it is undoubtedly important for Turkey to be able to concentrate her armed forces rapidly on the west.

6. A Bolshevik aggression is unlikely in the absence of trouble in the west. Peaceful penetration is a more subtle weapon, and one which can be used to better effect by Soviet Russia.

7. Discarding a very lavish and expensive programme of construction it is not possible to prepare railways for a concentration on the Iraq frontier without first satisfying the needs of a concentration on the Syrian frontier. Railways towards the Persian frontier would be too expensive to construct in the near future.

8. Broadly speaking, the present military railway communications of Turkey (see Diagram) consist of:—

(*a*.) One line from Constantinople to Nisibin, interrupted by Syrian territory before it reaches Iraq, vulnerable at two bottle-necks (the Taurus and Ammanus tunnels).
(*b*.) A branch to Smyrna and thence to Panderma and Egerdir.
(*c*.) A branch to Angora and Kaiserie.
(*d*.) The Kars–Erzerum Railway.

The system is not connected with the coal-mining district of Eregli. The eastern half of Turkey is not connected by rail with the western half. The only line to the south is extremely vulnerable.

This is obviously a very imperfect system.

9. By the construction of the new lines the defects of the system will almost all be remedied, and the country will be supplied with parallel lines of railway communication towards every frontier except the extreme east and Iraq (see Diagram). Moreover, the railway system and military factories will be connected directly with the coal area of Eregli–Filios by the Angora–Eregli Railway.

10. It will be seen therefore that, instead of the present inefficient and vulnerable railway communications of Turkey, the new programme will provide:—

(*a*.) Two parallel lines from east to west, Kars–Balikesri and Diarbekir–Smyrna.
(*b*.) Two parallel lines from north to south, Samsun–Malatia and Constantinople–Afiun Kara Hissar.
(*c*.) Two parallel lines from north-west to south-east, Constantinople–Eskishehr–Angora–Kaiserie–Sivas–Malatia and Panderma–Balikesri–Afiun–Keller.

It will thus satisfy the military needs of Turkey on every frontier except those of Persia and Iraq.

11. Turkey is in no danger from Persia and from Iraq, but it is conceivable that she should cast longing eyes at Azerbaijan and Mosul.

12. To build lines to the Persian frontier would be very costly, and the present programme provides only one railway line towards Mosul, but a second line is in existence, which would become available if a suitable rearrangement of the Turco-Syrian frontier could be made, namely, the line Adana–Islahié–Muslimié–Ras-el-Ain–Nisibin.

13. It will be seen therefore that before Turkey can, with economy, complete a satisfactory military railway programme, she must settle her differences with France in regard to Syria and obtain the line of the Bagdad Railway. Her present programme of railway construction provides the lines which will be required for military operations against Syria if they become necessary to the attainment of this object.

14. There are no lines in the projected programme which are not essential to the rapid concentration of Turkish troops on the Syrian or western frontier, and all that can be achieved towards efficient communications without very lavish expenditure will be achieved by the present projected railway lines.

15. It is therefore not surprising that work on the projected lines is being pushed on with all speed. In this connexion it may be interesting to note that 30 miles of line on the Kaiserie–Sivas line were laid by military labour in twenty days. (The earthwork had been prepared by a contractor.)

I have, &c.
H. F. HEYWOOD.

Enclosure 2 in No. 51.

Diagram showing Development of Railway System of Turkey-in-Asia.



[E 5957/91/44] No. 52.

Mr. Edmonds to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received December* 17.)

(No. 533.)

Sir, *Angora, December* 11, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to report that the negotiations regarding the Anatolian Railway, which were last referred to by Mr. Hoare in his despatch No. 630 of the 20th December, 1927, have been continued here during the last few weeks by the Turkish Government and Messrs. Weigelt, Meissner, Jacobi and Günther. These negotiations have at last come to a successful conclusion, and an agreement was finally signed last night.

2. According to an outline of the settlement given me by Dr. Weigelt, the Turkish Government undertakes to pay, in Swiss francs, and on a general 50 per cent. basis, the interest on the debentures and shares of the Anatolian Railway Company, the subsidiary Haidar Pasha Port Company and Adana–Mersina Railway Company, arrears being repaid without interest in twenty-five annuities as from 1933.

3. In return the Turkish Government acquires final and complete ownership of the line and all the property belonging to it. At the same time the Government obtains, for what they may be worth, the rights which the Haidar Pasha Port Company possesses in the harbour of Alexandretta—a transaction which the Turkish Government may merely intend to make use of in its present negotiations over the Syrian frontier.

4. Dr. Weigelt states that the total thus payable by Turkey is 150 million Swiss francs, that the maximum annuity is 15 million Swiss francs, which will be paid for the next four years, that the annuity will then drop to 6 million Swiss francs, and thereafter be rapidly decreased by redemption.

5. Following, as it does, closely upon the ratification of the Public Debt Agreement, this settlement seems to be a further important step towards the financial reconstruction of this country. No doubt it will be approved by the Assembly and ratified in due course.

I have, &c.
W. S. EDMONDS.

[E 5960/255/44] No. 53.

Mr. Dodd to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received December* 17.)

(No. 354.)

Sir, *Sofia, December* 11, 1928.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 160 of the 7th June last, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a despatch from the British vice-consul at Varna regarding the emigration of Turks from Bulgaria.

2. It is evident from Mr. Baker's despatch that these Turks are Bulgarian subjects, not Turkish nationals, as the secretary of the Turkish Legation stated and was reported by me in paragraph 6 of my despatch under reference.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
CHARLES DODD.

Enclosure in No. 53.

Vice-Consul Baker to Mr. Dodd.

(No. 29.)
Sir, *Varna, November* 7, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to report that during the present year an exceptionally large exodus from Bulgaria of the Turkish village population has been noted. The following are the numbers of Turkish families emigrating through the port of Varna from the Varna, Shumla, Razgrad and Roustchouk districts during 1928 :—

	Families.
January and February	50
March, April, May	560
June, July, August	560
September, October, November	980

Almost every steamer leaving Varna for Turkish ports is crowded with Turkish emigrants, but the fact that a general exodus of the Turks was taking place first came to my notice through trade reports from the districts largely populated by Turks. Certain classes of cotton goods exclusively used by the Turks are now no longer in demand, and Bulgarian business men make no secret of the fact that this is due to the change of population from Turkish to Bulgarian.

There are three factors contributing to cause this emigration :—

1. The activities of the Bulgarian Political Society ("Bulgarska Narodna Zashtita"), inciting the Bulgarian population to annoy and terrorise the Turk. Individuals are beaten, houses attacked and sometimes burned, crops fired, wells in Turkish villages contaminated, &c., and on two occasions mosques have been burned. These acts of oppression are carried out systematically, but quietly, so as not to attract general attention.
2. The enthusiasm of the Bulgarian population in carrying out the plans of the Narodna Zashtita. By goading the Turks to emigrate, the Bulgarian population is enabled to buy Turkish lands, property and stock at a fraction of their value.
3. The burden put upon Turkish villages by the installation on their communities of Bulgarian refugees from the Dobrudja.

The Bulgarian Government takes no open or active part in this system of oppression, but Bulgarian State officials in the Turkish districts aid the instigators, refuse protection to the Turks and take advantage of the situation further to despoil the emigrants. They demand that Bulgarian shall be spoken and that all petitions or complaints shall be written in Bulgarian. When passports are requested the officials demand the payment of excessive taxes, the payment by the departing Turks of "reparations" and an exorbitant fee for the passport itself.

I am told that the exodus of the Turks from the Philippopolis and Bourgas districts is even greater than here.

In this way Bulgaria is gradually losing a quiet, industrious and sober population—one of the chief supporters of the established order, as at elections the Turks *en bloc* invariably record their votes for the Government of the day.

I have, &c.
F. P. BAKER.

[E 6038/128/44] No. 54.

Mr. Troutbeck to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 61.) Extract.
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December* 20, 1928.

THE "Times" correspondent has communicated to me what he states is authentic confirmation that a fresh plot on a large scale has been discovered against the Ghazi and the present Government. Over 150 arrests have, he states, been effected at Brussa and Constantinople. The persons arrested include Refet and Kiazim Kara Bekir Pashas and other Oppositionists. Independent tribunals are to be re-established forthwith.

(Repeated to Angora, No. 52.)

[E 6083/18/44] No. 55.

Mr. Edmonds to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 538.)
Sir, *Angora, December* 15, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the negotiations between the Ford Car Company and the Turkish Government in connexion with the establishment of an assembling factory to be erected in a free zone within the limits of the port of Constantinople, which were reported to the Department of Overseas Trade by the commercial secretary to this Embassy in despatches in his "B" series, have now been brought to a successful issue. A convention has been drawn up and signed which will, it is expected, be submitted to the Grand National Assembly for approval in the near future.

2. According to the local press, the principal provisions of the agreement are the following :—

(*a.*) The site of the factory will be treated as a free zone. It is intended to erect or assemble motor cars, tractors and aeroplanes in this zone.
(*b.*) All machinery and plant, together with the constituent parts of motor cars, tractors and aeroplanes to be assembled in the factory will be exempt from the payment of customs duties and of all other State taxes and duties on introduction into the free zone.
(*c.*) Motor cars, tractors and aircraft or other material introduced into Turkey from the free zone will pay the customs duties and other taxes to which imported goods are normally liable.
(*d.*) The factory, being within the free zone, will not be required to keep its books in Turkish, and will be exempt from the necessity of registering with the Turkish Chamber of Commerce and Industry and of becoming a member of that institution.
(*e.*) A permanent exhibition may be organised in the free zone, but no sales organisation may be set up therein, and all sales must be made, as hitherto, by the Ford Company's agencies in the country.
(*f.*) The Turkish Government will pay to the factory a bonus of 30 dollars on every car and tractor imported into the country from the free zone.
(*g.*) The zone will be created at Tophane on a site at present occupied by the "Seiri-Sefain Navigation Administration," which will hand over to the Ford Company the depots situated therein.
(*h.*) Turkish coal will be utilised in the factory, provided that it is available in sufficient quantity, that its exclusive use presents no technical difficulty and that its price is not greater than that of foreign coal.
(*i.*) The concession will have a duration of twenty-five years.
(*j.*) The Ford Company undertakes to start active operations nine months after taking over the site of the free zone.

3. The United States Chargé d'Affaires further informed me that the company proposed to employ 80 per cent. of Turkish labour from the start, and hoped to increase the proportion before long to 90 per cent. The daily output of cars would, he estimated, beginning at fifty, attain within a year the figure of 150. Messrs. Ford would, he added, transfer to Constantinople their present Trieste installation, and Constantinople would become the distributing centre for Italy and Russia as well as the Near East. It is, I think, noteworthy that a firm of the importance of Messrs. Ford should have ultimately selected Constantinople for this purpose; it has always been contended that Constantinople, by virtue of its geographical position, would be the most suitable centre of distribution for an area including Black Sea as well as Mediterranean ports, and Messrs. Ford, who have been making exhaustive enquiries for several months past with a view to the selection of a distributing centre, have, in deciding upon Constantinople, in preference to the Piræus or Varna, justified this view. A firm of their international standing and extensive resources, able to establish itself at whichever centre made the best offer, was naturally in a position to strike a more satisfactory bargain with the Turkish Government than a smaller undertaking could hope to do, and it remains to be seen how far Messrs. Ford's example will carry other firms in their wake and lead to a real revival of the port of Constantinople. In any case, while the tendency ever since 1922 has been for business to leave Constantinople for the Piræus, this is a very striking instance of business

preferring Constantinople to the Piræus or elsewhere. If the Turkish Government is now alive to the importance of Constantinople as a source of national wealth, this concession may mark the turn of the tide of the city's fortune.

4. In conclusion, I would add that there has been a long controversy between the Constantinople Quay Company and the Turkish Government in regard to the occupation and exploitation of the Tophane site by the Seiri-Sefain Steamship Administration and, later, by the Turkish Chamber of Commerce. The Quay Company has maintained that the utilisation of bonded stores within the limits of the port of Constantinople by any organisation but itself was a contravention of its concession, but the commercial secretary learnt some time ago that, although the transference of the Tophane site to the Ford Company was regarded, in principle, as infringing upon its rights, the Quay Company would not be, in practice, unwilling to come to a working arrangement with the American company.

I have, &c.
W. S. EDMONDS.

[E 6077/3269/65] No. 56.

Mr. Edmonds to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received December* 24.)

(No. 540.)

Sir, *Angora, December* 18, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to offer the following observations on the secret despatch of the 20th ultimo from the High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, of which Sir H. Dobbs has been good enough to send a copy to this Embassy.

2. So far as concerns the relations of this country with Russia, it may be said, with some confidence, that Russian influence in Turkey has been declining slowly but steadily since the settlement of the Mosul question in the summer of 1926. The Turkish Government is convinced of the failure of the Communist system in Russia. As has been reported by this Embassy from time to time, the Government has no use for communism in Turkey and employs the police and the law courts to keep in check such Communist propaganda as there is. While it does not fear military attack from the Soviets, it believes their grip on Russia to be strong and likely to endure. It much prefers this prospect to any possibility of a reactionary régime, which, it thinks, would renew the territorial ambitions of Imperial Russia.

3. While, therefore, its protestations of friendship for Russia are to be discounted heavily, the Angora Government has no doubt little intention of breaking with a friend. On the other hand, it is quite serious in its desire to modernise the country, and it realises that this can only be accomplished in sympathy with the Western Powers. So Tewfik Rushdi Bey continues to sit smiling on the fence.

4. No doubt counsels from Moscow still have considerable weight at Angora, but it would seem to be too much to believe that the relations between the two Governments are so intimate as to make some sort of Turco-Iraqi pact of friendship a doubtful benefit. So far as the situation can be viewed from here, advantage would appear to lie rather in encouraging Turkey to move in a larger orbit than that of Russia and, as a step in this direction, to establish somewhat closer relations with Iraq. A step tending towards the consolidation of Russia's neighbours, either internally or in their mutual relations, should proportionally contribute towards weakening the power of Russia for intrigue and intimidation in this domain.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the British High Commissioner at Bagdad.

I have, &c.
W. S. EDMONDS.

[I. 273/273/405] No. 57.

Notes on Armenian History.

Introduction.

THE world had been familiar with an Armenian question for nearly fifty years when the Great War began in 1914. The war and the upheavals that followed provided a solution so ruthless and complete that in its political meaning the question ceased to exist when the Treaty of Lausanne was signed in July 1923. All that remained then was the humanitarian problem of how the dispersed survivors of the Armenian race could be assisted and settled for the future.

The period between 1914 and 1923 saw, in fact, the greatest tragedy, both racially and nationally, of Armenian history. It saw the massacre and deportation of Ottoman Armenians on the greatest scale. It saw the race support the victors in the war, and saw a treaty of peace concluded, of which Armenia was a signatory as one of the victorious Allied and Associated Powers. It saw the hope for a wide, independent and free Armenian State, embracing much of the ancient homeland, grow, take definite shape and give promise of a greater and more prosperous future than had ever been held out to the race before. It saw these hopes dissolve and vanish when realisation seemed most certain. And in the end it saw the national fortunes of the Armenian people sink into an obscurity and hopelessness deeper than any touched in the long and chequered course of their history.

These were, indeed, remarkable vicissitudes, with a conclusion in such violent contrast with the sovereign fact of Allied victory as to be almost inexplicable, except by the theory of cynical indifference on the part of the Great Powers to the claims of a feeble ally. And yet, in truth, a charge of indifference would rest on no firm foundation.

Geographical Position and Configuration the Cause of Armenian Ill-Fortune.

It can be shown that the tragedy of 1914–23 was a disaster in direct continuation of similar vicissitudes and misfortunes that have ever beset the Armenian race, and that the deepest and permanent cause of this striking persistence of national ill-fortune is to be found in the geographical position and physical configuration of the territory claimed by Armenians as their homeland.

In position their territory lies across the base of the great and rich peninsula of Asia Minor, which extends to the west, while on the north and east of the Armenian region are almost limitless continental spaces, the breeding grounds of peoples to whom movement towards the south and west has always held promise of easier existence.

In configuration the Armenian territory is a lofty plateau on which are imposed mountain ranges having a general direction east and west. This allowed of comparatively easy communication between east and west, but made communication more difficult between north and south, and broke the surface into isolated areas having strong local interests and, to say nothing of rivalries, only feeble interests in common with the remainder of the region.

Owing to its geographical position, the plateau was crossed by immemorial continental routes of communication. They ran chiefly between Asia Minor in the west and Persia and Central Asia in the east, and between Caucasia in the north and Persia and Mesopotamia in the south. The course of each route was determined by the direction of the great valleys and the position of favourable mountain passes. By the operation of these natural causes the Armenian plateau, therefore, has always been peculiarly liable to invasion, not only by organised armies but, in earlier times, by migratory hordes. For the same reasons it has been a territory ever coveted by stronger adjoining Powers ambitious of conquest in lands beyond the plateau, or in order to safeguard their frontiers.

Early Armenian History.

Such considerations led the Medes and Persians to subject the Armenian territory to their rule 2,500 years ago. Rome followed the same example just before the Christian era, but accepted Armenia as a client State forming the extreme eastern outpost of the Empire.

According to Armenian records, Christianity was established as the national religion of the people in the year A.D. 301. In their conflicts that were to follow with

Moslem peoples, the fact that Armenians professed Christianity was to add religious hatred to the racial hatred with which Armenian and Moslem regarded each other.

In the 5th century A.D. the Persian Sassanids and the Eastern Roman Emperors solved their Armenian question by dividing the plateau between themselves. Here was an early illustration of the inherent and extreme danger in which Armenia lay whenever two Great Powers, inevitably rivals, faced each other across her territory. Recurring partitionment and divided sovereignty early became the destiny of the Armenian land.

An opportunity offered independence was reasserted in various parts of Armenian territory by the formation of small kingdoms, particularly that which, with Ani for its capital, became powerful in the 9th century. But the unfortunate configuration of the country worked always against the creation of a united and powerful Armenia. The mountain masses of the plateau prevented easy north and south communication, and there was no central fertile region, great enough in area and undivided by mountains, where a population of several millions might have established itself, dominated the whole race, and permanently attracted the more distant provinces of the plateau to a central government. In the absence of such a powerful consolidating influence, the Armenian tendency always was towards the formation of a number of petty independent kingdoms.

Incursion by Seljuk Turks: Armenian Migration Westward.

In the 11th century the Seljuk Turks, moving westward from their home in Trans-Caspian regions in search of more fertile territory, occupied much of the Armenian plateau. Under this pressure, a portion of the Armenian population, led by Senekherim, Sovereign of an Armenian kingdom which had its seat at Van, removed to Sivas, in the part of Asia Minor then known as Armenia Minor. Here, in the year 1071, Senekherim was glad to exchange the precarious independence he had enjoyed at Van for the comparative security and ease of the Byzantine Viceroyalty of Sebastia. The migration so begun was continued by a steady stream of Armenians in succeeding years, and in this way a considerable Armenian element established itself in the western part of the region sometimes called the "Six Armenian Vilayets" of the Ottoman Empire.

But a century later the Seljuk invaders reached Sivas, and in 1172 the city and the province passed under their rule. From the Seljuks, towards the close of the 14th century, Armenia Minor was taken by the Osmanli Turks, but they in turn lost it for a while to Timur, who captured Sivas in the year 1400.

The greater part of the Armenian plateau fell to the Osmanli Turks in 1514; thereupon they included Armenians in the community (or *Millet*) system, which remained in force till the time of the Great War.

In 1639 the Erivan part of the plateau was annexed to Persia, and remained under Persian sovereignty until the beginning of the 19th century.

Armenian Migration into Cilicia.

Meanwhile another Armenian migration, also due to pressure from the east, had laid the foundations in 1080 of a small Armenian kingdom in the south-east of Asia Minor. This became known as Lesser Armenia. At one time it included the Cilician plain up to the Taurus Mountains. This little kingdom, ever friendly to the Crusaders, maintained its independence against Byzantines, Turks, Arabs and Egyptians for about three centuries. It ceased to exist in 1375. Upon the historical foundation of Lesser Armenia was based the Armenian claim that the region should be included in the Greater Armenia asked for at the Paris Peace Conference.

Russia reaches the Armenian Plateau, 1828.

At the beginning of the 19th century the southward advance of Russia had brought her to the Armenian plateau. In 1829 she obtained possession of Erivan and a region that included a considerable Armenian population; thenceforward Russia may be said to have shared possession of the Armenian territory with Turkey.

The more recent history of the Armenian race is bound up with that of both Russia and Turkey. As long as it suited the purpose of Russia she championed the interests of Armenians against the Turks and used the ill-treatment of Ottoman Armenians as a means of furthering her own annexationist policy in Asia Minor. But she always endeavoured to suppress any movement in Russian territory in favour

of Armenian independence or which would encourage that ideal. Nevertheless, in Russian Armenia the race found an asylum, enjoyed safety, became generally prosperous, and on the whole were not dissatisfied with a Russian citizenship that gave them opportunities within the Empire.

Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78.

As a result of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78, Russia advanced her western frontier in the Caucasus at the expense of Turkey. Of the districts so acquired, two, Ardahan and Kars, were on the Armenian plateau; and although the Armenian population formed only a minority, these districts were regarded by Armenians as an addition to Russian Armenia. There were reasons also for supposing that the Tsar, Alexander II, contemplated granting some special form of government, or even autonomy, to an Armenia under Russian protection. But the project ended with his assassination in 1881.

Treaty of Berlin, 1878.

The Treaty of Berlin in 1878 required the Porte to carry out administrative reforms in the districts inhabited by Armenians. Article 61 contained the following clause:—

> "The Sublime Porte undertakes to carry out, without further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the Circassians and Kurds. It will periodically make known the steps taken to this effect to the Powers, who will superintend their application."

In other words, the Powers collectively, and Great Britain in particular (because of her acquisition of Cyprus), assumed a certain responsibility for protecting the Armenians against Turkish oppression. This was all very well, assuming that the Powers were united among themselves in insisting on the execution of the reforms. Events were to prove, however, that between enacting provisions in the treaty and securing the performance of such provisions lay a wide difference. The Porte had but to show that only armed coercion would compel it to effect the promised reforms and the unity of the Powers disappeared. Coercion of Turkey never suited the wider political interests of *all* the Powers; the application of compulsion by those who might have been willing to take that course was even more unwelcome.

Effect of German Ambitions in Turkey.

In 1883, for instance, though Great Britain and Russia might have been willing to apply coercion Bismarck refused German participation. Germany was, indeed, already developing definite ambitions in regard to Turkey, and as these became more and more clear cut they forbade any German action that might alienate Turkish friendship. These ambitions grew rapidly and soon acquired a sinister meaning for the future of Armenia. From the time that German policy adopted the great ideal of a German highway to the East through the Ottoman Empire, all chance of enforcing the Armenian reforms disappeared.

Russia's Anti-Armenian Policy, 1884.

After the death of the Tsar, Alexander II, the Russian Government adopted a Russianising policy, opposed to Armenian national aspirations, and essentially anti-Armenian in spirit and practice. A result was the formation of revolutionary societies in Russian Armenia for the purpose of supporting the cause of Armenian national existence. Not all these societies stood for armed methods; but the most powerful, the Dashnaksutiun, drew the line at nothing, and became notorious and dreaded for its recourse to assassination and every form of extreme violence. Nor were its activities confined to Russian territory; its ramifications and its outrages extended into the Ottoman Empire. The Porte was not slow to seize upon such actions as excuses for rigorous measures of repression against Turkish Armenians. In the series of massacres that occurred during the 'nineties and up to 1909, it was generally alleged that violence or provocation by the Dashnaks or other Armenian

Nationalist organisations had precipitated the outbreak. Undoubtedly the charge sometimes had a foundation of truth.

In 1895 Great Britain, France and Russia submitted a scheme of Armenian reforms to the Porte; but no coercion to enforce acceptance was possible as Russia, for one, would not proceed to extremes.

Turkish Revolution, 1908.

With the Turkish revolution of 1908 better days seemed to have dawned for Ottoman Armenians. They welcomed, and at first supported, the revolution. The ideal of an Ottoman citizenship in which all the races of the Empire should find equal opportunity and equal satisfaction was held out to them as the aim of the "Young Turk" revolutionaries. If carried into practice it would perhaps have solved the Armenian question in Turkey. But the controlling figures behind the revolution were, knowingly or unknowingly, seeking something else than an obviously Ottoman State. They desired that the State should wear the Turkish aspect; use the Turkish speech; that the non-Turkish races should abandon their individuality and become good Turks except in blood and faith. In fact, what they really sought was "Turkification." For their part the Armenians promptly rejected this as an ideal, and, with the other subject races, offered a strenuous resistance, first to the proffered "Ottomanisation," and then to the compulsory "Turkification" that the Government of Young Turks sought to impose. In 1909 the Cilician massacres showed that Turks and Armenians were as far apart as ever, the revolution notwithstanding.

Rise of pan-Turkism.

The disastrous wars of 1911–12–13 between Turkey and Italy, and Turkey and the Balkan States, marked the breakdown both of "Ottomanisation" and "Turkification"; and in 1912 the new ideal of pan-Turkism appeared. Opposition by the non-Turkish peoples to any policy prejudicing their separate racial existence had contributed to the disasters of the Empire; these races, it was held, were not worth considering; they were worse than encumbrances; they could go to the devil. The recreated State for which patriotic Turks were hoping must be formed by Turks alone. The goal was perhaps attainable, but only by a long road and a hard; the sooner, therefore, the reformers urged, the Turkish people set out upon it in deadly earnest, the better. The Turkish people took this road, and the fact that they had done so long went unrecognised in Europe.

The Armenians, however, were more alive to what was taking place. The territorial ambitions of the pan-Turks, which included the incorporation of the Moslem areas of Caucasia and North-Western Persia in a great Turkish State would, if carried to achievement, place the Armenian plateau, including Russian Armenia, under Turkish sovereignty and jeopardise the whole future of the race. The danger, though recognised, had seemed remote until the outbreak of war in August 1914. Then, however, it was clear that if, as seemed likely, Turkey sided with Germany against Russia, execution of the pan-Turkish plan would be attempted, and that if the *Entente* Powers were defeated the position of the Armenian race would become desperate.

The World War, 1914–18.

In furtherance of their aims the Turkish Government endeavoured to secure in advance Armenian support against Russia, particularly the support of Russian Armenians. But these attempts failed: Armenian leaders decided that if war should come their people in Turkey and in Russia should do their duty to their respective Governments.

Before Turkey actually entered the war the Russian Government are said to have held out to their own and Ottoman Armenians the prospect of an enlarged and autonomous Armenia under Russian protection. But when hostilities began, fearing that a successful defence of Caucasia by Armenian forces would dangerously inflame the nationalist aspirations of the race, they conveyed their Armenian troops, numbering some 150,000 men, to the Polish and Galician fronts, and brought other Russian troops into Caucasia. This precautionary measure had an unforeseen and disastrous result at a later stage of the war, when the presence of a large number of Armenian troops in Caucasia would have changed the whole immediate prospect of

Armenian independence. Their presence there might, indeed, have proved decisive in establishing the Armenian State of the subsequent Treaty of Sèvres.

Once the war had begun, all the hopes of Ottoman Armenians lay in the ultimate success of the *Entente* Powers. A cartoon in a Turkish comic paper of the time most accurately reflects the hopes and fears by which Ottoman Armenians were torn. "Where do you get your war news?" one Turk is made to ask another. "I don't need any," the other replies, "I watch the faces of Armenians. When they are happy I know the Allies are winning; when they are sad I know there has been a German victory."

After the defeat of the great Turkish offensive against Caucasia in December 1914 and January 1915, Armenians of the Turkish eastern districts were charged with having acted as spies and agents on behalf of Russia; Armenian bands, too, were said to have cut Turkish lines of communication. It is exceedingly likely that both charges were true.

These acts and general Armenian disaffection provided the ostensible excuse for the tragedy that followed. In 1915 the Turkish Government began and ruthlessly carried out the infamous general massacre and deportation of Armenians in Asia Minor. About 400,000 women and children escaped into Russian territory, others reached Persia, Mesopotamia and Syria; but the clearance of the race from Asia Minor was about as complete as such an act on a scale so great well could be. It is supposed that about 1¼ millions were effected, of whom more than half perished.

There is no reasonable doubt that this great crime was planned and executed for political reasons. The opportunity presented itself for clearing Turkish soil of a Christian race planted geographically between Turkish and Caucasian Moslems, a race opposed to all Turkish ambitions, and cherishing national ambitions of its own that could be satisfied only at the territorial expense of Turkey. It has been suggested, too, with a good show of probability, that the Gallipoli campaign precipitated and intensified the tragedy. That the pan-Turks were anxious to get the deed done and the Armenian element out of the way before the Allies should reach Constantinople and be in a position to prevent the clearance. That even if Turkey were destined to be knocked out of the war in 1915 a great advantage for the future of the Turkish people would have been achieved if the elimination of Armenians from Asia Minor had already been accomplished.

With the Russian capture of Erzerum in February 1916, and the subsequent occupation of Turkish territory in North-Eastern Asia Minor, Armenian hopes revived. It appeared inconceivable that the occupied region should ever revert to Turkey. Various signs pointed to the creation of a Greater Armenia, embracing much of the conquered territory, at the conclusion of the war. At all events it seemed clear that the war would result in advantage for the remnant of the Armenian race.

Russian Revolution, 1917.

These hopes were shaken by the Russian revolution of 1917. Russia was proclaimed a Federal Republic on the 15th September, 1917; five days later representatives of the Transcaucasian peoples—Georgians, Armenians, Tatars—similarly proclaimed Transcaucasia a Federal Republic. No more ill-assorted trinity of peoples ever proposed to act together. Georgians regarded Russians, whether Red or White, with hatred, and their feelings towards Armenians were scarcely less hostile, for national jealousies were involved. The Armenian attitude was favourable to Russians of any colour, hostile to Georgians, and fiercely opposed to Tatars as Moslems more or less in alliance with the Turks. The Tatars, for their part, detested Russians, but reserved their strongest hatred for Armenians. They looked to Turkey for support, and contemplated a form of union with that State somewhat in accordance with pan-Turkish plans. Their leaders were, in fact, temporising, for the prospect they liked least was that of being a Moslem minority in a federal republic that included the Christian States of Georgia and Armenia.

Early in 1918 the Russian army of the Caucasus abandoned the front in Asia Minor and dissolved into an armed rabble struggling to entrain for home. All Armenian national hopes now turned upon maintaining the line in Asia Minor abandoned by the Russians. Armenian elements of the Russian army, therefore, stood fast, and with the help of a number of volunteers succeeded for a time in holding back a Turkish advance. But the defenders never numbered more than 35,000 men; and when, in February 1918, after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk had ended the war between Russia and Germany and the Allies of Germany, the Turkish eastward

advance began in earnest, the Armenian line was overwhelmed. It was at this time that the use of Armenian troops on European fronts instead of in Caucasia had a result fatal to the hope of a Greater Armenia. These men, who would have had every interest in opposing the Turks, were dead or otherwise not available in Caucasia, when their presence might have changed the whole course of events. By the middle of May 1918, not only had the Turks recovered their territory lately occupied by Russia, but they had taken Batum and the two districts of Kars and Ardahan, claimed as part of Russian Armenia, and were preparing to advance to the Caspian. On the 26th May the Transcaucasian Federal Republic dissolved itself into the three Republics of Georgia, Erivan and Azerbaijan.

It did not suit German policy, then seeking to establish a German route through Caucasia, to the East, that Russian Armenia should fall to Turkey. In June 1918 Germany, therefore, procured that her own troops should occupy Georgia, and that Turkey should sign treaties of peace with the Republic of Georgia and the Armenian Republic of Erivan and recognise the independence of both. But under the latter treaty the Erivan Republic had to accept a Turkish occupation, and undertake to give free passage across her territory to Turkish troops proceeding to the Caspian basin.

The last stages of the Great War, therefore, saw the Armenian people reduced by massacre, losses of war, and the tremendous death rate of an enforced deportation adopted as an easy system of killing, to about two-thirds of its pre-war total. At the same time, although the independence of a small Armenian Republic had been recognised by its enemies, the whole of the Armenian plateau was overrun by Turkish troops, or was liable to occupation by them.

The Armenian Cause after the War.

At the end of October 1918 the Turks recognised defeat at the hands of the Allies, and the Armistice of Mudros came into operation on the last day of the month. The armistice provided for the occupation of Baku and Batum and the control of part of the Transcaucasian Railways by Allied forces, the evacuation of Persian and Caucasian territory by Turkish troops, and gave the Allies the right to occupy any part of the "Six Armenian Vilayets" in the event of disorders occurring therein. British troops took over Baku on the 17th November, and Batum on the 27th December, and subsequently the occupation was extended to the Georgian Republic. But neither British nor Allied troops ever occupied the Armenian Republic, nor any part of the "Six Armenian Vilayets." It has been called a disastrous oversight that Allied troops did not occupy these vilayets at a time when that might perhaps have been done without opposition. It can only be regarded as an oversight if the view be accepted that the Allies were willing, after hostilities had ceased, to undertake the tremendous commitment of a hostile occupation of the wildest and most inaccessible part of Asia Minor, in area more than a fourth of the whole, and to do so on behalf of a minority section of the population that had almost entirely disappeared.

The conclusion of the Great War relieved the Armenian Republic of Turkish pressure for a time, though conditions in Caucasia remained exceedingly disturbed. The region of the British occupation enjoyed some degree of order, but the three Republics of Georgia, Erivan and Azerbaijan, each claimed territory claimed by one or even both of its rivals, and desultory fighting between them could not always be prevented.

The future, too, of the republics was uncertain. His Majesty's Government refused to contemplate the retention of British troops in Caucasia except for the shortest possible time. With a view of creating a Caucasian barrier against Bolshevik Russia, British policy favoured the creation of a Federal Republic embracing all the Transcaucasian States; but the jealousies and animosities of the various people rendered this obvious course impracticable. For the time being, therefore, Caucasian problems had to await the decision of a Peace Conference engrossed in greater and more urgent matters.

It was, however, inevitable that the future of the Caucasian States should depend upon what happened in Russia. These little republics could not escape the influence of their geographical position in relation to Russia, an influence much intensified by the fact that the economic life of Russia was largely dependent on supplies of oil from Baku. In the absence of a unified Transcaucasia supported by some Great Power as mandatory, nothing was more certain than that, sooner or later, Russia, whether under a "White" Government or a "Red," would reassert her

authority over the quarrelling republics. But no Great Power would accept the political responsibility and financial liability inseparable from a mandate, though the United States of America and Italy, certainly, looked into the proposal. The truth was that the future of Transcaucasia, whether considered by the Peace Conference or by individual Powers, was seen to lie in the ominous shadow of Russia, and that this inescapable position strictly conditioned the problem.

General Denikin's Operations against the Bolsheviks, 1919.

At the beginning of 1919 efforts by "White" Russians to overthrow the "Red" Government of Russia introduced another distracting factor for the Transcaucasian States. General Denikin, supported by the Allied Powers, having mustered a "White" army in Ciscaucasia, expelled the Bolshevik forces from that region and prepared to advance on Moscow. He made no secret of his hostility to the Transcaucasian Republics as independent States, nor of his intention to bring them under Russian authority again; and he repeatedly encroached on the territories of Georgia and Azerbaijan.

In this situation the Armenians of the Erivan Republic never wavered in their policy of supporting Russia, caring little whether Russia were "White" or "Red." The army of the Republic counted itself part of Denikin's forces; Armenians at Baku, after the British evacuation in August 1919, supported the Bolsheviks.

All British troops were withdrawn from Caucasia by the end of August 1919, except from Batum, the evacuation of that town having been delayed until the 7th July, 1920. At this time Denikin's prospect of success was improving rapidly, and in October he was approaching Moscow with a large army. But during November and December his operations utterly failed, and by the end of April 1920 the Bolshevik Government of Russia was again in complete possession of Ciscaucasia, had landed a Bolshevik army in Baku, had established in Azerbaijan a Soviet Republic subservient to Moscow, and had thus opened a way for imposing similar Bolshevik control on the Georgian and Armenian Republics. In January 1920 the Allied Powers gave *de facto* recognition to the Armenian Republic of Erivan.

Effect of the Greek Landing in Smyrna, May 1919.

Meanwhile, events had happened in Turkey destined to exert a fatal influence on Armenian prospects. The landing of the Greeks at Smyrna in May 1919 completely changed the Turkish situation with which the Allied Powers had to deal. Until the Allies by this act committed themselves to aggrandising Greece on the mainland of Asia Minor, the Turkish people had accepted defeat as a decree of fate. After the landing at Smyrna they did so no longer. The spell fell away from them. They could see no decree of fate, nothing they could not themselves withstand, in an invasion of Greeks; they felt themselves quite competent to throw the invaders into the sea. However submissive they had been to the Allies before, they became, after May 1919, a people resolved to make every effort and endure every extremity in preserving their national heritage against Greek conquest. All unknown at the time, Allied policy in sending the Greek army to Smyrna was to result in the expulsion of the whole Greek race from Asia Minor, and, incidentally, in the final destruction of Armenian hopes for a Greater Armenia.

Encouragement of Armenian Expectations by the Allied Powers.

That, however, lay in the future, unforeseen. During 1919 Armenian hopes ran high, buoyed up by the firm expectation that the Great Allied and Associated Powers would in the end establish an enlarged and independent Armenia. The Armenian people had, it must be admitted, ample ground for their confidence. In his declaration of British war aims, made on the 5th January, 1918, Mr. Lloyd George had specifically mentioned Armenia as an area of the Ottoman Empire entitled to "recognition of separate national conditions," and had added that "it would be impossible to restore Armenian territory to its former [Ottoman] sovereignty."

President Wilson, too, in his speech of the 8th January, 1918 (three days after Mr. Lloyd George's declaration), in which he laid down his "Fourteen Points," had declared in the 12th of the "points" that ". . . . the other [non-Turkish] nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development . . . ."

He was more emphatic in his speech of the 11th February, 1918, enunciating his "Four Principles." The President had said then ". . . . national aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. Self-determination is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action . . . ." And in the last of his "Four Principles" he had declared that: "All well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them. . . . ."

These utterances may not have been explicit pledges to the American people, but they went a good way in that direction, and they were confirmed and supported by the Treaty of Versailles, signed on the 28th June, 1919. In the Covenant of the League of Nations embodied in that treaty, article 22 contains the following words:—

> "Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory, until such time as they are able to stand alone. . . . ."

Armenians were not named, but there could be no question that the Armenian community was one of those implied.

Armenian hopes had also been encouraged by the visit to Armenia, in the latter half of 1919, of a military mission under General Harbord, sent by the American Government to examine the problems involved in a mandate for Armenia and Transcaucasia. That the report of the mission (dated the 16th October, 1919) had much to do with the American refusal even to consider a mandate for Armenia was a later development.*

The Treaty of Sèvres, August 1920.

When at last the Allied Powers came to drafting the Treaty of Peace with Turkey they did not overlook the claims of the Armenian people to favourable consideration. But the more the question of these claims was considered, the more difficult it was seen to be. A sincere desire existed to put the national existence of the Armenian ally on a firm basis; but how that was to be achieved became a problem that baffled satisfactory solution. No Power would accept the position of mandatory; nor could the Powers which declined be reproached for refusing a mandate that would have been more dangerous, costly and thankless than any other in the disposal of the Peace Conference. On the 12th March, 1920, the Supreme Council offered the mandate to the League of Nations. But the League, too, for all its goodwill, refused the task. In the end the Allied Powers could do nothing better than confide the future of a Greater Armenia to treaty obligations assumed by a Turkish Government under compulsion.

Greater Armenia and President Wilson's Arbitration.

The Armenian Republic of Erivan and those who represented the Armenians of Turkey had agreed to make common cause in prosecuting Armenian claims. In the Treaty of Sèvres, therefore, signed on the 10th August, 1920, the Powers compelled Turkey to recognise an as yet undetermined Armenia as a free and independent State. And in article 89 they laid it down that Turkey must submit to "the arbitration of the President of the United States of America the question of the frontier to be fixed between Turkey and Armenia in the vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis, and to accept his decision thereupon, as well as any stipulation he may prescribe as to access of Armenia to the sea." The frontiers between Armenia and Georgia and Azerbaijan were to be settled by mutual agreement.

The fact that President Wilson's arbitration was to be confined to the four vilayets named definitely excluded Lesser Armenia (or Cilicia) from whatever territory he might finally award to the enlarged Armenian State. Doubtless, it would have been unwise, in the absence of a mandatory Power, to create an Armenia of

* The report made it clear that a mandate for Armenia and Transcaucasia alone was impracticable. It showed that for the scheme to be workable it was essential that the same Power should, in addition, be mandatory for Anatolia, the Straits and Constantinople. The vast responsibilities and obvious dangers of such an increased task were seized upon by the opponents of President Wilson's policy; and whatever sympathy may have existed in the United States in favour of accepting a mandate for Armenia was speedily overwhelmed by alarmed public opinion.

unwieldy area; but a more potent reason for the exclusion was that this region had already been assigned to France, first by the Sykes–Picot Agreement of May 1916, and then, in part, by the Treaty of Sèvres. It may be remarked, however, that in order to obtain the assistance of Armenians against the Turkish Nationalist forces that invaded Cilicia in 1920, the French held out to them the prospect of Lesser Armenia being formed into an autonomous Armenian State under the protection of France.

The Government at Constantinople accepted and signed the conditions of the Treaty of Sèvres; but they were already a Government without power. Asia Minor, including the territory ear-marked for Greater Armenia, was by that time under the control of the so-called "rebel" Nationalists and a leader whose genius was not as yet recognised.

The award of President Wilson was made known in December 1920. The frontier he defined gave Armenia, roughly, the Turkish territory which had been occupied by Russian troops until they disbanded themselves under the influence of the revolution. The territory to be ceded contained an area of some 45,000 square miles, and possessed a coast-line to the Black Sea of about 200 miles, extending from Georgian territory to a point 60 miles west of Trebizond. It included the important towns of Erzerum, Erzinjan, Van, Mush and Bitlis, and, as port, the historic city of Trebizond. This substantial block of territory, added to the Republic of Erivan, made up an Armenian State with an area of nearly 60,000 square miles.

Justice to the Armenian race had been allowed to prevail against all considerations of ethnical right. The Turkish area assigned to Armenia included Turkish Lazistan with its population of Moslem Lazis; furthermore, in the whole of the area to be ceded were no Armenians, they—a minority before the war—having fled or been killed or deported. It is true that the area contained some 200,000 Christian Greeks, but even if these were added to the Armenian population of 1¼ millions in the Republic of Erivan, the Armenian-Greek population of the new State would be outnumbered by Moslems. It was expected, however, that the latter would gradually leave after the territory had been ceded.

Treaty of Sèvres rendered Inoperative by Rise of Nationalist Turkey.

But President Wilson's award had only an academic interest by the time it was issued. The intention of the Allied Powers, avowed in the Treaty of Sèvres, to aggrandise Greece, create a Greater Armenia and transfer part of Cilicia to France, all at the expense of Turkey, had directed Turkish Nationalist opposition against the treaty as a whole. The Nationalists would have none of it. They stood for resisting execution of the treaty whether by Greeks, French, Armenians or the array of all the Allied Powers. In this attitude of defiance they received support from Soviet Russia, and, later, even from France and Italy.

In January 1920 Nationalist forces attacked the French in Cilicia, drove them out of the Marash district, and massacred many thousands of Armenians. From this time, the Treaty of Sèvres and the professed sympathy of the Allied Powers notwithstanding, the fortunes of Greater Armenia and the Armenian people had rapidly declined.

Bolshevik Troops Invade the Armenian Republic, May 1920.

In May 1920 Bolshevik troops from Azerbaijan invaded the Republic of Erivan, and by August had compelled the Government to sign a disadvantageous treaty with Soviet Russia. It mattered little that at the same time *de jure* independence of Armenia was recognised by the Principal Allied Powers.

Armenian Republic Overrun by Turkish Nationalist Troops, September 1920.

In September 1920 the Republic of Erivan was invaded by a Turkish Nationalist army. The purpose of this aggression, obviously undertaken with the approval of Soviet Russia, was to recover for Turkey the Province of Kars, held by the Armenian Republic since the Turks evacuated Caucasia under the terms of the Armistice of Mudros. As in Cilicia, Turkish military operations here were made the opportunity for massacring many thousands of Armenians. The conditions of peace imposed by the Turks included the cession not only of the district of Kars but of Alexandropol as well—thus reducing the area of the republic by more than half.

A Bolshevik Government Established in the Armenian Republic, December 1920.

These severe terms did not, apparently, suit the Russian Soviet Government. A Bolshevik rising was organised in Erivan; the pro-Ally Government were overthrown; a Bolshevik Government were installed on the 2nd December, 1920, and in all but name the Erivan Republic passed under the control of the Russian Soviet.

Russia Determines Terms of Peace between Turkey and the Armenian Republic, October 1921.

The republic having been placed in this position, Russia saw to it that Turkish peace terms should be modified, and in the peace between Erivan and Turkey concluded in October 1921 Alexandropol was restored to the Armenians. Russia also contrived that Turkey and the Moslem Republic of Azerbaijan should be separated by Armenian territory.

France and Nationalist Turkey conclude the Agreement of Angora, October 1921.

Expectations raised that a small autonomous Armenian province might eventually be established in Cilicia under French protection disappeared at the same time. Pressure in Cilicia and Syria by Turkish National forces involved an increasing and intolerable strain on the French people. In October 1921, therefore, France, by the Agreement of Angora, recognised the Nationalist Turkish Government, undertook to evacuate Cilicia completely, and, further, to cede to Turkey some 9,000 square miles of Northern Syria. These conditions were duly executed.

The Armenian Republic Incorporated in the Russian Union of Soviet Republics, December 1922.

Early in March 1921 Georgia, also, was forced to become a Soviet republic. A year later—in March 1922—the Russian Bolshevik Government carried their Transcaucasian plans a step further by compelling the three Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Erivan to federate as the Transcaucasian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic. The final step was taken on the 30th December, 1922, when the Transcaucasian Federal Republic was incorporated in the Russian Union of Soviet Republics.

Armenian Interests in the Treaty of Lausanne, July 1923.

Perhaps the most significant proof of how completely the hopes of the Armenian people for a Greater Armenia, or even for such a poor substitute as an "Armenian National Home," were dashed is afforded by the Treaty of Peace between the Allied Powers and Turkey, signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923.

In this treaty the words "Armenia" and "Armenians" do not even occur. Armenians as non-Moslems, however, are included in the provisions of the treaty relating to minority and non-Moslem races.

As a matter of interest it should be noted that during the discussions at Lausanne repeated efforts were made by representatives of the Allies to persuade the Turks to create an Armenian National Home in Turkish territory, but that the suggestion was vehemently opposed by the Turkish delegation and came to nothing.

During the four years and two months between the Armistice of Mudros of the 30th October, 1918, and the incorporation of Transcaucasia in the Russian Union of Soviet Republics in December, 1922, the hopes of the Armenian people and the bright prospect of a Greater Armenia raised by the collapse of Russia and the defeat of Turkey, had therefore passed from high promise to definite extinction.

That this failure of Allied policy in regard to Armenia was closely bound up with the Greek failure in Asia Minor cannot well be denied. But it is scarcely to be supposed that, had the Greeks overthrown the Turkish Nationalists and reached Angora in September 1921, Greater Armenia, even if it had come into being, would have escaped ultimate domination and annexation by Russia. Geographical position and the whole history of the Armenian plateau oppose the conjecture that in the presence of an adjoining Great Power an Armenia of the 20th century, unsupported by another Great Power, would have long remained independent.

W. J. CHILDS.

Foreign Office, December 28, 1928.

[E 6167/43/44] No. 58.

Mr. Edmonds to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received December* 31.)

(No. 548.)

Sir, *Angora, December* 21, 1928.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 504 of the 26th ultimo, I have the honour to report that Signor Grandi, accompanied by his wife, arrived here on the 18th instant after spending a day at Constantinople. He met with a very warm official welcome. He was received by the Ghazi and the Prime Minister. The latter entertained him at luncheon. The Minister for Foreign Affairs gave in his honour a big dinner at the new hotel and afterwards a ball, to which the Diplomatic Corps was invited. The next night much the same dinner and ball were given in the same place by the Italian Ambassador. At the first of these dinners formal speeches were exchanged. Tewfik Rushdi Bey spoke of the two countries' mutual policy as being based on a common interest in peace and consolidation and on mutual confidence. He referred to Signor Grandi as having inspired that policy and carried it out. In reply, Signor Grandi struck a note which could not fail to please when he said that Italy could understand Turkey because both countries had had the same political experience in recent years. Each had made sacrifices for independence. Each had, in the time of crisis, found a great leader with a firm hand and an iron will.

2. The press has for some time past been indulging in laudatory remarks about Signor Mussolini, Fascism, Italian institutions in general and Italian policy. It has now welcomed Signor Grandi in cordial terms and has regarded his visit as a noteworthy mark of the close understanding which now exists between the two countries. The semi-official "Milliet" declares that, although certain countries may affect to think otherwise, Italo-Turkish friendship can but make for peace in the Mediterranean.

3. It has been suggested that Signor Grandi's real purpose was to discuss Turco-Greek or even Turco-Albanian relations. These subjects may have been touched on, but there seems to be no reason to think that Signor Grandi's primary purpose was more than to return the visit which Tewfik Rushdi Bey paid to Italy earlier in this year. Italo-Turkish relations have—on the surface, at any rate—changed completely since the signing of the treaty. Signor Orsini-Baroni seems to have succeeded in convincing the Turks that they have nothing immediate to fear from Italy. The Turks' suspicions appear to have been replaced by a degree of confidence. This confidence is probably entertained with definite reservations, but it suits Turkish policy, particularly while there are questions pending with France and Greece, to make much of the new friendship.

4. Signor Grandi left Angora yesterday intending to return straight home and to visit Athens early in the new year. Standing bareheaded in the sleet, slush and dark at the station, he assured Tewfik Rushdi Bey that he could not find words to express his feelings.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome.

I have, &c.

W. S. EDMONDS.

[E 6168/128/44] No. 59.

Mr. Edmonds to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received December* 31.)

(No. 549.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December* 27, 1928.

PUBLIC interest has been considerably stirred during the past week by rumours of the discovery of a large-scale plot against the present régime. The first information that reached this Embassy on the subject came from the "Times" correspondent. I would refer in this connexion to Mr. Troutbeck's telegram No. 61 of the 20th December from Constantinople. Since then the air has been full of rumours, but authentic information is less easy to obtain, and I have purposely refrained from cross-questioning Turkish officials on the subject.

2. Two points, however, may, I think, be stated with conviction: the first is that the Government took a serious view of the development; otherwise it would hardly have forbidden all reference to the matter in the press for the first twenty-four

hours, nor be still inspiring the press to protest so vehemently that the affair is of no importance. Secondly, the Government clearly has the situation now in hand, and the only question before it is to decide upon the punishment fit for the crime. In any case, I was informed on excellent authority that there is no question of reconstituting the independence tribunals for the purpose.

3. The full measure of censorship was withdrawn after the first day, and the press has since been full of disconnected and somewhat contradictory accounts of the story. Its chief *motif*, clearly inspired by the Government, is to minimise the seriousness of the whole affair. Thus, it denies that any persons of note, such as Refet and Kiazim Kara Bekir Pashas, were implicated or that those arrested were in any relationship with the ex-Sultan's family, as early rumours had suggested; it declares that there was no connexion between the arrests at Brusa and those at Constantinople, and that the arrests at Brusa were nothing more than the natural result of an attempt to set free a Circassian bandit from the gaol; it is inclined to ignore the events at Brusa, which seem to have been the more serious, and to concentrate upon those at Constantinople, where it states that some fourteen persons are now under arrest and cross-examination on the ground of illegal reactionary activities. The persons arrested in Constantinople, it states, belong almost exclusively to a single family, the head of which is a drawing-master aged 70; the worst suspicions, however, fall upon a younger member of the family, named Kadrié Hanum, who was recently discovered to have visited Angora in possession of a revolver. But the reports that have hitherto filled the pages of the press are so incoherent as to render any intelligible account impossible.

4. As regards the events at Brusa, I have had the advantage, thanks to the courtesy of the French Embassy, of hearing the story as reported by the French consul at that city, and it is on this report that I chiefly base my belief that the affair was more serious than the Government or the press would have one believe. According to this report, military measures of a precautionary nature had been taken a month ago at Brusa, which was always something of a reactionary centre and harbouring, as it does, a prominent reactionary in the person of Nureddin Pasha, a retired general, was believed to be the headquarters of a secret anti-Government society. These measures were reinforced last week, and, with the assistance of the military authorities, over a hundred persons were arrested, including priests, soldiers, the governor of the prison and certain persons who attempted an assault upon the prison with the object of setting political prisoners free. Machine-gun posts were then placed round the prison and the town was patrolled at night. This is a very different story from that given by the Turkish press.

5. I have received no confirmation of the original report that such figures as Refet and Kiazim Kara Bekir Pashas were among those first arrested, and in the absence of such confirmation I am inclined to believe the denials of the press. But whether or no these men were implicated, one thing stands out clear. Reaction is not dead in the country, and the Government still has need of the mailed fist to carry out its programme of reforms. It is inevitable that a reform of so fundamental a nature as the compulsory abolition of the Arabic characters must give rise to discontent, more especially among the religious-minded, to whom Arabic is the sacred language. Any weakness on the part of the Government would undoubtedly prompt the malcontents to assert their beliefs, and it is possible that the recent movements in Afghanistan may have suggested the occasion for the present plot. Those who hate the Government, however, lack cohesion, and most of their leaders are abroad. Consequently, Mustafa Kemal's Government seems to have as firm a hold on the country as ever.

I have, &c.
W. S. EDMONDS.

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